State v. Demetrius Cope (074206)., 135 A.3d 562

Background

Police executed an arrest warrant at Cope’s second-floor apartment; officers knocked, heard commotion, and arrested Cope in the living room. A sliding door opened onto an adjacent back porch.
Sergeant Brintzinghoffer conducted a protective sweep of the bedroom, bathroom, and porch; on stepping onto the porch he saw and opened a camouflage rifle bag and seized an assault-type rifle and ammunition.
Cope was charged with second-degree possession of a weapon by a person previously convicted; he moved to suppress the rifle as the product of an unlawful search.
Cope’s defense was that a former employee, Dante Santiago, placed the rifle on the porch; Santiago executed a notarized statement confessing responsibility and was willing to testify.
At a Rule 104 hearing the trial court excluded Santiago’s statement and prospective testimony as factually impossible because records showed Santiago was incarcerated on the arrest date; the jury convicted Cope.
The Appellate Division reversed (suppressing the rifle and excluding third-party evidence); the Supreme Court affirmed suppression ruling reversal (rifle admissible) but reversed the conviction reversal, holding exclusion of Santiago’s evidence was an abuse of discretion and remanding for retrial.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Validity of protective sweep and seizure of rifle	Sweep was lawful under Buie; porch immediately adjoined arrest site so officers could cursory-inspect and seize contraband in plain view	Sweep lacked reasonable/articulable suspicion; no evidence someone hid on porch so entry/search exceeded Buie limits	Sweep of immediately adjoining porch was permitted; plain-view seizure upheld — suppression denied
Exclusion of third-party-guilt evidence (Santiago)	Santiago’s account was impossible because jail records place him incarcerated on the arrest date; exclusion prevented perjured testimony	Santiago’s timeline was uncertain; his notarized confession and willingness to testify created a jury question about credibility	Trial court abused discretion by excluding Santiago; proffered confession/testimony not “patently impossible” and jury should assess credibility — reversal and remand for retrial
Standard for excluding third-party confessor	Court may bar testimony that is demonstrably false to avoid perjury	Defense: only truly impossible claims (e.g., irrefutable alibi) justify exclusion; otherwise admissible and impeachable	Only when a proffered confession is so patently false (e.g., documents of unquestioned authenticity proving impossibility) may a judge exclude it; that standard was not met here
Admissibility of defendant’s prior convictions on retrial	Prior- convictions admissibility was proper under then-existing law	On retrial, new N.J.R.E. 609 governs admissibility	On retrial, apply current N.J.R.E. 609 to any impeachment by prior convictions

Key Cases Cited

Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (protective-sweep doctrine; cursory inspection of spaces immediately adjoining arrest site)
State v. Davila, 203 N.J. 97 (2010) (state elaboration of Buie; reasonable articulable suspicion required for wider sweeps)
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (compulsory-process/due-process right to present a complete defense; exclusion of critical third-party confession may violate fairness)
State v. Jamison, 64 N.J. 363 (trial court cannot bar a witness from confessing to the crime)
State v. Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225 (third-party guilt evidence admissible if it creates reasonable doubt)
State v. Fortin, 178 N.J. 540 (2004) (standard that third-party evidence need only be capable of raising reasonable doubt)
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (plain-view seizure where criminal nature of item is immediately apparent)
State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210 (plain-view doctrine elements under New Jersey law)