State v. Champagne
305 P.3d 61
Mont.2013Background
- Champagne was convicted of felony sexual assault in Hill County after trial.
- J.B., age 10, testified that Champagne touched her inappropriately at her grandmother Ramona's house in 2010.
- Lamere was not removed for cause despite reservations about a defendant not testifying; Herdina served on the jury.
- Matkin testified as a forensic interviewer; the court admitted her lay opinion under 701 regarding coaching and her impressions.
- J.B.'s prior consistent statements were admitted via Falcon and Matkin after Champagne opened the door by alleging coaching or fabrication; statements predated alleged improper influence.
- Judgment imposed a 40-year prison sentence and restitution with ongoing future costs; non-binding recommendations to the DOC were included; restitution amount for future costs must be specified on remand.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Denial of for-cause removal of Lamere | State contends Lamere could be impartial despite reservations | Champagne argues Lamere was not impartial and should be removed | No abuse of discretion; Lamere could follow the court's instructions. |
| Effectiveness of counsel re Herdina bias | State/Champagne claim counsel failed to probe Herdina's bias | Champagne asserts ineffective assistance for not questioning Herdina | Post-conviction review appropriate; record on direct appeal insufficient to resolve; remand for ICA claim. |
| Admissibility of Matkin's testimony | State relies on Matkin's training to identify coaching | Champagne argues lack of proper expert qualification | Proper lay opinion under M.R.E. 701 due to training. |
| Admission of J.B.’s prior consistent statements | State used Falcon and Matkin to corroborate J.B.'s trial statements | Champagne argues no pre-coaching statements before alleged coaching | Proper under M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B); doors opened by defense; statements predate coaching. |
| Illegal sentence / restitution and remorse considerations | State contends sentence rests on permissible factors | Champagne argues lack of explicit basis in remorse overstepped | Remand to set a specified restitution amount; non-binding community supervision recommendations permissible. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Jay, 369 Mont. 332 (2013 MT 79) (abuse-of-discretion standard forfor-cause juror challenges; voir dire considerations)
- State v. Freshment, 43 P.3d 968 (2002 MT 61) (bias and inability to follow law; failure to dismiss jurors for cause)
- State v. Upshaw, 335 Mont. 162 (2006 MT 341) (ineffective-assistance-on-appeal standard; record-based analysis)
- State v. Henderson, 125 P.3d 1132 (2005 MT 333) (admissibility of evidence; lay vs expert)
- State v. McOmber, 173 P.3d 690 (2007 MT 340) (prior consistent statements admissibility; door-opening rule)
- State v. Frasure, 100 P.3d 1013 (2004 MT 305) (lay opinion by trained witness; foundation of testimony)
- State v. Morris, 245 P.3d 512 (2010 MT 259) (remorse and lack of remorse in sentencing factors)
- State v. Shreves, 60 P.3d 991 (2002 MT 333) (remand/review when sentence influenced by lack of remorse)
- State v. Heafner, 231 P.3d 1087 (2010 MT 87) (specified restitution amount requirement)
