State v. Crosby, 182 Conn. App. 373

Background

December 18, 2008: robbery at Webster Bank; surveillance photos captured suspect; two eyewitnesses (McVey and Lee) later identified Crosby from a photographic array shown on February 3, 2009.
February 18, 2009: Connecticut arrest warrant issued while Crosby was incarcerated in Massachusetts on unrelated convictions; Enfield PD faxed a copy of the warrant to Massachusetts on September 1, 2010 at facility request, but Massachusetts did not treat that fax as an IAD detainer.
Crosby repeatedly inquired about lodging a detainer; Massachusetts repeatedly told him no detainer had been filed and advised him to request one from Connecticut; Connecticut lodged a detainer in May 2013, Crosby was notified July 2013, and extradited November 6, 2013.
Crosby moved to dismiss (IAD violation and due process pre‑accusation delay) and to suppress the photographic identifications; motions denied, he was tried, convicted of first‑degree robbery and third‑degree larceny, and appealed.
On appeal the court reviewed (1) whether a detainer was lodged in 2010 or 2013 and whether any IAD/due process violation required dismissal; (2) whether the photographic array was unduly suggestive or unreliable; and (3) whether the jury identification charge was inadequate.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Crosby)	Held
Whether a detainer was lodged in Sept. 2010 triggering IAD protections	The fax of the warrant in 2010 was merely produced at Massachusetts’ request and did not indicate Connecticut’s intent to lodge a detainer	The 2010 fax was effectively a detainer; failure to provide IAD forms and notice in 2010 violated IAD and merits dismissal	Court held no detainer was lodged in 2010; detainer was lodged in May 2013, so IAD protections started then and dismissal was not required
Whether custodial delay violated IAD / required dismissal (Article III)	N/A (state argued it complied once detainer lodged in 2013 and delay thereafter was not prejudicial)	Delay from 2010 (or from 2009 warrant) to 2013 prejudiced Crosby and IAD/noncompliance merits dismissal or relief	Court applied IAD principles/Barker balancing: no presumption of prejudice; Crosby failed to show unjustifiable delay or actual prejudice, so dismissal denied
Whether pre‑accusation delay violated due process	N/A (state: delay not wholly unjustifiable and did not cause substantial prejudice)	Delay in executing warrant/extraditing him (~4+ years) dimmed witness memory and caused actual substantial prejudice to fairness of trial	Court required both substantial actual prejudice and unjustifiable delay; Crosby failed to show actual, substantial prejudice (witness memory gaps favored defense), so due process claim failed
Whether photographic array/identifications were unduly suggestive and unreliable	The array complied with practices in effect in 2009; warnings were given; no officer feedback; witnesses had opportunity to view robber	Array was unduly suggestive: fillers dissimilar, Crosby pictured in prison garb, simultaneous non‑double‑blind procedure created risk of suggestion and inflated confidence	Court held array was not unnecessarily suggestive; even assuming suggestiveness, identifications were reliable under totality (close in time, good opportunity to view, high certainty), so suppression was properly denied
Whether jury instruction on identification omitted critical Guilbert factors (double‑blind, confidence, unconscious transference)	Court framed instructions to cover substance of requested points, warned jurors about confidence and feedback, and cautioned on memory limits	Instruction omitted specific Guilbert language, failed to explain unconscious transference, and should have emphasized double‑blind importance and weak correlation of confidence and accuracy	Court held that in substance requested instruction was given, omission of specialized items (e.g., unconscious transference) was reasonable absent expert testimony; charge was legally correct and not misleading

Key Cases Cited

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (U.S. 1972) (four‑factor balancing test for speedy‑trial/prejudice analysis)
United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (U.S. 1978) (IAD is triggered only when a detainer is filed)
State v. Herring, 210 Conn. 78 (Conn. 1989) (IAD Article III dismissal rule and custodial‑state delay analysis)
State v. Marquez, 291 Conn. 122 (Conn. 2009) (standards for assessing suggestiveness and reliability of photographic arrays)
State v. John, 210 Conn. 652 (Conn. 1989) (due process test for pre‑accusation delay: actual substantial prejudice and unjustifiable delay required)
State v. Guilbert, 306 Conn. 218 (Conn. 2012) (eyewitness identification reliability and the role of expert testimony)
State v. Day, 171 Conn. App. 784 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017) (harmless‑error framework for unreliable identification evidence)
State v. Taylor, 63 Conn. App. 386 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001) (interpretation of IAD and activation by detainer filing)