State v. Danny Ray Sowell, 12-15-00038-CR

Danny Ray Sowell was prosecuted for misdemeanor DWI; jury trial commenced and Sowell cross-examined State witness Trooper Brady Lunceford.
During cross-examination the trooper gave explanatory answers rather than simple yes/no responses; defense counsel objected and sought a court instruction and a sidebar; the judge refused to direct the witness and admonished defense counsel for hostility.
After more than thirty additional questions and answers, the prosecutor sought a hearing and then moved for a mistrial based on counsel’s statements and alleged hostility; the trial court granted the mistrial in front of the jury.
Sowell filed a pretrial writ of habeas corpus arguing double jeopardy barred retrial because the mistrial lacked manifest necessity; the habeas court granted relief.
The State appealed, arguing the mistrial was justified by potential juror bias from defense counsel’s remarks, that less drastic alternatives were considered, and that retrial should not be barred.
The Court of Appeals reviewed whether the trial court abused its discretion in declaring mistrial, concluded there was no manifest necessity, held the trial court failed to consider less drastic alternatives (e.g., contempt), and affirmed the habeas court—retrial barred by double jeopardy.

Issue	State's Argument	Sowell's Argument	Held
Whether mistrial was supported by manifest necessity so retrial is permitted	Counsel’s hostile remarks created substantial risk of juror bias; mistrial appropriate	Mistrial unnecessary; court’s hostility and counsel’s objections preserved error and did not justify mistrial	Trial court abused discretion; no manifest necessity; retrial barred
Whether trial court considered less drastic alternatives before declaring mistrial	Admonishing counsel showed court considered alternatives	Court could have used contempt or other remedies instead of mistrial	Court did not reasonably consider less drastic alternatives; mistrial improper
Whether prosecutor’s motion for mistrial was timely and specific	Motion accepted though made after substantial testimony	Motion was untimely—made after 30+ Q&A and after harm could accumulate	Motion untimely; distinguishes Arizona v. Washington and Pierson on timeliness
Whether defendant’s comments warranted automatic reversal or precluded cure by admonition	Comments allegedly so prejudicial no instruction could cure	Comments preserved error and did not inject inadmissible evidence; admonition or contempt could cure	Remarks did not involve inadmissible evidence; cure was available; mistrial not justified

Ex parte Wheeler, 203 S.W.3d 317 (Tex. Crim. App.) (standard for reviewing habeas rulings)
Ex parte Martin, 6 S.W.3d 524 (Tex. Crim. App.) (de novo review when no disputed facts)
Pierson v. State, 426 S.W.3d 763 (Tex. Crim. App.) (trial court abuses discretion if it declares mistrial without considering less drastic alternatives)
Ex parte Garza, 337 S.W.3d 903 (Tex. Crim. App.) (manifest necessity is a heavy burden; limited to extraordinary circumstances)
Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (U.S. Supreme Court) (deference to trial judge when mistrial based on prejudicial remarks; facts permitting retrial)
Griggs v. State, 213 S.W.3d 923 (Tex. Crim. App.) (mistrial motion must be timely and specific)