[¶ 1] Thе City of Fargo (“City”) appealed from an order suppressing evidence found as a result of a search without a warrant of Megan Rae Ellison’s apartment. The City contends the district court erred in its decision the warrantless search of the apartment was performed without the consent of Ellison. In the alternative, the City contends that Ellison’s age and identity can be established through an independent source without violating either the United States’ or North .Dakota’s Constitution, and therefore should not have been suppressed. We conclude the district court’s decision to suppress the evidence found in the search is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. We further conclude, however, if Ellison’s age and identity can be produced independently of the illegal search, it should not be suppressed. Therefore, we affirm in pаrt and reverse in part and remand.
I
[¶ 2] Fargo Police, responding to a complaint of a loud party, arrived at Megan Rae Ellison’s apartment early in the morning of January 3, 2001. The two officers knocked on the door, and announced themselves. The door was answered by a guest of Ellison’s. The police asked the guest if he was a resident of the apartment and the guest said he was not. The police then asked to speak to a resident. Ellison went to the door to speak with the police. The police asked if she was the apartment’s residеnt and she answered in the affirmative. Next the police asked if they might enter the apartment. Ellison refused and attempted to close the door. One of the police officers placed his foot in the door preventing Ellison from closing it, but he did not otherwise enter the apartment. The police officers then *154 suggested that if Ellison did not cooperate she could be placed under arrest. The police officers further suggested they could get a search warrant, but a judge would be unhappy with Ellison if the police were forced to resоrt to this. Ellison then attempted to walk away from the door and withdraw deeper into her apartment. Ellison stopped when one of the police officers remarked she was being “feisty” and they would have to use handcuffs. Ellison returned to the door and continued to speak with thе officers until a police sergeant arrived.
[¶ 3] The sergeant explained to Ellison that she had the right to refuse them permission to enter, but they could request a warrant. The trial court found Ellison may have interrupted the sergeant and consented to the search at this point, but the sergeant continued the explanation. The sergeant explained that a judge may or may not grant the warrant. Finally, Ellison relented and consented to the police entering her home. The police entered the apartment and conducted a search, which resulted in evidence of a minor possessing and or consuming alcohol, in violation of city ordinance. See Fargo N.D., Municipal Ordinance art. 10-01 § 01 (2000)(“Minor Possessing”). The evidence included the identity and age of Ellison, who was then twenty years of age. Ellison was charged with this offense as well as with an infraсtion of the City’s Noisy Parties ordinance. See Fargo N.D., Municipal Ordinance art. 10-07 § 01 (1999)(“Noisy Party”).
[¶ 4] Ellison appeared in Fargo municipal court and requested the case be transferred to district court. The Minor Possessing charge was transferred, but the Noisy Party infraction was not. Ellison was convictеd by the municipal court of the Noisy Party infraction.
[¶ 5] Ellison moved the district court to suppress the evidence of Minor Possessing discovered during the police search of her apartment. Ellison asserted the evidence was the product of an illegal search because the police did not have a warrant to search her home, nor did the police conduct fall within any exception to the warrant requirement. The district court granted the motion and suppressed the evidence, stating in its findings, “Ms. Ellison did not feel free to close the door, to leave, to walk away, to deny them.”
[¶ 6] In response, the City filed a document entitled “City’s Objection to the Proposed Order,” and a second document outlining the City’s proposed evidence regarding Ellison’s age and identity including:
1. A copy of the judgment of conviction from Fargo Municipal Cоurt in which [Ellison] was convicted of violation of the City’s loud party ordinance, which arose from this same occurrence, and/or;
2. Testimony of the manager of the apartment in which [Ellison] resides who would offer evidence concerning [her] name and age.
The district court, aftеr hearing argument, ruled this evidence was produced as a result of the illegal search, and thus would not be admissible over Ellison’s objection at trial.
II
[¶ 7] The North Dakota Century Code authorizes a city to appeal an order granting the suppression of evidence if the appeal is not for the purpose of delay, and the evidence is a substantial proof of a material fact in the case. N.D.C.C. § 29-28-07(5);
City of Wahpeton v. Desjarlais,
[¶ 8] Further, “[u]sually the circumstances which attend the giving of a confession or a consent are not completely agreed upon by law-enforcement officials and the accused; hence, the trial judge often must decide between conflicting evidence to form a picture in [his or her] own mind оf the ‘totality of the circumstances.’ ”
State v. Discoe,
Ill
[¶ 9] “The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as Article I, Section 8, of the North Dakota Constitution prohibit unreasonаble searches and seizures.”
City of Jamestown v. Dardis,
[¶ 10] Warrantless searches and seizures in a home are “presumptively unreasonable.”
City of Jamestovm v. Dardis,
[¶ 11] This presumption may be defeated, however, if the gоvernment shows the search or seizure was within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.
See City of Jamestown v. Dardis,
[¶ 12] “In the absence of such an exception, evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s protections against unreasonable searches must be suppressed as inadmissible under the exclusionary rule.”
State v. Blumler,
[¶ 13] In this case the City asserts Ellison voluntarily consented to the police request to enter and search her apartment; Ellison disputes this. “[W]hen the validity of a consent to search is called into question, the trial court must satisfy itself that the consent was given voluntarily before it can permit the use of evidence obtained from the search against the accused at trial.”
State v. Discoe,
[¶ 14] The district court found Ellison consented to the police entry and search of her apartment, but only after she was threatened with both arrest and handcuffing if she chose to exercise her constitutional right tо refuse the police entry. Further, the district court found Ellison attempted to end the conversation with the police twice. Once by attempting to close her door and once by retreating from the open door and withdrawing within her apartment. Each of these efforts werе wrongly thwarted by police. As a result, the district court found, “Ms. Ellison did not feel free to close the door, to leave, to walk away, to deny them.” The district court reasoned the ultimate consent was, therefore, not voluntarily given. The district court’s finding is supported by sufficient competеnt evidence and is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Thus, we affirm the district court’s suppression of the evidence produced as a result of the search.
IV
[¶ 15] The district court further suppressed both the copy of the judgment of conviction from the Fargo municiрal court and the anticipated testimony of the manager of the apartment building in which Ellison resides. The district court reasoned both of the above were the product of the illegal search of Ellison’s apartment and accordingly inadmissable at trial. We cannot agrеe.
[T]he exclusionary rule essentially operates as a judicial remedy or sanction against law enforcement intrusion into an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights. By excluding evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule acts to deter police misconduct in making unreasonable searches and seizures, and to bolster judicial integrity by not allowing convictions based on unconstitutionally obtained evidence.
State v. Wahl,
The interest of society in deterring unlawful police conduct and the public interest in having juries receive all probative evidenсe of a crime are properly balanced by putting the police in the same, not a worse, position [than] they would have been in if no police error or misconduct had occurred.... When the challenged evidence has an independent source, exclusion of such evidence would put the police in a worse position than they would have been in absent any error or violation.
State v. Winkler,
[¶ 16] After the police conducted the illegal search of Ellison’s apartment, they issued a complaint and summons charging her with a violation of the Noisy Party ordinance and the Minor Possessing violation. To do this the police demanded, received and recorded Ellison’s identity. The Minor Possessing charge was transferred to the district court, but the Noisy Party infrаction was not. See N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-03.1(l)(providing, generally a person charged with an infraction is not entitled to a jury). Though the municipal court went on to find a violation of the Noisy Party ordinance, the district court ruled the entry and search of Ellison’s home was illegal. Therefore, all information derived frоm the search must be sup *157 pressed. This does not include, however, the record of Ellison’s identity found on the municipal court conviction, for the police were in the position to issue Ellison a citation for the violation of the Noisy Party ordinance from the moment they respоnded to the complaint. 1
[¶ 17] The City ordinance prohibits any person from participating in a party in a residential area during certain times, which may be found to be unreasonably noisy by others in the area.
See
Fargo N.D., Municipal Ordinance art. 10-07 § 01 (1999). Thus, the police could have issued Ellison а citation for the Noisy Party the moment they saw her within the apartment, where the party was occurring. A guest or resident in an apartment, where music is “played so loudly as to cause complaints to the police, ... may expect a knock at the door.”
See State v. Ackerman,
[¶ 18] Similarly, the police would have been within their authority to inquire as to Ellison’s identity with the apartment manager, before they approached the apartment, let alone before they had illegally searched it. Therefore, the apartment manager’s testimony regarding Ellison’s identity as well as the record of her identity and age found on the municipal court conviction are both “wholly independent of any constitutional violation.”
State v. Winkler,
[¶ 19] We, therеfore, affirm in part and reverse in part and-remand.
Notes
. Our decision is limited to evidence of identity and age and should not be read to suggest the municipal court record may be used to "prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” See N.D.R.Ev. 404(b).