State v. D. Ingram, 478 P.3d 799

Background:

Douglas Ingram pleaded guilty to felony DUI (fourth-or-subsequent) after a single-vehicle crash and an Intoxilyzer result of .220 BAC.
PSI showed Ingram is 61, unemployed, sole income $857/month SSDI, about $7,000 medical debt, and indigent.
District Court imposed: mandatory $5,000 minimum fine, 13-month DOC commitment to treatment, three years suspended sentence with probation conditions, a $100 legal-fee fine, and a $500 surcharge (10% of fine); probation conditions included paying costs of imprisonment/probation/treatment “if financially able” and a requirement to seek employment.
At sentencing Ingram asked the court to suspend the $5,000 fine and strike some conditions; he cited 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) and Eaton but did not press an as-applied constitutional challenge or ask the court to overrule binding precedent (Mingus).
On appeal the Montana Supreme Court reviewed legality de novo and whether discretionary conditions were an abuse of discretion; it affirmed imposition of the statutory fine, costs-of-treatment condition, and $100 fee, but reversed and remanded as to the $500 surcharge for lack of an ability-to-pay inquiry.

Issues:

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Ingram)	Held
1. Legality of $5,000 mandatory minimum fine (§ 61-8-731)	Mandatory statutory fine was properly imposed; Mingus controls.	Mandatory fine is unconstitutional as applied given indigency and SSDI-only income; court should have considered ability to pay and § 407(a).	Affirmed — Mingus binding; Ingram did not preserve an as-applied constitutional challenge; Eaton does not preclude imposing debt (only seizure of SSDI).
2. Cost of imprisonment/probation/treatment (§ 61-8-731(4)(b))	Statute allows conditioning payment if defendant is "financially able"; DOC assesses ability to pay after sentencing.	Court should have assessed ability to pay at sentencing.	Affirmed — statutory language delegates post‑sentencing ability‑to‑pay assessment to DOC (Daricek).
3. $100 fine in lieu of statutory legal fees (§ 46-18-232)	Imposition permissible; court has discretion to impose greater of statutory fees or $100.	Court failed to make an on-the-record inquiry into ability to pay as required by statute.	Affirmed (no relief) — failure to make specific findings rendered the sentence objectionable but was not preserved on appeal, so court declines to consider it.
4. $500 surcharge (10% of fine) (§ 46-18-236)	Surcharge correctly calculated as 10% of $5,000.	Court failed to consider ability to pay as required by § 46-18-236(2); surcharge should be waived or stayed.	Reversed and remanded — State conceded the error; court must conduct ability‑to‑pay proceedings under § 46-18-236(2).

Key Cases Cited

State v. Eaton, 323 Mont. 287, 99 P.3d 661 (2004) (reversing sentence terms that effectively subjected SSDI to collection; anti-attachment protection under 42 U.S.C. § 407 applied)
State v. Mingus, 319 Mont. 349, 84 P.3d 658 (2004) (mandatory DUI fines are not subject to ability-to-pay inquiry)
State v. Daricek, 390 Mont. 273, 412 P.3d 1044 (2018) (Department of Corrections, not sentencing court, determines ability to pay costs of imprisonment/probation/treatment)
State v. Yang, 397 Mont. 486, 452 P.3d 897 (2019) (discusses limits on mandatory fines within ability-to-pay analysis)
State v. Reynolds, 390 Mont. 58, 408 P.3d 503 (2017) (fines reviewed like sentencing conditions)
State v. Kotwicki, 335 Mont. 344, 151 P.3d 892 (2007) (failure to apply statutory considerations makes a sentence objectionable, not necessarily illegal)
Washington State Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371 (2003) (construed "other legal process" in § 407 to bar judicial mechanisms that transfer control over protected benefits)
City of Richland v. Wakefield, 380 P.3d 459 (Wash. 2016) (state court holding that courts may not order legal financial obligation payments when SSDI is the sole income source)