State v. Dai'Vonte E'Shaun Titus Ross, 531 S.W.3d 878

Ross was charged by information with disorderly conduct under Tex. Penal Code § 42.01(a)(8) for "display[ing] a firearm in a public place in a manner calculated to alarm" (300 block of Ferris Ave., June 8, 2016).
Ross moved to quash, arguing the information failed to allege an essential element: the particular manner/means by which the display was "calculated to alarm," denying fair notice and his ability to prepare a defense in an open-carry jurisdiction.
At the hearing, the trial court gave the State an opportunity to amend; the State declined and the court granted the motion to quash for lack of specificity.
The State appealed, arguing the information was sufficient because it tracked the statutory language and that details of how the display alarmed others are evidentiary and not required in the pleading.
The Fourth Court of Appeals reviewed de novo whether the information provided constitutionally sufficient notice and affirmed the trial court, holding that the undefined, variable term "alarm" required more specific pleading than mere statutory tracking.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether an information that merely tracks § 42.01(a)(8) provides constitutionally sufficient notice	State: statutory text suffices; factual manner is evidentiary, not required in the information	Ross: statutory term "alarm" is vague/indeterminate; must plead specific manner/means so defendant can prepare a defense	Court: Tracking statute alone is insufficient because "alarm" is an undefined, variable term requiring more specific pleading

State v. Barbernell, 257 S.W.3d 248 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (charging instrument must give fair notice to enable defense preparation)
Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (tracking statutory text usually sufficient unless statute lists alternative manners/means)
Mays v. State, 967 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (undefined, indeterminate terms in statute require more specific pleading)
May v. State, 765 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (term "alarm" in harassment context held inherently vague)
Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (U.S. 1971) (ordinance using "annoy" unconstitutionally vague; conduct subjective across observers)
Kramer v. Price, 712 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1983) (Texas harassment statute vague for using terms like "annoy" and "alarm" without specifying whose sensibilities matter)
Smith v. State, 309 S.W.3d 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (distinguishes evidentiary facts from necessary pleading allegations)
Ex parte Poe, 491 S.W.3d 348 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2016) (rejected vagueness challenge to § 42.01(a)(8) by finding ordinary meaning of "alarm")