State v. Dennis John Halseth
157 Idaho 643
| Idaho | 2014Background
- On Nov. 5, 2012, Idaho law enforcement identified and pursued a truck with stolen plates; the driver (Dennis Halseth) fled and was later stopped and arrested in Washington.
- A Washington trooper, after Halseth refused field sobriety tests, transported him to a Spokane hospital where technicians drew blood over his verbal objections; no warrant was obtained.
- Idaho charged Halseth with DUI (a felony based on prior convictions) and moved to suppress the warrantless blood results; he did not dispute probable cause for the arrest.
- The State conceded McNeely prevented a per se exigency rule based on alcohol dissipation and did not assert exigent circumstances; instead, the State relied on Idaho/Washington implied consent statutes and prior Idaho precedent treating implied consent as authorizing blood draws.
- The district court granted suppression, reasoning McNeely requires case‑by‑case exigency analysis and that implied‑consent statutes do not automatically permit nonconsensual warrantless blood draws when the subject objects.
- The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed, holding implied‑consent statutes do not authorize involuntary warrantless blood draws after a motorist withdraws or objects to consent.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a state implied‑consent statute authorizes a warrantless involuntary blood draw when a driver objects | Implied‑consent statutes (Idaho/Wash.) constitute statutory consent that justifies warrantless blood draws; earlier Idaho precedent treated implied consent as encompassing blood tests | Objecting driver withdrew consent; implied consent cannot be treated as irrevocable authorization to bypass the Fourth Amendment | The court held implied‑consent statutes do not justify a warrantless blood draw once the motorist withdraws or objects; suppression affirmed |
| Whether consent to search may be withdrawn, making the implied consent ineffective against the Fourth Amendment | Implied consent is statutory acceptance that binds the driver and permits testing without a warrant | Consent must be voluntary and can be withdrawn; refusal/objection defeats any implied consent as a Fourth Amendment exception | The court held consent must be voluntary and may be withdrawn; by objecting the defendant revoked implied consent and the warrantless draw was unreasonable |
Key Cases Cited
- Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957) (upheld nonwarranted blood draw reasoning then applicable pre‑Mapp)
- Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (incorporation of Fourth Amendment to the States)
- Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (permitted warrantless blood draw as exigent incident to arrest due to alcohol dissipation)
- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent must be voluntary)
- State v. Bock, 80 Idaho 296 (1958) (Idaho precedent on compelled blood tests prior to Mapp era)
- State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368 (1989) (Idaho held alcohol metabolism could create exigency justifying warrantless blood draw pre‑McNeely)
- State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300 (2007) (held implied‑consent statute includes blood draws; did not address withdrawability of implied consent)
- Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013) (rejected per se exigency rule based on alcohol dissipation; exigency assessed case‑by‑case)
- Aviles v. State, 385 S.W.3d 110 (Tex. App. 2012) (Texas court upheld warrantless involuntary blood draw under implied‑consent statute; later vacated and remanded by U.S. Supreme Court in light of McNeely)
