State v. Davis, 261 P.3d 1197

Defendant was convicted of murder and manslaughter for injuries to his 15‑month‑old daughter, with autopsy revealing abdominal and brain injuries and several prior fractures.
Autopsy indicated acute injuries within 24–36 hours of death and possible older injuries; death ruled homicide.
Trial court excluded evidence of prior physical abuse and certain lay/experiential testimony from Payne; defense theory posited a preexisting, days‑old injury causing later events.
Court of Appeals reversed exclusion of Payne's statement that the victim resembled Payne's brain‑injured daughter four days before death, but affirmed other evidentiary rulings.
Supreme Court granted review to resolve admissibility and harmlessness of excluded evidence and to interpret the relevance standard; court affirmed in part and reversed in part the Court of Appeals, remanding for further proceedings.
Core issues center on admissibility and relevance of Payne’s observations, lay opinion under OEC 701, and expert testimony explaining causal timing of injuries.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Payne’s June 25 statement to Ecklund that the victim reminded her of her daughter—admissible?	State argued testimony was hearsay or irrelevant to June 29/30 injuries	Davis argued the statement showed Ecklund’s knowledge of prior brain injury and supported defense theory	Trial court did not err in excluding the statement
Payne’s lay opinion that the victim looked like her brain‑injured daughter on June 25—admissible under OEC 701?	Payne’s observation aided understanding and supported timing theory	Lay opinion should be excluded as speculative	Court held Payne’s lay opinion admissible; trial court erred in excluding it; not harmless
Evidence of prior injuries/abuse for purpose of expert testimony—admissible under OEC 703/705?	Prior injuries relevant to basis for experts’ opinions that death predated June 29	Evidence would be confusing and not tied to a specific author of injuries	Trial court erred in excluding prior injuries; not harmless; reversed
Harmless error standard applied to evidentiary rulings—proper framework?	Walton bifurcated test; evidence likely affected verdict	Single‑criterion analysis focusing on likelihood of affect on verdict	Oregon’s single inquiry standard governs; in this case, errors were not harmless; reversed

State v. Salas‑Juarez, 349 Or. 419 (Or. 2010) (low bar for relevance; evidence need only tend to prove a fact of consequence)
State v. Sparks, 336 Or. 298 (Or. 2004) (relevance and evidentiary standard for exclusion/acceptance)
Barzingus v. Wilheim, 306 F.3d 17 (10th Cir. 2010) (arbitration standard comparison to other evidentiary standards)
Lerch, 296 Or. 377 (Or. 1984) (lay opinion admissible when rationally based on perception)
State v. Wright, 315 Or. 124 (Or. 1992) (lay opinion on appearance and intoxication admissible)
State v. Walton, 311 Or. 223 (Or. 1991) (harmless error standard (two‑part traditionally))
State v. Davis, 336 Or. 19 (Or. 2003) (clarified harmless error framework; single inquiry rather than bifurcated test)
State v. Hansen, 304 Or. 169 (Or. 1987) (recognizes constitutional framework for harmless error analysis)
State v. Parker, 317 Or. 225 (Or. 1993) (discussed timing/conviction standards for timing in homicide cases)
State v. Yielding, 238 Or. 419 (Or. 1964) (illustrates date as a material element when charged with specific timeframe)