947 N.W.2d 182
Wis. Ct. App.2020Background
- Dawn Prado was injured in a December 2014 fatal crash, transported unconscious to a hospital, and a police officer ordered a warrantless blood draw while she was intubated.
- The officer relied on Wisconsin’s implied consent statute, specifically its incapacitated-driver provision, which deems drivers to have consented and presumes incapacitated drivers have not withdrawn that consent; no warrant was obtained.
- The blood test detected alcohol and controlled substances; Prado moved to suppress the result, arguing the provision is unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.
- The circuit court suppressed the test result; the State appealed. The Court of Appeals stayed the matter while higher courts addressed related questions.
- The Court of Appeals held the incapacitated-driver provision unconstitutional (implied consent alone does not satisfy the Fourth Amendment), but reversed suppression because the officer acted in objective good-faith reliance on then-settled Wisconsin law.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Prado) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the incapacitated-driver provision (statutory implied consent for unconscious drivers) satisfies the Fourth Amendment | Statutory implied consent authorizes warrantless blood draws; drivers consent by choosing to drive on Wisconsin roads | Implied consent cannot supply constitutional consent for an incapacitated person; provision is unconstitutional | Provision is unconstitutional: statutorily implied consent alone does not satisfy any Fourth Amendment exception |
| Whether statutorily implied consent satisfies the traditional consent exception (voluntariness under Schneckloth) | Implied consent is voluntary because driving is a voluntary choice; no additional inquiry required | Voluntariness requires totality-of-the-circumstances analysis at the time of the search; implied consent cannot substitute | Rejected State: Birchfield and Mitchell require totality-of-the-circumstances; implied consent alone is insufficient to prove voluntariness |
| Whether implied consent is an independent warrant exception (i.e., created by statute) | Wisconsin courts long recognized implied consent; courts should treat it as its own exception to the warrant requirement | Federal precedent does not recognize a statutory exception; courts must not create new categorical exceptions | Rejected State: Court will not recognize a new independent warrant exception for statutorily implied consent; federal precedent declined to do so |
| Remedy: whether the blood-test result should be suppressed or admitted under good-faith/exigent circumstances | Even if provision unconstitutional, evidence should be admissible because officer reasonably relied on the statute; alternatively, exigent circumstances may justify the draw | If the provision is unconstitutional, suppression is required absent an applicable exception | Suppression reversed: court finds officer acted in objective good-faith reliance on then-settled Wisconsin law, so evidence admissible; exigency not decided (good faith dispositive) |
Key Cases Cited
- Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (blood draws are Fourth Amendment searches requiring justification)
- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent exception requires voluntariness under totality of the circumstances)
- McNeely v. Missouri, 569 U.S. 141 (2013) (exigency for warrantless blood draws must be judged case-by-case; no per se dissipation rule)
- Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016) (breath tests may be search incident to arrest; blood tests are more intrusive and consent voluntariness must be evaluated)
- Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525 (2019) (fractured decision remanding for exigency analysis; plurality suggested exigency "almost always" in unconscious-driver cases)
- State v. Wintlend, 258 Wis. 2d 875 (2002) (Wis. Ct. App.) (earlier decision treating implied consent as satisfying Fourth Amendment; overruled by federal precedent)
- State v. Padley, 354 Wis. 2d 545 (2014) (Wis. Ct. App.) (interprets implied consent as not independently authorizing searches; focuses on actual consent at scene)
- United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (good-faith exception to exclusionary rule for reliance on then-settled law)