State v. D.B., 150 Ohio St. 3d 452

D.B., a 17-year-old, was charged with multiple counts of aggravated robbery and kidnapping with firearm specifications; his juvenile court transferred the case to the adult common pleas general division under R.C. 2152.12(A)(1)(b)(ii).
D.B. pleaded guilty to three aggravated-robbery counts (one with a firearm specification) and three kidnapping counts; the trial court imposed an aggregate nine-year sentence (concurrent terms except the firearm spec consecutive).
On appeal the Second District held the kidnapping convictions were subject to the reverse-bindover procedure in R.C. 2152.121(B)(3) even though at least one conviction stemmed from a charge that had been mandatorily transferred.
The Second District certified a conflict with the Eighth District’s decision in State v. Mays on whether a trial court must analyze each conviction separately under R.C. 2152.121(B).
The Ohio Supreme Court (majority) held that if at least one conviction in the case was for an offense that would have required mandatory transfer, the common pleas court must sentence the juvenile under R.C. Chapter 2929 on all convictions in the case; it reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the trial sentence.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether R.C. 2152.121(B) requires the adult court to analyze each convicted offense separately to decide reverse bindover or mandatory adult sentencing	State: once the court determines at least one convicted offense required mandatory transfer, it may sentence on all convictions under Chapter 2929	D.B.: statute requires a charge-by-charge analysis; convictions from discretionary-transfer charges require reverse bindover	The court held the adult court need not analyze each conviction separately; if at least one convicted offense required mandatory transfer, the court must sentence on all convictions under Chapter 2929
Whether a court may split a case so some convictions are returned to juvenile court while others are sentenced in adult court	State: splitting is not permitted because the relevant inquiry is what the juvenile court would have done with the case	D.B.: court can split mandatory- and discretionary-transfer portions and reverse-bindover the discretionary ones	The court held splitting would create incompatible obligations and is not allowed; the case must be treated as a whole under R.C. 2152.121(B)

State ex rel. Huebner v. W. Jefferson Village Council, 75 Ohio St.3d 381 (1996) (court may grant reconsideration to correct decisions made in error)
State v. Aalim, 150 Ohio St.3d 463 (2016) (initially held mandatory-transfer statutes unconstitutional; later vacated)
State v. Aalim, 150 Ohio St.3d 489 (2017) (reaffirmed constitutionality of mandatory-transfer statutes)
State v. Lowe, 112 Ohio St.3d 507 (2007) (statutory interpretation begins with plain language and legislative intent)
Portage County Bd. of Commrs. v. Akron, 109 Ohio St.3d 106 (2006) (apply plain meaning when statutory language is unambiguous)
State v. Wilson, 73 Ohio St.3d 40 (1995) (absent proper bindover, juvenile court retains exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction)
Wingate v. Hordge, 60 Ohio St.2d 55 (1979) (courts should not make fine distinctions based solely on singular/plural statutory phrasing)