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Curry v. State
30 S.W.3d 394
Tex. Crim. App.
2000
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*1 judgment of the trial court is af- firmed. J.,

KELLER, point concurs in of error joins

one and opinion. otherwise

WOMACK, J., delivered a concurring

opinion. J.,

WOMACK, concurring. join

I judgment I the court. do agree appellant’s that the fifth point of briefed,

error inadequately see ante at I n. 2. would appellant’s hold that the

challenge to the of the evi-

dence, fact, as a matter of has no merit. Troy CURRY, Appellant,

Steven

The STATE of Texas.

No. 1521-99. Appeals

Court of Criminal of Texas.

Sept. *2 allegation.

clude this conclude that allegation, once the State made this it had it. We also conclude sufficiency of the must be ana- evidence lyzed using phrase. And in con- *3 analysis, this the ducting we find evidence to support Curry’s sufficient conviction.

FACTS Jetterson Williams testified that he was parking Nightclub the lot of the Spices at 8 p.m. Curry about when and two other “put” him car individuals into a and drove off. He testified that not want he did to car, Curry be in the car. inWhile the up Curry beat him with his hands. twist- punched ed Williams’ knee and arm and in the Williams head. Williams did not length beating, recall the whether any stops, Curry the car made him, anything Curry said or whether got gun any a at time. Williams admitted previously telling police Curry that had him car, Curry dragged that and the brick, men other had beaten him with a Curry up put that had tied him and a plastic bag face, Curry over his had a gone by friend’s house and obtained a .38 pistol, Curry had the car at one exited Freeman, Houston, appel- Charles for point gun- and Williams had heard three lant. shots, Curry had and forbidden Horn, Jeffrey L. Van First State’s Asst. anyone to tell to what had hap- Williams Paul, Austin, Atty., Atty., Matthew State’s pened. for the State. Williams then that he never testified police gun, a Curry told the had OPINION car, Curry gotten had out or that KEASLER, J., opinion delivered the im- Curry had threatened him. The State P.J., Court, McCORMICK, in which credibility peached Williams’ with the MANSFIELD, KELLER, PRICE, and previously that he had made to statements HOLLAND, J.J., WOMACK, joined. and cross-examination, police. On Curry The State’s indictment of Steven Williams testified that he had no recollec- charged aggravated kidnapping anyone him with anything tion of he said to from the “by deadly was thrown in ear until using and to use time he Curry’s a firearm.” namely, hospital. force Over time he awoke On re- examination, that, objection, permitted trial court admitted direct Williams incident, in a placed State to this trial be- after he was hold- delete after gan. Curry We must decide whether trial over cell with and had been con- deletion, trial, allowing safety. court and for his Later erred cerned and got in- back on the stand testi- analysis whether a should Williams ... Williams person Curry “abduct[ed] who Jetterson Curry not the fied that consent, intent to up. prevent and him his kidnapped him beat without using threatening to and his liberation by emergency medi- Williams was found firearm, on deadly namely, a use force district. cal technicians a warehouse bodily with intent to inflict and [Williams] his up pants He was tied with his around and terrorize injury [Williams] uncontrollably. shaking ankles and was and abuse and violate [Williams] knee a dislocated hospitalized He was sexually.” [Williams] head, elbow, gross trauma to the instability. case, it moved rested its After the State

Tracy using he phrase “by testified that saw threat- Jacobs to delete the night similar-looking namely, fire- getting out of force ening use *4 Curry holding arm, a gun. car and shot the indictment. [Williams]” on from individual, to killed then returned over granted another trial that motion The court car car off. testi- the and the drove Other objection. Curry’s had mony Curry’s that home revealed that appeal, appeals the court of held On bur- day before. The burglarized been the 28.10(b) the under Art. for it was error by broken his home break- glars had into motion, the grant court State’s trial to suspected that ing Curry down door. the Curry.1 Curry’s On suf- the error harmed responsible burglary. for the Williams was ficiency point, appeals the court of held routinely a thief petty Williams was who was sufficient to that the evidence convict.2 jewelry Spices sold at the He stolen Club. discretionary re- Curry petition filed a for had several theft convictions. argued the view in which he that court Curry an alibi John presented defense. sufficiency by analysis in its appeals erred working testified that he was on McCalep to v. State.3 We failing apply Malik Curry’s p.m. front door about from court and remanded the case the agreed He that p.m. night. about 11 testified Curry’s sufficiency appeals to reconsider apartment or Curry either was light Malik.4 point nearby Curry the entire time. testified remand, appeals again the court of On similarly. ruling trial court’s found testimony The State refuted that the indictment motion amend State’s testimony Floyd, Curry’s of Cynthia Curry.5 the error harmed was error and girlfriend at time. She testified sufficiency the court con- analysis, In its time apartment she at the the entire was theory that it was “bound cluded door, McCalep working while on the as amended.”6 alleged the indictment 7 or 8 Curry apartment left around nor jury charge given neither the Since testi- p.m. and never returned. She also required proof the amended indictment Curry say fied her to that she told firearm, found Curry a the court used evening. with him that support convic- the evidence sufficient to tion.7 BACKGROUND PROCEDURAL petitions Curry filed Curry

The for Both the State aggravated indicted review, which we discretionary from alleged The kidnapping. indictment (Tex Curry 177-79 5. v. Curry 1. 205-06 1998). 1999). .App. App. Paso Paso — El — El 2. Id. at 207. Id. at (Tex.Crim.App.1997).

3. 953 S.W.2d (Tex.Crim. S.W.2d 629 1998). App. granted Legal grounds. Background three The through Attorney Prosecuting the State Both the U.S. Constitution and the County Attorney, and the Harris District guarantee Texas Constitution an accused phrase contends that the issue “to right be informed the nature and surplusage, unnecessary indictment was against cause of accusation” him.8 The indictment, so the permitted State was charging convey instrument must suffi language to “abandon” the even after trial prepare cient notice to allow the accused to began. Curry argues that the court of Legislature provided defense.9 has appeals analysis, adequacy its some guidance erred as to the of notice Malik, Chapter 21 Code of through of the Crimi hypothetically under nal In particular, Procedure.10 Art. 21.03 jury charge correct would have included provides that “[everything should be stat improperly which the State was ed in is necessary an indictment which allowed to abandon. Since the resolution proved.”11 of Curry’s depends claim on our resolution contention, of the State’s we address the An generally indictment is suffi State’s claim first. provide cient to notice if it follows the

statutory language.12 But tracking the language may statute be insufficient *5 MODIFICATION OF INDICTMENT if statutory language completely the not is Initially, that we note this case does not descriptive, particularity so that more is really an involve an “abandonment” of alle- required provide example, to For notice.13 gation. was to permitted The State delete when a statute defines the manner or its specific allegation regarding type the of means of commission several alternative result, sought prove. abduction to it As ways, an indictment will fail for lack of permitted it at prove was trial to either if specificity neglects identify it to which of definition of abduction. Rather than “los- statutory the it means addresses.14 On the deleted, hand, ing” essentially it allegation the it plead other the State need not evi- allegation retained al- matters.15 dentiary and the added abduction, giving ternative definition of it every in a Not list of alternatives statute the to opportunity prove either one or- will or constitute “manner means” of der to By deleting obtain a conviction. the committing example, the offense. For did, words it State actually the broadened State, v. we the Thomas held State need scope alleged the of the offense so as to allege statutory which definition of include both theories of abduction. This is prove it seeks to in a theft case.16 “owner” “abandonment,” not like a standard which We reached this conclusion because the results in at limiting the State its theories “go term did to an act “owner” or 17 trial. refer of We will to the deletion the Similarly, omission the defendant.” phrase in this case as a modification the we held the State need not further define indictment, consent,” than phrase rather an abandonment. “without effective as I, VI.; 8. U.S. 13. Ibid. Const., Amend. Tex. Const. Art. § 10. Mays, 14. 967 S.W.2d at 407. 404, (Tex. Mays,

9. State v. 967 S.W.2d 406 1998). Crim.App. State, 800, (Tex. Berg 15. v. 747 S.W.2d State, 846, 1984) Ferguson Crim.App. (op. 10. v. 622 S.W.2d reh’g). on (Tex.Crim.App.1981) (op. reh’g). on (Tex. v. Thomas Proc Art. 21.03. Tex.Code Crim. 1981) (op. reh’g). Crim.App. Olurebi v. 1994). Crim.App. defendant, and charge against or act did not constitute an are to indictment detriment part defendant.18 without omission on contrast, may held be surplusage, v. we as mere Ferguson treated exception to allege, in the face of entirely disregarded.”27 did need to State unnecessary method of deliv- “the matter quash, a motion to which rule is when delivery in a ery legally it to that which is es- sought prove descriptive of is This prosecution.19 Upchurch controlled substance charge a crime.”28 sential by “the delivery act language extra we crimi- eonstitute[d] [defendant] of the of- “descriptive” of element is nal conduct.”20 if it the offense more nar- “define[s] fense placets] specific setting, it in a rowly, State,21 we recently, in More Saathoff which it was the method describe[s] concept beyond acts extended language “must committed.”29 Such There, we held omissions to conduct.22 needlessly though even alleged, as proven of a allege, must in the face the State stated.”30 quash, type motion to intoxication invol prosecution it seeks to in a con- important distinguish It two untary manslaughter.23 argued The State fails to cepts. Whether an indictment that intoxication was not an act or omis entirely is an charge an offense all sion, merely a condition. We held from the indict- different issue interpreted concept of “act provide adequate fails notice ment narrowly.24 too We concluded omission” quash.31 subject to a motion to is therefore prohibited “[i]f the conduct is statuto today only with what are concerned rily more man defined include than one provide no- allege the indictment commission,” ner or means of the State tice to the defendant. *6 allege, upon timely request, which manner or means it seeks establish.25 Application in this alleges the State evi- To determine whether the Sometimes our cases dentiary matters in was review surplusage, its indictment case we majority of our proved” surplusage. are not to be under vast “necessary language Art. allegations surplusage 21.03. These are consid cases involve State,26 any ered from statute. those “surplusage.” Burrell v. not derived cases, at un- “allegations language we essen issue is either not offense, be necessary language tial that need not to constitute the might entirely affecting descriptive language that must proved32 be omitted without 18. Id. at Id. at 161. 27. 802. Ferguson,

19. 622 at S.W.2d 850-51. 28. Ibid. State, 638, 20. Id. at 850. Upchurch v. S.W.2d 641 29. 703 1985). (Tex.Crim.App. 1994). (Tex.Crim.App. 21. 891 S.W.2d 264 640, Burrell, citing 526 at Id. at S.W.2d 30. 1.07(a)(10) (conduct § 22. 802. Penal Tex. Code accompany- act or and its means an omission state). Olurebi, ing n. 5. mental 870 S.W.2d at 62 31. 130, State, (Tex. 23. at Eastep 891 S.W.2d 941 S.W.2d 135 v. (abandonment ap Crim.App.1997) some of permissible propriations Id. at 266. in theft indictment remaining appropri aggregate value of where State, $20,000); Swope still over v. ations was 1991) (State (Tex.Crim.App. 442 805 S.W.2d notice, allege, provide defen- (Tex.Crim.App.1975). need not acts 26. 526 S.W.2d 799 400 20.01(2)(B). proved though needlessly cally, § only

be even al- Penal Code leged.33 surplusage have handful of cases con- cerning statutory language. of hand, Some

inBut the language case at at statute, comes directly specifi- issue from those that statutory language cases hold charged party property by dant as committed which con case that was "owned Karen manner stituted or means which he solic unnecessary alleged, Johnson” was but once ited, directed, encouraged, primary aided proved, presumably had to be because it was actor); State, 937, Mays v. 726 S.W.2d 941-42 State, descriptive property); of Polk v. 749 1986) (Tex.Crim.App. (allegation of conduct of 813, (Tex.Crim.App.1988) (allega S.W.2d 816 person surplusage another was and need not grand tion that was individual "unknown” to proved any be because not did describe con jurors descriptive was of element of "anoth defendant’s); Upchurch, supra (allega of duct er,” alleged, proved); so once had to be Huff "exempt" tion vehicle was was not de State, 155, (Tex. man v. 726 S.W.2d 156-57 scriptive any of element of offense of failure Crim.App.1987) (allegation of "Black Hat responsibility maintain financial so was unnecessary descriptive Bar” was "li surplusage proved); Carberry and need be premises” alleged, censed so once had to be State, 701 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) S.W.2d 255 State, 631, proved); Wray v. 711 S.W.2d 634 (excessive markings by bank on tenor of (Tex.Crim.App.1986) (allegation "by pointing alleged forgery check indictment were sur- Mary weapon said Ann Henderson” plusage proved); parte and need be Ex Williams, 876, (Tex.Crim. descriptive was an 622 of element S.W.2d 877 App.1981) (allegations bodily credit injury, card abuse other with imminent so once State, indictment “owned card was com alleged, proved); had be Clark v. 665 plainant” complainant” and stolen "from 476, (allega (Tex.Crim.App.1984) S.W.2d 484 surplusage proved, were and need not be even tion that used defendant instrument "known State, though alleged); Hardie v. psychological as a stress de evaluator” was 936, (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (allegation 938-39 offense, scriptive element of of “instrument" culpable surplusage mental state was proved); alleged, so once to be had Franklin proved need not be offense); where not an element of 1983) (Tex.Crim.App. Smallwood v. S.W.2d (unnecessary allegation that defendant knew 1979) (Tex.Crim.App. (allegation in rob Herzberg property from was stolen Elmer L. bery property indictment stolen was descriptive property of stolen element pair "three surplusage women's slacks” was offense, alleged, proved); so had once to be property taken not essential element (Tex. Windham v. S.W.2d proved, though offense so even need not be Crim.App.1982) (phrase "by shooting at her alleged); Green v. 578 S.W.2d 411 gun” allegation amounting with a of act Crim.App.1979) (allegation in criminal mis preparation to more than mere so had to property indictment chief was "seven *7 State, proven); Garcia v. 595 S.W.2d 533 County” miles north of Palo Pinto was unnec (Tex.Crim.App.1980) (allegation that defen essary descriptive legally and not of what was steal, “take, appropriate carry essential, dant did and surplusage, so and was need not be away” unnecessary alleged, was but once had proved, though alleged); Ferguson even v. State, 521, State, proved); (Tex.Crim.App. 572 524 to be v. S.W.2d Weaver 551 S.W.2d 1978) (word 1977) security "copy” (allegation gun tenor of (Tex.Crim.App. on in 419 that surplusage and indictment was need not be "Ruger” descriptive was a was of offense); descriptive proved offense, of not weapon alleged, so once element of State, (Tex.Crim.App. v. 626 Davis 532 S.W.2d State, proved); had to be Rowland v. 523 1976) (allegation money robbery of stolen in 1975) (Tex.Crim.App. (allegation S.W.2d 676 surplusage proved was and need not be where descriptive "upon "on F.M. 1632” was of alleged indictment also automobile was stolen offense, public highway” of element so once robbery prosecution require proof did not State, proved); alleged, had to be Cohen v. alleged property all the was that len); in fact sto 950, (al (Tex.Crim.App.1972) 479 S.W.2d 951 le State, 168, v. Collins 500 S.W.2d 169 12,300 gation "in the block of Westheimer 1973) (Tex.Crim.App. (allegation of value unnecessary, descriptive "in Road” was but of surplusage, only $5.00” "over as statute re Houston, Texas,” city an of of element $50.00); quired value be below v. Malazzo offense, alleged, proved); so once had to be State, 29, 31, 308 S.W.2d 165 441 Tex.Crim. State, 263, S.W.2d McClure v. 296 163 Tex. (1957) (allegation $25” value "in excess of of (1956) (allegation Crim. 650 "at the Alamo surplusage proved). and need not be Cafe located at Cleveland and Second State, 718, descriptive Streets” was of location element Langston S.W.2d 855 721-22 alleged, proved). (Tex.Crim.App.1993) (allegation trespass had in offense so once to be

401 But evidentiary an matter.38 merely if hold was proved alleged.34 be Others must language is sur- of a statutory that excessive that in the face we also indicated The need plusage proved.35 notice, not be for quash motion to lack authority relies on this latter line of State alle- required to make this would be State statutory lan- contention that the for its to conflict reasoning This seems gation.39 surplusage here guage alleged was evidentiary holding Thomas’s with proved. not been need have in the not even alleged matters need be already contrary to the quash.40 have held motion to But since We face of a position precise to this regard State’s in was that the indictment holding Porter Gibbons, aggra- In held in an statute. we defective, fundamentally the state- not was must kidnapping vated case that the State merely dicta. regarding notice are ments quash, face of allege, a motion Porter’s, issue holding is irrelevant to the prove.36 type of abduction it seeks dicta, us, it refutes though and its before argues holding Gib- The State that our State, not does questionable. is Porter incorrect, Berg, was conflicts with bons conflict with Gibbons. Porter;37 Ward, parte and Ex and should argues Berg41 con- The also State disagree. We be overruled. Berg we stated flicts with Gibbons. Porter, we need held that the State “appropriate” need not be that the term “forgery” it allege not which definition of The contends further defined.42 State prove. seeks to contends State the same. and “abduct” are “appropriate” no But “forge.” different than “abduct” itself is not disagree. Appropriation the allegations Porter concerns the State Rather, Penal Code. defined make in order for an indictment must in which describes circumstances Code an offense. concern allege It does not appropriation is unlawful.43 We allegations make needs to Berg acquisition that the “manner of in order to did state provide notice. We forgery surrounding acquisition particular definition of circumstances 688, and would 34. Thomas v. is within definition "restrain” 753 S.W.2d Crim.App.1988) (allegation surplusage); did S.W.2d that owner Jackson v. be 897, give unnecessary (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (allegation his "assent in fact” public” descriptive open effective element of lack of "was then to the habitation consent, proved); alleged, unnecessary burglary so once had to be indictment so 685, alleged). Reynolds proved, though 686-87 even need not (Tex.Crim.App.1986) (statutory alternatives restraint, moving type vic Gibbons, 652 S.W.2d at 415. place confining tim from one victim, to another or alleged must be in face of motion to (Tex.Crim.App.1992) 37. 827 S.W.2d quash); Gibbons v. (op. reh’g) (State (Tex.Crim.App.1983) allege *8 prove type in which of abduction it seeks to 38. Ibid. quash), part, to overruled in face of motion State, 707 Adams v. S.W.2d 902-03 39. (error Crim.App.1986) not result in auto does reversal); at Ferguson, S.W.2d matic 622 Thomas, 621 S.W.2d 161. 40. at (State allege type of deliv 850-51 ery to to it seeks in face of motion Berg, 809. quash). Ibid.; Coats but see (allegation Berg, 747 S.W.2d at 809 (term (Tex.Crim.App.1986) appropriate 520 appropriation was owner’s effective "without defined); 643 must be Coleman v. of theft was not element of offense consent” (same); (Tex.Crim.App.1982), 124 S.W.2d surplusage proved, so was and need not (Tex.Crim. 681 S.W.2d Gorman alleged); though even Ward v. (same). App.1982) 1982) (false (Tex.Crim.App. S.W.2d allege imprisonment indictment need not consent”; 31.03(b). § phrase 43. Tex. Penal Code restraint was "without merely evidentiary are matters.”44 We importantly, More there are no statuto McClain, relied on McClain v. State.45 In ry alternative manner or means for the we acquisi that the manner of “without consent” element of restraint. tion is irrelevant under the Penal Code.46 Restraint restricting per is defined as a earlier While versions of the Code had set son’s movement without pre consent while out distinct theft offenses based on the venting his liberation in either of two acquisition, manner of the current Code ways.52 Restraint is not restraint unless it removes that entirely.47 focus is without consent. Since there are no consent,” alternatives to “without there

The term “abduct” is different from would be no need for the State make First, “appropriate.” “appropri- unlike allegation provide in an ate,” indictment “abduct” is defined in the Penal given notice. It ais under the statute that merely Code. The Penal Code does not all restraint is In describe without consent. con circumstances which an abduc- unlawful; trast, only thing “given” is it an tion defines an abduction as about ab a accompanied by restraint an intent duction is that it includes restraint. The prevent liberation.48 So treatment of intent element is not a given, since there “appropriate” the terms “abduct” statutory are two alternatives. So Ward is Second, the Penal Code is different. distinguishable. there is no legislative history pertaining to Although rely the State does not kidnapping statute similar to that of State,53 Jackson Marrs v. we note that the theft statute. There has been no ef- too, Jackson, they, distinguishable. are In Legislature’s part codify fort on the alleged burglary-of-a-habi- many types kidnapping different into a tation indictment that the habitation was single statute. We conclude the rationale open “not then public.”54 to the This lan- Berg and applicable behind McClain is not guage appears portion of the statute kidnapping

to the statute. criminalizing burglary building, of a not a Ward, the issue was whether infor- habitation.55 We held the State did not charging imprisonment mations false were need to make it allegation and was fundamentally failing defective for to al- surplusage.56 distinguishable This case is lege that the restraint “without con- statutory because the language at issue holding sent.” the informations were was not even an element of the offense defective, we stated that seeking prove. the State was “without consent” surplusage.50 This First, Finally, there no conflict between distinguishable. case is also “ab- conduct, Marrs and Gibbons. We held in Marrs duct” is but “without consent” is act, omission, nor “enter” need be further defined neither conduct.51 So Thomas, burglary indictment. “Enter” is defined Ferguson, Saathoff, under intruding any part must be while in the Penal as “abduct” defined “without Code object body intruding any physical consent” need not be. Thomas, Berg, (allegation 747 S.W.2d at 809. 51. See 621 S.W.2d at 161 of "without effective consent” in theft indict- defendant). ment not act or omission of (Tex.Crim.App.1985). 45. 687 S.W.2d 350 20.01(1). § 52. Tex. Penal Code 46. Id. at 353-55. *9 (Tex.Crim.App.1983). 53. 647 S.W.2d 286 47. Id. at 353. 20.01(2). 54. S.W.2d at § 898-99. 48. Tex Penal Code 30.02(a)(1). 49. S.W.2d at 783. § 55. Tex. Penal Code Ibid. 56. 633 S.W.2d at 899. 50. Gibbons, Reynolds,64 in opposite the body.57 We with

connected invita the State’s decline Ferguson.65 We in enter- that the “act” involved in Marrs In today. new rule create this statutory alter- tion to intrusion.58 The ing is the in Gibbons stead, our decision between we reaffirm not differentiate natives listed do in the allege, must intrusion, are the State because both and hold that of methods type of require quash, motion to essentially the same.59 Both face of a directly give in order to body, prove it to to use his either seeks defendant abduction “by Daw- us phrase Professors Dix and The indirectly.60 or notice. the defendant statutory deadly force alterna- to use son have described ing and aspects” surplusage, of “peripheral here as the was not namely, tives a firearm” allowing in entering.61 the act of erred trial court and the Curry’s phrase over delete this State It adds to Abduction is different. begun. had objection after trial liberation prevent the intent to “restraint” issue, the or on this by secreting argument its ways: in one of two either Within exception An to overrule the urges threat of force.62 us by the use or if provides that the surplusage element of abduction is rule which essential libera ele- prevent descriptive intended to of an essential phrase defendant is offense, this complainant.63 proved of the Without it must be tion ment state, is no in phrase mental there But the accompanying surplusage. cannot be abduction; only restraint. an merely descriptive there of this case was what trans offense; mental state is accompanying it a manner element of So restraint into abduction. forms mere element of committing means nothing “peripheral” about there is here does not offense. Since The two alternative men intent element. exception surplusage to the fall within the (and not) statute are the provided tal states rule, decide we need not should engaging “manner or means” of exception to to abandon the whether of abduction. The rationale conduct surplusage rule. specific

Marrs involved the definition burglary statute. It did not “enter” THE OF EVIDENCE SUFFICIENCY statutory any general principle of set forth contention that Curry’s address We next definition construction. The Penal Code’s erred in its appeals the court of analogous to its simply of “enter” is the court original opinion, analysis. its definition of “abduct.” elaborating stated without appeals con- Curry “that the record agreed it have never before held that abduct- ... evidence” or means” tains no statutory alternative “manner threatening to “by using and act, omission, or conduct ed Williams engaging in an firearm.”66 namely, a Indeed, deadly force we held use surplusage. constitutes (State allege, must at 686-87 64. 723 S.W.2d 30.02(b). § Code 57. Tex. Penal statutory quash, which in face of motion 290. 58. 647 S.W.2d at restraint it or means of alternative manner by moving victim prove, seeks Ibid. 59. confining vic- place to another from one tim). George E. Dix & Robert O. 61. Dawson, (State allege at 849 65. § 20.119 Practice and Procedure Criminal delivery type it seeks (1995). delivery sub- of controlled prosecution for stance). 20.01(2). § Penal Code Tex. Carpenter S.W.2d at 66. 966 1977). (Tex. Crim.App. *10 Malik, explain why agreed The court did not it sufficiency of the evidence is to be Curry give any or for rationale its against measured the hypothetically cor- It conclusion. made this statement with jury charge. rect A hypothetically correct reciting out the facts of the case or exam jury charge “accurately is one which sets Nevertheless, ining any relevant caselaw. law, by out the is authorized the indict- the court held the evidence sufficient be ment, unnecessarily does not increase the it against cause measured the evidence proof unnecessarily State’s burden of or jury charge given, charge and that did not liability, restrict the theories of State’s require jury Curry to find that abduct adequately particular describes the offense by using ed Williams a firearm.67 We for which the defendant was tried.”72 apply remanded for the court to Malik.68 necessarily This list is not exhaustive.73 remand, appeals On the court of Determining by the “law” as “authorized stated as follows: requires the indictment” first that we de- As we have found in our discussion of termine which indictment: the State’s error, Curry’s point first Curry’s rem- original indictment or the amended indict- edy for in amending error the indict- ment. Since we have concluded the indict- ment after began trial is a new trial. amended, ment erroneously hypo- adequately error is addressed with thetically jury correct charge must be one remedy and we need not fashion an by original which is authorized indict- remedy acquittal additional based on ment, not the amended indictment. failure of the evidence as un- measured We believe the “law” as “authorized original der the indictment.69 by the statutory indictment” must be the disagree. If the evidence is insuffi- aggravated elements the offense of conviction, support Curry’s cient to by kidnapping charging as modified remedy acquittal. remedy is That say, Curry’s hy- instrument. That is to greater simply than granting Curry a new pothetically jury charge correct could Curry’s trial. sufficiency point of error statute, simply language quote addressed, regardless must be of the fact instructing jury Curry to find guilty prevailed point that he has on his of error if it found that he abducted “another concerning erroneous amendment of person,” specifi- because the indictment the indictment. Curry cally charges abducted appeals briefly The court of then ad- Williams, required and the State was Curry’s sufficiency dressed point. It held prove that element of the offense. it theory alleged that was “bound the indictment as Similarly, jury amended.”70 Since the correct hypothetically statute, charge, against court’s as measured charge simply could not track the indictment, require jury did to find alleging Curry abducted Williams firearm, (1) used a the court found him “with the intent to hold [either] sup- (2) it “irrelevant whether the evidence reward; him as a shield ransom or use ported finding.”71 (3) such a hostage; facilitate the commission of or attempt felony flight or the after the

Hypothetically Jury Charge Correct (4) felony; bodily inflict commission of a him considering ap injury the court of on him or violate or abuse (5) peals’ analysis, per- him a sexually; we look to Malik. Under terrorize third Ibid. 68. 975 S.W.2d at 630. Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240.

69. 1 S.W.3d at 180. 73. Id. at 240 n. 5. 70. Id. at 181. *11 An “ad- (6) kidnapping. aggravated was son; performance tried or interfere with offense, again, of that equate” description political func- any governmental or of the ele- incorporation an limit- must mean specifically The indictment tion.” (4) With- charging instrument. and ments of the options allegations ed the State’s elements, the of- (5). incorporating out those “setting out the law” as terms of So Here, indictment,” “adequately described.” Curry’s fense is not by the “authorized alleged that specifically would the indictment jury charge correct hypothetically threatening to “by using and that, Curry acted jury to find Cur- have to instruct inSo namely, a firearm.” deadly intention- use force ry they must find that he guilty, case, of the “adequate description an this ally knowingly abducted Williams him, tried would Curry was bodily injury on offense” for the intent to inflict means of abduc- this manner and sexually, violate or abuse him or terrorize include tion. him. with the ratio- vein, comports conclusion the “law” defines two Our that same There, the “abduction,” in Malik. expressed nale we

different methods of jury concerning only charged trial court alleges one of those meth- indictment detention.75 jury legality correct of the defendant’s hypothetically ods. So the charge merely related to noted that this charge phrase would have to include the evidence, any admissibility not to deadly the “by using threatening to use the offense.”76 We Curry’s a indict- “element of namely, force firearm.” judgment acquittal should a conviction on a ment would “authorize” in which there element, for those instances reserved proof less than of this proof al- failure the State’s phrase surplusage; this is not once “actual leged, proved. it had to be the crime.”77 including We next consider Here, a at issue is language operates “unnecessarily increase phrase element of the or means of an manner proof.” the State’s burden of The indict- If the State failed offense. Curry charged ment abducted means, was an “ac then there manner prevent Williams with intent to his libera- proof of the tual failure State’s by using threatening tion to use dead- Malik, it follows that crime.” So under ly Including “by using phrase force. phrase must factor into a threatening deadly to use force name- Curry’s hypo analysis. We conclude ly, hypothetically a firearm” in the correct have jury charge would thetically correct jury charge does not increase the State’s if it jury Curry to convict instructed the Rather, it proof. keeps burden of knowingly intentionally or found that he proof exactly burden of the same. State’s pre with the intent abducted Williams prove what simply required The State is by using or vent his liberation contrast, to delete alleged. it firearm, deadly namely, force to use in a charge from the would result phrase bodily to inflict and with intent Williams proof. in the State’s burden decrease to terrorize Williams injury on Williams or sexually. or to violate and abuse Williams inclusion

Finally, we consider whether “using and jury charge Application namely, force threatening to use consider whether We next “adequately describe firearm” would Curry to convict was sufficient [Curry] evidence particular offense charge. correct hypothetically under this for which tried.” The offense 20.04(a). Id. at 240. § 74. Tex. Penal Code Id. *12 reviewing sufficiency Curry revenge the of the evi- believed that wanted dence, in we must view the evidence the against Williams for the break-in. The light most favorable to verdict and Curry jury also could have believed that any determine whether rational trier of Floyd asked to lie for him he had fact could have found the essential ele- evening. violated the law that beyond ments of the offense a reasonable only remaining question The doubt.78 We resolve inconsistencies in the jury rationally could have testimony in favor of the verdict.79 Curry found that restrained Williams Williams testified that around 8 prevent “by using intent to his liberation p.m. Curry put against him in a car his deadly namely, threatening to use force Curry him up will. He testified that beat jury a firearm.” believe the could Though and broke his knee and arm. he An have reached this conclusion. abduc Curry later testified that it was not who continuous, ongoing a event.80 tion is jury him him up, took and beat There limit for an is no time abduction.81 testimony free to find his initial more cred So the abduction did not cease once impeached ible. cred The State Williams’ in put Williams was the car. It continued ibility with previously statements he had throughout time was in the entire he jury police. made to the The could have until car he was released the warehouse entirely found that Williams was not an that district. Since Jacobs testified he saw witness, portions credible that of some Curry gun night, jury with a that could testimony his were true while others were Curry gun have had that and believed that not. it during used the course of the abduction Curry testified that saw that Jacobs he prevent Williams’ liberation. addi night, getting similar-looking same out of a tion, credibility Williams’ was im since car, holding gun. Curry He saw and State, jury free to peached someone, and kill then return to the shoot testimony Curry disbelieve Williams’ that Floyd Curry car. testified that left their Curry gun did not have a and that did not apartment p.m. around 7 or 8 and did not jury reasonably him. could threaten The evening. the entire She testi- return also that these have believed Williams denied Curry say fied that asked her to that he things at trial because he was afraid of evening. The evidence was with her that Curry. retribution from Curry suspected also revealed for a We deem the evidence sufficient burglary Williams was involved jury proved rational find that the State Curry McCalep and Although his home. beyond all the elements of the offense Curry apartment was at the testified reasonable doubt. evening, jury the entire was free to Floyd Curry and disbelieve believe

McCalep. CONCLUSION “by using We conclude that the testimony, jury

Based could to use force name- reasonably Curry have believed that re- The ly, surplusage. a firearm” was not without his stricted Williams’s movement erroneously permitted trial court Curry to inflict consent and that intended Curry’s ob- allegation to delete this over bodily him. injury on Williams or terrorize court of jection begun. after trial had The jury could have believed motive, this error jury appeals could have has determined had a that the (Tex. 307, 319, 150 80. Weaver v. Virginia, 443 U.S. Jackson 2781, 2789, (1979). Crim.App.1983). S.Ct. 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (Tex. 79. Moreno Crim.App.1988). evidence); Curry v. Curry, grant

harmed and we did not re- (Tex.Crim.App.1998) affirm S.W.2d issue. We therefore view of appeals vacated (judgment of court holding grants appeals’ court of de for reconsideration cause remanded Curry a new trial. light Ma sufficiency claim fendant’s Curry’s hypothetically We also find that ); Blanco v. 962 S.W.2d 46 lik jury charge would have included correct ap (judgment of court Crim.App.1998) *13 “deadly phrase, force” and that for re and cause remanded peals vacated evidence was sufficient to convict Malik). As we light consideration affirm, charge. under such a albeit for stated, jurisdiction is our previously have reasons, appeals’ the court of different by the courts review of decisions limited to holding that the evidence was sufficient to State, 15 appeals. Garcia v. S.W.3d convict. 533, see (Tex.Crim.App.2000); n. 5 536-37 4.04, 2;§ also Tex.Code Crim. Tex. Proc. JOHNSON, J., dissenting delivered a R.App. ap the court of P. 66.1. Because J., MEYERS, joined. opinion which suffi peals apply appropriate did not majority’s application ciency analysis, the JOHNSON, J., in which dissenting not a review appropriate of the standard is MEYERS, J., joined. decision; it is an appeals’ court agree majority I with the that once the that standard in the first application of alleged aggravated kidnapping “by state this cause instance. We should remand using threatening deadly and to use force to conduct appeals the court of allow firearm,” namely, required it was sufficiency analysis. To appropriate I allegation. agree also beyond authority. our do otherwise is sufficiency the evidence However, analyzed using allegation. this I

respectfully disposi- dissent from the final

tion case, appeals instant the court of hypothetically-correct

concluded

jury charge “by did not include the phrase

using force use DANIELS, Appellant, Frederick firearm, namely, Complainant.” on 175, Curry v. S.W.3d 180-81 1999). majority

App. Paso The finds — El The of Texas. STATE error, hypotheti this was No. 1612-99. cally-correct jury charge would include - Ante, Thus, phrase. at 404 405. Texas, Appeals of Criminal Court appeals applied court of is found to have En Banc. wrong standard in its anal Oct. ysis. majority performs then its own sufficiency analysis using proper hypo Ante,

thetically-correct jury charge.

406-407. pre- with our

Such action is inconsistent See, e.g.,

cedents Malik v. (Tex.Crim.App.1997)

S.W.2d vacated and

(judgment appeals of court of apply that court to

cause remanded for analyzing

correct standard of review

Case Details

Case Name: Curry v. State
Court Name: Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
Date Published: Sep 20, 2000
Citation: 30 S.W.3d 394
Docket Number: 1521-99
Court Abbreviation: Tex. Crim. App.
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