State v. Crump, 376 N.C. 375

Background

Late-September 2013: defendant Ramar Crump (Black) was implicated in a prior armed robbery and later drove to a decoy (“bait”) poker game in a silver Mustang with two companions; police were dispatched after a tip reporting two Black males with guns in the vehicle.
Officers Holzhauer and Sussman approached the Mustang covertly; an exchange of gunfire occurred; defendant fled, a chase ensued, and defendant was arrested; weapons and victims’ property were recovered from the car.
A grand jury indicted Crump on robbery/kidnapping/conspiracy and on charges arising from the shooting (including assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill and assault on a law enforcement officer).
At trial the defense raised self-defense; the State’s case required jurors to resolve the core factual dispute who fired first and to weigh credibility of Black defendant vs. the officers. Jury convicted on most counts; total sentence of 872–1,203 months.
During voir dire the trial court sustained State objections to defense questions about implicit racial bias and about recent police shootings (including the Jonathan Ferrell case), cutting off that line of inquiry; Court of Appeals found no prejudicial error.
The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed: it held the trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting inquiry into racial bias and opinions on police shootings in this context and that the error was prejudicial, requiring reversal.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Crump's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting voir dire questions about implicit racial bias and opinions on police shootings of Black men	The trial court properly sustained objections to the specific, improperly framed questions and did not bar the entire topic; broad discretion to manage voir dire	Defense was entitled to probe jurors about racial bias and opinions on police shootings because these issues were directly relevant to assessing juror impartiality	Abuse of discretion: the court “flatly prohibited” inquiry into race and “categorically denied” questions about police shootings; in this case that was improper
Whether defense questions were impermissible “stake-out” questions (asking jurors how they would decide)	Questions were stake-out/hypothetical or otherwise confusing and therefore properly excluded	Questions seeking awareness of Ferrell and views about police shootings were not stake-out hypotheticals but probative of juror bias	Not stake-out: asking if jurors knew of a shooting or had opinions about police shootings is not an attempt to predetermine verdict and was a permissible means to test bias
Whether error was prejudicial (i.e., reasonably possible a different result would have occurred)	No prejudice: Crump testified he did not know he was firing at police until later; parties could ask many other questions about attitudes toward police; defendant’s race was incidental	Prejudice: jurors’ racial bias or views on police shootings could have materially affected credibility assessments and verdict; inability to probe deprived defense of meaningful for-cause and peremptory challenges	Prejudicial: there is a reasonable possibility the exclusion affected the jury composition and outcome; reversal required
Jury instruction on self-defense / causal nexus between felonious conduct and self-defense disqualification	State contended no reversible error or not reached given voir dire resolution	Crump challenged the self-defense instruction (not reached by the Supreme Court)	Not reached by the Supreme Court (decision reversed on voir dire error)

Key Cases Cited

State v. Crump, 259 N.C. App. 144 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018) (Court of Appeals opinion at issue below)
State v. Chapman, 359 N.C. 328 (2005) (trial court has broad discretion to regulate form of voir dire)
State v. Rodriguez, 371 N.C. 295 (2018) (same; defendant must show abuse of discretion and prejudice to prevail on voir dire claims)
Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017) (racial bias in jury deliberations threatens Sixth Amendment fairness)
State v. Jones, 347 N.C. 193 (1997) (distinguishing permissible bias-probing from improper stake-out questions)
State v. Burr, 341 N.C. 263 (1995) (discussion of permissible voir dire that asks jurors’ prospective approach to issues to test impartiality)
State v. Parks, 324 N.C. 420 (1989) (voir dire reviewed in context of entire transcript; stake-out question doctrine)
State v. Vinson, 287 N.C. 326 (1975) (trial court may reject hypothetical or ambiguous questions)
State v. Robinson, 330 N.C. 1 (1991) (trial court can manage form/number of questions on sensitive topics but cannot prohibit appropriate inquiry)
State v. Wiley, 355 N.C. 592 (2002) (limitations on voir dire that impair ability to exercise challenges intelligently may be grounds for reversal)