State v. Chatman
2015 ND 296
N.D.2015Background
- Chatman was arrested May 15, 2014 on an unrelated charge; officers searched his cell phone without a warrant and found drug-distribution text messages.
- An informant began providing information to a Bismarck detective on May 20, 2014 in exchange for bus tickets and help with charges; she claimed Chatman, known as “D,” supplied heroin and planned a Chicago trip to obtain heroin and cocaine.
- The informant accompanied Chatman to Chicago; during the trip she updated the detective by text about their location and about Chatman possessing drugs.
- On May 22, 2014, the detective applied for a cell-tower warrant for a phone believed to be used by Chatman and the informant; the warrant was supported by information from the May 15 cell-phone search.
- The detective later applied for a warrant to search Chatman and his vehicle; surveillance tracked Chatman returning to Bismarck, and officers stopped and searched him and the vehicle, uncovering heroin, cocaine, and marijuana.
- Chatman moved to suppress the evidence, arguing tainted information from the May 15 cell-phone search was used to obtain the warrants; the district court denied suppression and Chatman was tried and convicted on all counts.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was the evidence tainted by the warrantless cell-phone search admissible to support the warrants? | Chatman argues tainted information was used to establish probable cause. | State contends sufficient probable cause remained after excising tainted material. | Probable cause existed after excising tainted information; suppression not required. |
| Are anticipatory warrants unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment? | Chatman raises anticipatory warrants as unconstitutional. | State contends anticipatory warrants are not per se unconstitutional. | Anticipatory warrants not categorically unconstitutional; proper under Grubbs if conditions met. |
| Did the admission of informant's testimonial statements violate the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause? | Chatman asserts the informant’s statements, admitted via detective, violated confrontation rights. | State argues any errors were not prejudicial; many issues not preserved for appeal. | No obvious error; trial evidence supported guilt; no prejudice shown. |
| Did Chatman’s Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process fail due to informant’s unavailability? | Chatman claims inability to subpoena informant violated compulsory process. | State argues there was no demonstrated unavailability or defense-favorable testimony. | No violation; informant’s testimony not shown to be favorable or material. |
Key Cases Cited
- Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (U.S. 2014) (warrantless cell-phone search generally impermissible; Riley discussed but retroactivity not addressed here)
- State v. Ellison, 635 N.W.2d 151 (N.D. 2001) (illegally obtained evidence cannot be used to establish probable cause)
- State v. Fields, 691 N.W.2d 233 (N.D. 2005) (excise tainted information from affidavit to assess probable cause)
- Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90 (U.S. 2006) (anticipatory warrants not per se unconstitutional; require probable cause and likely triggering condition)
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (U.S. 2004) (Confrontation Clause governs testimonial hearsay; unavailable witness with prior cross-examination)