State v. Diaz
2016 S.D. 78
| S.D. | 2016Background
- In November 2009 a badly burned body (16‑year‑old Jasmine Guevara) was found in the trunk of a car; autopsy showed she was burned alive. Two occupants identified from Walmart surveillance were Alexander Salgado (21) and Maricela Diaz (15 at the time).\
- Police arrested Diaz and Salgado; both waived Miranda rights (Diaz in Spanish) and gave statements implicating themselves in luring, stabbing, placing Guevara in the trunk, dousing the car with lighter fluid, and setting it on fire.\
- Juvenile court denied Diaz’s suppression motion and transferred her case to adult court after considering statutory transfer factors (seriousness, premeditation, prosecutive merit, prospects for rehabilitation, etc.).\
- In adult court Diaz’s earlier statements were initially suppressed by the circuit court but this Court reversed that suppression in State v. Diaz (Diaz I). A jury convicted Diaz of first‑degree murder and related counts; some counts were later dismissed by the trial court.\
- Diaz was sentenced to 80 years with no time suspended (parole eligibility after ~40 years); she appealed raising transfer, suppression/reconsideration, jury instructions on duress/imminent fear for abused juveniles, and proportionality/Miller/Graham‑related sentencing challenges.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Diaz) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Transfer to adult court | Juvenile court properly weighed statutory factors (seriousness, premeditation, prosecutive merit, safety, rehab prospects) and made supported findings | Transfer relied on flawed testimony (Salgado’s transfer‑hearing testimony later recanted at trial) and questionable expert opinions; Diaz’s youth, abuse, and rehab potential favored juvenile jurisdiction | Affirmed transfer: findings supported by Diaz’s statements, physical evidence, and expert testimony; recantation at trial did not erase transfer‑hearing record |
| 2) Reconsideration of Diaz I (suppression reversal) | This Court’s prior Diaz I decision was correct; no basis to reconsider under post‑Miller/Montgomery jurisprudence | Court should reconsider Diaz I in light of juvenile‑specific protections and interrogation tactics (lighter fluid on table) and changed facts (Salgado’s recantation) | Denied reconsideration: Diaz I properly applied special care to juvenile confession issues and Court considered interrogative facts previously |
| 3) Jury instructions on duress/imminent fear for abused juvenile | Standard duress/Battered Woman instructions and jury charge referencing a "reasonable person in her situation" adequately connected juvenile/battered context to the legal standard | Requested instructions emphasizing heightened perception of imminent danger for an abused child were necessary; refusal prejudiced defense | Affirmed: instructions as a whole correctly stated law and allowed jury to consider juvenile status and battered‑woman evidence; no distinct juvenile duress standard required |
| 4) Sentence proportionality / Miller/Graham challenges | 80‑year term (with parole eligibility after ~40 years) is within permitted statutory range for juveniles sentenced to term of years and not a de facto life without parole; court considered youth/mitigating factors | 80 years (beyond life‑expectancy) is grossly disproportionate, effectively life without parole, and violates Eighth Amendment precedents protecting juveniles | Affirmed sentence: trial court considered mitigating qualities of youth; sentence not grossly disproportionate and not a de facto life without parole given parole eligibility |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Diaz, 847 N.W.2d 144 (S.D. 2014) (this Court’s prior opinion reversing suppression of Diaz’s statements)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (U.S. 2016) (juvenile sentencing and retroactivity principles for Miller)
- Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (U.S. 2012) (mandatory life without parole for juveniles unconstitutional; courts must consider mitigating qualities of youth)
- Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (U.S. 2010) (juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses cannot be sentenced to life without parole)
- Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (U.S. 2005) (death penalty unconstitutional for crimes committed as juveniles)
- Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (U.S. 1983) (Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis)
- Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (U.S. 1991) (limits of Eighth Amendment disproportionality review)
- State v. Chipps, 874 N.W.2d 475 (S.D. 2016) (framework for state proportionality review)
- State v. Rice, 877 N.W.2d 75 (S.D. 2016) (characterization of homicide gravity)
- State v. Springer, 856 N.W.2d 460 (S.D. 2014) (analysis on whether long term sentences are de facto life sentences)