State v. Daniel W. E.
142 A.3d 265
| Conn. | 2016Background
- Victim (daughter) alleged repeated sexual assaults by her father, Daniel W. E., from ages ~6–9; she delayed reporting until 2009.
- At trial defendant convicted of two counts of first‑degree sexual assault and one count of risk of injury to a child; sentenced to 25 years plus 20 years special parole; appealed.
- State presented constancy witnesses (friends/family) who testified the victim had earlier told them about the abuse; defense objected to scope and the jury instruction.
- Trial court admitted constancy evidence under Connecticut law limited to corroborating the fact and timing of complaints (Troupe / Conn. Code Evid. §6‑11(c)) and gave a limiting instruction; defense raised instructional and doctrinal challenges on appeal.
- Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, held the jury instruction accurately stated existing law, but modified the constancy doctrine prospectively to reduce potential prejudice from multiple constancy witnesses.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Daniel) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether jury instruction on constancy evidence misled jury | Instruction followed Troupe/Code and was adequate; not reasonably probable jury was misled | Instruction used “corroborate” and dense language that could let jury treat constancy as substantive proof | Instruction was proper and not misleading; affirmed conviction |
| Whether constancy of accusation doctrine should be abandoned/modified | Doctrine still needed to counter juror bias against delayed reporting | Doctrine outdated given public awareness; multiple constancy witnesses unduly prejudicial | Doctrine retained but modified prospectively to limit prejudice from multiple witnesses |
| Scope of admissible constancy testimony | Admit out‑of‑court complaints to corroborate fact/timing/identity (per Troupe) | Limit to minimal details or exclude multiple witnesses; define “corroborate” more clearly | Maintain Troupe limits but change when constancy witnesses may be offered (see holding) |
| When prosecution may call constancy witnesses | As part of state’s case to negate inference from delayed reporting | Should be allowed only for first complaint or upon trial court discretion; exclude if not impeached | New rule: victim may testify about prior complaints; prosecution may call constancy witnesses only if defendant challenges victim’s credibility regarding delay or out‑of‑court complaints; otherwise exclude and give jury instruction about reasons for delay (prospective application) |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Troupe, 237 Conn. 284 (1996) (modified fresh‑complaint rule: constancy evidence admissible only to corroborate fact/timing and limited details necessary to associate complaint with charge)
- Commonwealth v. King, 445 Mass. 217 (2005) (upheld special rule admitting first‑complaint evidence to counter juror bias; reviewed literature on juror attitudes)
- State v. Madigan, 199 Vt. 211 (2015) (rejected fresh‑complaint doctrine as independent rule; apply ordinary evidentiary principles)
- State v. Samuels, 273 Conn. 541 (2005) (precluded admission of constancy testimony about complaints made after official police report)
- People v. Brown, 8 Cal.4th 746 (1994) (reexamination of fresh complaint doctrine; allowed out‑of‑court complaints under general evidentiary standards)
- State v. DeWolf, 8 Conn. 93 (1830) (early adoption of fresh‑complaint doctrine)