State v. Clausen
307 Neb. 968
| Neb. | 2020Background
- Clausen and two other inmates escaped Lincoln Correctional Center in 2016 by hiding in a laundry truck, stealing a vehicle, and fleeing; Clausen was later arrested and charged with escape, theft by unlawful taking, and operating a vehicle to avoid arrest.
- Clausen asserted a duress defense, claiming coperpetrator Armon Dixon coerced him and drove the stolen vehicle; Clausen sought to call Dixon and fellow inmate Bentley Buckner as defense witnesses.
- At a pretrial hearing and deposition, Dixon admitted planning aspects of the escape but invoked the Fifth Amendment when asked how he obtained the phone and drugs used to coordinate the escape; the court excluded Dixon under Neb. Evid. R. § 27-513 and applying a Cardillo-style framework.
- The court excluded Buckner as hearsay, too remote, and speculative. Clausen testified at trial but repeatedly disrupted proceedings; the court warned him and ultimately struck his testimony for refusing full cross-examination.
- Jury convicted Clausen on all counts; after an enhancement hearing he was adjudicated a habitual criminal and sentenced to consecutive terms totaling 80–140 years. Clausen appealed, raising evidentiary, instruction, confrontation/due process, sentencing, and ineffective-assistance claims.
Issues
| Issue | Clausen's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Exclusion of Dixon's testimony (invoking Fifth) | Dixon’s limited invocation related only to collateral preparatory matters; excluding him deprived Clausen of critical duress evidence | §27‑513 and Cardillo permit excluding a defense witness when invocation would frustrate cross‑examination; Dixon’s privileged topics were closely related to the escape | Court affirmed exclusion: Dixon’s refusal implicated central preparatory acts so exclusion was not an abuse of discretion |
| Exclusion of Buckner | Buckner would corroborate Dixon’s threats and establish duress | Buckner’s proffered statements were hearsay, too remote, and speculative | Court affirmed exclusion as within discretion |
| Striking Clausen’s testimony and refusal to give no‑inference instruction | Striking testimony and refusing no‑inference instruction deprived Clausen of right to present defense and required a no‑inference charge | Clausen’s disruptive conduct and refusal to submit to cross‑examination justified striking; he did testify and later forfeited the privilege claim | No plain error; striking was within court’s authority and no‑inference instruction was properly refused |
| Right to present a defense / structural error | Excluding witnesses and striking testimony amounted to structural constitutional error requiring automatic reversal | Exclusion/sanction were trial‑level evidentiary and decorum rulings subject to harmless‑error analysis; not structural | Not structural error; rulings were trial errors and not reversible on that basis |
| Ineffective assistance claims (multiple) | Counsel failed on numerous fronts (disclosures, introducing deposition, investigation, objections, jury instruction) | Record shows counsel made proper objections, secured evaluations, and any omissions caused no prejudice | All ineffective‑assistance claims rejected on the record (no deficient performance or no prejudice shown) |
| Excessive sentence | Sentence excessive; court made no meaningful findings | Sentence within statutory limits; court found habitual criminal status | Sentence affirmed as not an abuse of discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Cardillo, 316 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1963) (three‑category framework for striking testimony when witness invokes Fifth Amendment)
- Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) (trial judge discretion to manage disruptive defendant to preserve trial decorum)
- Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987) (limits on excluding defendant’s testimony under due process)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- United States v. Crews, 856 F.3d 91 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (application of Cardillo where defense witness invokes Fifth and discussion of alternatives to total exclusion)
- Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (right to present witnesses is essential to due process)
- Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988) (limitations on the right to call witnesses for compelling public interests)