State v. Criswell
327 Ga. App. 377
Ga. Ct. App.2014Background
- At ~1:43 a.m., officers responded to a call about a truck blocking a driveway; they found Matthew Jenkins intoxicated in the truck and questioned him.
- Another car arrived; Sgt. Cullen LaFrance approached Cristopher Criswell, initially standing 12–15 feet away in Criswell’s yard; that initial contact was found consensual.
- LaFrance then walked up the driveway, observed signs of impairment (unsteady gait, slurred speech, bloodshot watery eyes, odor of alcohol), and questioned Criswell about Jenkins.
- LaFrance told Criswell to come to the street; Criswell eventually complied, refused chemical testing, and was arrested for DUI.
- The trial court suppressed evidence obtained from the closer contact on grounds that LaFrance’s step onto the driveway was an illegal second‑tier encounter lacking reasonable, articulable suspicion and that probable cause was lacking; the State appealed.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Criswell's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Legality of officer entering driveway (curtilage/second‑tier encounter) | Entry onto driveway was lawful because it followed the same route a visitor would take; driveway not protected curtilage | Entry onto driveway was an illegal second‑tier stop requiring reasonable suspicion | Entry lawful: driveway was open and visitor‑accessible, so Fourth Amendment not implicated; first‑tier encounter |
| Credibility of officer's observations from initial contact (12–15 ft) | Officer could have perceived impairment indicators once on driveway and during lawful approach | Trial court disbelieved that officer could see/smell impairment from 12–15 ft and credited only that perception occurred at closer, suppressed time | Court need not resolve credibility; but observations made from driveway are admissible because entry was lawful |
| Whether ordering Criswell to the street converted encounter into seizure requiring reasonable suspicion | Officer had observed driving into driveway plus impairment indicators (odor, bloodshot eyes, unsteadiness) giving articulable suspicion to continue and order movement | Moving Criswell by threat of arrest made subsequent actions involuntary; conversion to Tier‑3 arrest without probable cause | Officer had articulable suspicion once close enough to detect odor/eyes/unsteadiness; ordering him to street was supported by that suspicion |
| Probable cause to arrest for DUI | Observations of driving immediately before, plus bloodshot eyes, odor, slurred speech and unsteadiness provided probable cause | Trial court erred: suppression of close‑range observations left insufficient basis for probable cause | Probable cause existed: combined observations established a fair probability Criswell was driving under the influence |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (factors to determine curtilage protection)
- Espinoza v. State, 265 Ga. 171 (observations from expected visitor areas like driveways/porches are not Fourth Amendment intrusions)
- State v. Gravitt, 289 Ga. App. 868 (visitor route doctrine: officers may take same route as guest/deliveryman)
- Brittian v. State, 257 Ga. App. 729 (distinguishing first‑tier consensual encounters from stops requiring reasonable suspicion)
- Peeler v. State, 286 Ga. App. 400 (officer observations from lawful presence in driveway admissible)
- State v. Silva, 263 Ga. App. 371 (plain smell detected from a lawful position supports investigation)
- Brown v. State, 302 Ga. App. 272 (probable cause for DUI requires probability defendant was in physical control while impaired)
- Cann‑Hanson v. State, 223 Ga. App. 690 (bloodshot, watery eyes and alcohol odor can supply probable cause without field tests)
- McCormack v. State, 325 Ga. App. 183 (appellate review standards for suppression rulings)
- State v. Gauthier, 326 Ga. App. 473 (de novo review applies where legal error is claimed on suppression rulings)