State v. Coleman, 460 P.3d 368

Background:

Jacqueline Coleman had a 1992 Kansas conviction for involuntary manslaughter (class D felony) and later pleaded guilty to multiple thefts occurring in 2012, 2013, 2014, and two thefts in April 2015.
The presentence reports scored Coleman’s 1992 involuntary manslaughter as a person felony, producing a C criminal-history score that influenced her grid-box sentences and probation terms.
After the 2015 thefts, the district court revoked Coleman’s probation on earlier cases and imposed prison terms; Coleman appealed the person-crime classification of the 1992 conviction and the probation revocations.
The Court of Appeals affirmed; the Kansas Supreme Court granted review limited to whether the 1992 involuntary manslaughter conviction should be scored as a person felony.
The core legal question: which test governs classification of pre-1993 (pre-KSGA) Kansas convictions for criminal-history scoring (the Wetrich identical-or-narrower test or the earlier comparability approach), and whether the 1992 statute is identical to or narrower than the later involuntary-manslaughter statute that is designated a person felony.
Supreme Court held the Wetrich identical-or-narrower test applies to the direct-appeal sentencing for Coleman’s 2015 convictions and that the 1992 statute is identical-or-narrower (thus properly scored as a person felony); the result for the earlier (2012–2014) cases is the same regardless of which test applies, so no relief.

Issues:

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1) What test governs classification of a pre-KSGA Kansas conviction when sentencing a 2015 offense?	Coleman: apply the comparability rule used pre-2015 (more favorable).	State: apply Wetrich identical-or-narrower test adopted for out-of-state priors.	Court: Wetrich identical-or-narrower test governs direct-appeal sentencing for the 2015 convictions.
2) Is the 1992 involuntary-manslaughter statute broader than the later statute (so not comparable as a person crime)?	Coleman: 1992 statute is broader because it included ordinance violations and criminalized killings by a lawful act done in an "unlawful or wanton manner."	State: later statute’s reckless standard encompasses wantonness and criminalizes equal or more conduct; many 1992 acts would be covered as reckless under the later statute.	Court: 1992 statute is identical-or-narrower (comparable); classification as a person felony was correct.
3) For probation-revocation sentences on pre-2015 thefts, must the identical-or-narrower test apply and did misclassification create an illegal sentence?	Coleman: Descamps/Apprendi require identical-or-narrower; misclassification violated constitutional protections and produced an illegal sentence.	State: illegal-sentence motion cannot raise this constitutional argument here; and outcome is same under either test because 1992 statute is identical-or-narrower.	Court: did not reach full constitutional question but held no relief available—1992 statute qualifies under identical-or-narrower, so scoring was proper.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Wetrich, 307 Kan. 552 (Kan. 2018) (adopts identical-or-narrower test for comparing prior out-of-state convictions to Kansas offenses)
State v. Keel, 302 Kan. 560 (Kan. 2015) (discusses KSGA amendments and retroactive scoring of pre-1993 convictions)
State v. Williams, 299 Kan. 870 (Kan. 2014) (earlier comparability approach for prior convictions)
State v. Murdock, 299 Kan. 312 (Kan. 2014) (interpreting scoring of out-of-state priors prior to legislative amendment)
Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (U.S. 2013) (federal ACCA requires prior-offense elements to be identical-or-narrower to qualify)
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (U.S. 2000) (facts increasing penalty generally must be proved to a jury, with exception for prior convictions)
State v. Makin, 223 Kan. 743 (Kan. 1978) (analysis of wantonness vs. recklessness distinctions)
State v. Obregon, 309 Kan. 1267 (Kan. 2019) (applies Wetrich in a direct-appeal sentencing context)