State v. Claerhout, 115227

Background

On Jan. 11, 2015, Jeremy Claerhout, while intoxicated, rear‑ended Christopher Willdermood; Willdermood died from severe brain trauma. Claerhout registered a .211 BAC and admitted heavy drinking that day.
Prosecutors charged Claerhout with reckless second‑degree murder (depraved‑heart) as the primary count, and involuntary manslaughter and reckless driving as alternatives; Claerhout conceded involuntary manslaughter but denied facts sufficient for second‑degree murder.
The State introduced: surveillance/eyewitness evidence, vehicle Crash Data Retrieval (CDR) reports, officer testimony (including Officer Misemer as an accident‑reconstruction expert), and Claerhout’s 2010 DUI diversion agreement; district court gave a limiting instruction on the prior diversion evidence.
Claerhout moved to exclude the prior diversion agreement under K.S.A. 60‑455, to suppress statements to police as Miranda violations, and to exclude Misemer as an unqualified expert; he also requested a jury instruction that voluntary intoxication could negate recklessness. All motions were denied.
The jury convicted Claerhout of reckless second‑degree murder; he was sentenced to 117 months. On appeal he challenged: (1) admission of DUI diversion agreement, (2) Misemer’s expert testimony, (3) denial of suppression of post‑crash statements, and (4) refusal to instruct that voluntary intoxication is a defense to reckless second‑degree murder.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Claerhout)	Held
Admission of prior DUI diversion agreement under K.S.A. 60‑455	Relevant to Claerhout's state of mind/knowledge that DUI is dangerous; probative value outweighs prejudice	Diversion was dissimilar ("garden‑variety") and therefore irrelevant; overly prejudicial propensity evidence	Admitted: court did not abuse discretion; diversion probative of knowledge/state of mind and limiting instruction mitigated prejudice
Qualification of Officer Misemer as expert accident reconstructionist	Misemer relied on admissible CDR reports and was qualified to interpret them	Misemer lacked necessary understanding of physics/formulas and thus was unqualified	Even assuming error, any improper admission was harmless given other overwhelming evidence; CDR data admissible independently
Suppression of Claerhout’s on‑scene statements (Miranda)	Statements admissible because Claerhout was not in custody; alternatively any Miranda error harmless	Officer Ubrik interrogated him while effectively in custody and failed to give warnings	Assuming possible Miranda violation, admission was harmless given other evidence of intoxication and causation
Voluntary intoxication instruction as defense to reckless second‑degree murder	Intoxication could negate the mental state of "consciously disregarding" a substantial risk	Voluntary intoxication is only a defense to specific‑intent crimes, not to crimes based on recklessness	Denial of requested instruction affirmed; voluntary intoxication is not a defense to reckless second‑degree murder under Kansas law

Key Cases Cited

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579 (expert‑testimony admissibility framework)
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (custodial interrogation and Miranda warnings)
State v. Gunby, 282 Kan. 39 (K.S.A. 60‑455 governs admission of other‑crimes evidence)
State v. Boggs, 287 Kan. 298 (limitations on PIK instruction & cautions on admitting prior acts under 60‑455)
State v. Torres, 294 Kan. 135 (three‑step test for 60‑455 admissibility review)
State v. Doub, 32 Kan. App. 2d 1087 (factors relevant to depraved‑heart second‑degree murder)
State v. Perez, 306 Kan. 655 (juror adherence to limiting instructions and undue‑prejudice analysis)
State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541 (harmless‑error standard for nonconstitutional error)
State v. Kershaw, 302 Kan. 772 (voluntary intoxication defense limited to specific‑intent crimes)