State v. David M. Gibson (070910), 218 N.J. 277

Background

At ~3:20 a.m., Officer Comegno observed David Gibson momentarily leaning against the upraised porch of the Omega Community Center; a “no loitering” sign was posted in a window facing the porch.
The officer believed the porch area was private curtilage, the neighborhood was high-crime, and the center’s president had requested police checks for mischief.
Gibson walked away as the patrol car approached; the officer drove around the block, intercepted him, and asked for ID and whether he had permission to be on the property.
The officer perceived Gibson as “very excited” and “somewhat evasive,” concluded Gibson intended to commit defiant trespass, arrested him, and searched him; no contraband was found on-scene.
At the stationhouse a more thorough search uncovered 13 bags of crack cocaine; Gibson moved to suppress claiming the arrest lacked probable cause.
Trial court denied suppression; Appellate Division affirmed; New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, holding the record lacked sufficient evidence of probable cause for defiant trespass and suppressed the stationhouse evidence.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was there probable cause to arrest Gibson for defiant trespass (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3(b))?	State: Totality (leaning on porch, high‑crime area, owner complaints, Gibson’s evasive demeanor, failure to claim permission, and “no loitering” sign) gave a well‑grounded suspicion/probable cause.	Gibson: “No loitering” warns against lingering, not brief entry; his momentary leaning and explanation (waiting for a ride) do not support probable cause — arrest was arbitrary.	No — record insufficient to support probable cause for defiant trespass; arrest unconstitutional.
Does a “no loitering” sign satisfy the statute’s notice requirement for defiant trespass?	State/App. Div.: Yes — owner’s intent to exclude can be reasonably conveyed by “no loitering.”	Gibson: No — loitering and trespassing have different meanings; sign did not warn that a brief entry/leaning would be prosecutable.	No — “no loitering” ordinarily communicates prohibition of lingering, not the notice required to criminalize even a brief entry.
Was the stationhouse search lawful as incident to arrest?	State: Search incident to arrest exception permitted a full search at stationhouse following arrest.	Gibson: Search invalid because arrest lacked probable cause; alternatively, he should've been permitted to post bail before stationhouse procedures.	No — search was incident to an unconstitutional arrest and its fruits must be suppressed; Court did not decide bail argument.
Did the trial court’s factual findings merit deference?	State: Trial court credibility findings for officer should be deferred to; probable cause finding stands.	Gibson: Even with deference, facts and inferences were not objectively reasonable to support probable cause.	Although credibility findings are entitled to deference, the probable‑cause conclusion was clearly mistaken given the record.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Dangerfield, 171 N.J. 446 (setting limits on stops/arrests for trespass and rejecting flight alone as sufficient)
State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13 (distinguishing consensual field inquiries from investigative stops)
State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502 (standards for consensual encounters and questioning)
State ex rel. J.M., 339 N.J. Super. 244 (App. Div.) (reversing trespass arrest where facts didn’t support probable cause; suppressing evidence)
State v. Basil, 202 N.J. 570 (description of probable cause as more than suspicion but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt)
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (probable cause defined as reasonable grounds for belief of guilt)
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (totality‑of‑the‑circumstances approach to probable cause)
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (search‑incident‑to‑arrest doctrine)