State v. CoxÂ
256 N.C. App. 511
N.C. Ct. App.2017Background
- On 2 December 2012 multiple people in Jamal Kornegay’s trailer were shot; Kornegay and Nakiea Garner died, Trae Stokes and Leonard Darden were wounded. Defendant Jujuan Maquis Cox was charged with multiple counts including first‑degree murder, second‑degree murder, attempted first‑degree murder, AWDWIKISI (assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury), and discharging a firearm into occupied property/vehicle.
- Eyewitnesses placed Defendant at or near the scene, saw him with a rifle, heard him call for Darden to come outside, and heard numerous shots fired into the occupied trailer; some witnesses later acknowledged inconsistencies or lies to police about recognizing Defendant’s voice.
- Defense presented an alibi witness who said Defendant was at a relative’s home watching football but left after 10:00 p.m.; defense objected to several jury instructions (acting in concert; multiple murder theories) and moved to dismiss various charges for insufficiency of evidence.
- Jury deliberated less than five hours, reported being deadlocked multiple times; court gave an Allen‑type instruction and sent the jury back; after further deliberation the jury convicted Cox of (inter alia) first‑degree murder of Kornegay (lying in wait), second‑degree murder of Garner, attempted first‑degree murder, AWDWIKISI, and weapons offenses.
- Trial court sentenced Cox to life without parole for first‑degree murder, consecutive lengthy terms for other convictions. Cox appealed, raising sufficiency challenges, challenge to post‑impasse jury instructions, and ineffective assistance; the appellate court reviewed and dismissed ineffective assistance claim without prejudice to MAR.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Cox's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether first‑degree murder (lying in wait) should have been dismissed | Evidence supported lying in wait: Defendant waited, spoke to Kornegay, then fired into occupied trailer; victim unaware of murderous purpose | No ambush because Defendant announced his presence; no lying‑in‑wait | Affirmed: lying in wait may exist even if defendant not concealed or victim aware of presence; here victim unaware of homicidal purpose, so submission proper |
| Sufficiency of evidence for second‑degree murder of Garner | Evidence of shots fired into occupied trailer permitted inference of culpability for deaths in the attack | Insufficient evidence; defense did not preserve or specifically move to dismiss second‑degree murder at trial | Unpreserved for appeal; claim rejected on preservation grounds |
| Sufficiency of evidence for AWDWIKISI as to Stokes | Firing multiple shots into an occupied trailer supports inference of intent to kill whoever was inside; circumstantial evidence sufficient | State had to show specific intent to kill Stokes (no direct evidence) | Affirmed: intent to kill may be inferred from nature/number of shots, weapon, and circumstances; transferred‑intent instruction not required where State relied on intent to kill any occupant |
| Whether post‑impasse jury instructions were coercive (plain error) | Court properly gave Allen‑type instructions and encouraged further deliberation without coercion; totality of circumstances justified asking jurors to continue | Final comments ("these folks deserve better") were coercive and pressured jury to reach verdict | No plain error: court’s repeated Allen instructions, breaks, meal, short deliberation time (<5 hours), and framing did not amount to coercion |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Leroux, 326 N.C. 368 (definition and elements of lying‑in‑wait murder)
- State v. Brown, 320 N.C. 179 (lying‑in‑wait may exist though defendant not concealed; momentary pause can satisfy element)
- State v. Allison, 298 N.C. 135 (lying‑in‑wait conviction appropriate where defendant waited and then summoned victim)
- State v. Alexander, 337 N.C. 182 (intent to kill may be inferred from firing deadly weapon into occupied vehicle/property)
- State v. Grigsby, 351 N.C. 454 (intent to kill inferred from manner of assault, weapon, and circumstances)
- State v. Wynn, 278 N.C. 513 (doctrine of transferred intent explained)
- State v. Peek, 313 N.C. 266 (analysis of whether court instructions coerced verdict)
- State v. Porter, 340 N.C. 320 (totality‑of‑circumstances review for alleged coercive jury instructions)
- State v. Patterson, 332 N.C. 409 (factors for assessing jury coercion)
- State v. Barnes, 334 N.C. 67 (standard for ruling on motions to dismiss/insufficiency)
- State v. Taylor, 203 N.C. App. 448 (de novo review on denial of motion to dismiss)
