delivered the Opinion of the Court. ¶1 Gayle A. Morris pleaded no contest in the District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, Cascade County, to Accountability to Prostitution and Obstructing a Peace Officer or Other Public Servant. He now appeals his sentenсes. We affirm.
ISSUES
¶2 We restate Morris’ issues as follows:
¶3 1. Whether the District Court illegally sentenced Morris in violation of his constitutional rights and Montana sentencing policy.
¶4 2. Whether the District Court abused its discretion when it sentenced Morris to the maximum statutory penalty.
BACKGROUND
¶5 On July 9,2009, Morris was charged with Promоting Prostitution, a felony pursuant to §45-5-602, MCA (2007). The charge resulted from a two-year investigation of Really Windy’s Gentlemen’s Club, in Great Falls, of which Morris was the proprietor. The supporting affidavit alleged that Morris knowingly promoted prostitution by employing exotic dancers who performed sexual acts with male customers, on the premises.
¶6 On May 17, 2010, Morris entered into a plea agreement with the Cascade County Attorney. In exchange for the Promoting Prostitution charge being droppеd, Morris agreed to plead no contest to the amended charges of Accountability to Prostitution, §45-5- 601(1), MCA, and Obstructing a Peace Officer or Other Public Servant, §45-7-302, MCA. In the agreement, Morris acknowledged that sentencing was entirely within the discretiоn of the presiding district court judge, subject to the limits of statutory and case law. The County Attorney agreed to recommend that Morris pay a fine of $500, for each offense, and a $35 surcharge, for each offense. Additionally, the County Attorney agreed to recommend that Morris receive two suspended six-month sentences, to run consecutively. Morris acknowledged that pursuant to § 45-12-211(2), MCA (2007), his plea could not be withdrawn, even if the District Court decided to not accept the County Attorney’s recommendation. The County Attorney filed an amended information reflecting the new charges.
¶7 On June 3, 2010, Morris and the County Attorney agreed to a set of stipulated facts supporting the amended information. Morris did not admit any of the fаcts but stipulated that the State was capable of presenting them at trial. They included:
*309 I. At all times specified in the amended information, the defendant Gayle Morris, was the proprietor of Really Windy’s Gentleman’s Club.
6. Female dancers еngaged in prostitution on the premises of Really Windy’s Gentlemen’s Club by engaging in or offering to engage in sexual intercourse with patrons.
9. Morris, knew, or should have known of these activities by dancers on the premises of Really Windy’s Gentlemen’s Club.
II. Morris aidеd the dancers in the planning or commission of the offense of prostitution by not taking action to end the activities. 12. Prior to the service of the search warrant in this case, Morris, while cleaning the establishment, removed and/or destroyed condoms and wrappers hindering the enforcement of criminal law.
¶8 On June 3,2010, Morris appeared at a change of plea hearing. He advised the court that he wanted to go forward with the plea agreement. The District Court accepted the plea and sentenced Morris to the maximum statutory penalties. For the charge of Accountability to Prostitution, Morris received six months in the Cascade County Detention Center, with no time suspended, and a fine of $500. For the charge of Obstructing a Peace Officer or Other Public Servant, Morris received six months in the Cascade County Detention Center, with no time suspended, and a fine of $500. The sentences were to run consecutively.
¶9 The court articulatеd eight reasons for Morris’ sentences: (1) The serious nature of the offense, (2) harm to the community, (3) harm to the young women who were brought into prostitution and the permanent damage to their lives, (4) the permanent damage to other pеople in like situations, (5) the ripple effect of the crime on the community, (6) the fact that Morris was a former Mayor of Great Falls and a former Cascade County Commissioner indicated that he should have known better, (7) Morris did not contеst the charges and admitted the fact that he supported the charges, indicating a high probability of conviction at trial, and (8) Morris’ conduct was unacceptable in the community.
¶10 Morris appealed the sentences to this Court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶11 When an offender is not statutorily eligible for sentence review,
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this Court reviews the sentence for legality and abuse of discretion.
State v. Gunderson,
DISCUSSION
¶12 To be statutorily eligible for sentence review, a defendant must be sentenced to a term of one year or more in the state prison or to the custody оf the Department of Corrections. Section 46-18-903(1), MCA. Morris was sentenced to two consecutive terms of six months at the Cascade County Jail. As a result, Morris was not eligible for sentence review and we review his sentences for legality and аbuse of discretion.
¶13 Morris additionally invites the Court to review his sentences for “uniformity,” in a manner similar to the Sentence Review Division. However, “sentence review is not a constitutional right.’”
State v. Hinkle,
¶14 Whether the Sentences Were Illegal Because they Violated Morris’ Constitutional Rights and Montana Sentencing Policy.
¶15 Generally, a sentence is legal if it falls within statutory limits.
State v. Harper,
a. Section 46-18-101, MCA
¶16 Section 46-18-101, MCA, sets forth Montana’s correctional and sentencing policy. Specifically, § 46-18-101(3)(c), MCA, provides, “[sentencing practices must bе neutral with respect to the offender’s race, gender, religion, national origin, or social or economic status.” Morris argues that the District Court violated this policy when it considered his status as a former mayor and former county сommissioner. He equates prior public service to a social or economic status. However, Morris fails to present any legal authority, or argument, in support of such a contention. On appeal, the Appellant has the burden to present legal authority that establishes error on the part of the district court.
State v. Giddings,
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¶17 Moreover, “in imposing sentence, the sentencing court may consider any relevant evidence relating to the nature and circumstances of the crime, the character of the defendant, the defendant’s background history, mental and physical condition, and any evidence the court considers to have probative force.’”
Driver v. Sentence Rev. Div. in the Sup. Ct. of Mont.,
b. Due Process
¶18 Morris argues that the District Court denied him due process of law because his sentences were based on misinformation or information contained in the original information and supporting аffidavit. Both the Montana Constitution and United States Constitution protect criminal defendants from being sentenced based on misinformation.
State v. Walker,
¶19 We need not address the question of material inaccuracy, because Morris has failed the threshold requirement of proving the District Court relied on misinformation. The District Court explicitly based Morris’ sentences on the stipulated facts and his voluntary responses at the hearing. Morris fails to point to any portion of the sentencing order that reflects reliance on improper or erroneous information. In his Reply Brief, Morris admits that the stipulated facts were sufficient to support his plea.
¶20 Morris challenges the District Court’s findings that he harmed the community, caused a ripple effect in the community and was responsible for damage done to the young women. A sentencing court must clearly state the reasons for the sentence imposed. Section 46-18-102(3)(b), MCA. A district court is in the best position to deal with the evidence before it.
State v. Alden,
¶21 Morris also challenges the evidentiary basis for the District Court’s finding that his plea of no contest indiсated a high probability of conviction at trial. The no contest plea exists to allow a defendant to plead guilty, without admitting to a charge, when the record contains strong evidence of guilt. Commission Comments to §46-12-212, MCA. The District Court’s finding was mеrely an articulation of this policy,
c. Self-Incrimination
¶22 Morris claims that his right against self-incrimination was violated because he was punished for a lack of remorse and failure to admit he was wrong. A district court is permitted to sentence a defendant based on lack of remorse so long as there is affirmative evidence of the lack of remorse.
State v. Rennaker,
¶23 As a threshold matter, Morris’ argument fails because he does not establish that the sentences were based on lack of remorse or failure to admit wrong-doing. The District Court provided eight valid reasons for the sentences, none of which indicate any reliance on lack of remorse or accountability. Morris offers a single instance where the District Court inquired whether he felt remorse. This аlone, does not establish that the District Court relied on lack of remorse or accountability. Moreover, Morris offers no explanation why, in the absence of an explicit finding, we should assume that the sentences were based оn lack of remorse or accountability.
¶24 Whether the District Court Abused its Discretion by Sentencing Morris to the Maximum Penalty Allowed by Statute.
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¶25 Finally, we turn to whether the District Court abused its discretion when it sentenced Morris to two consecutive six-month prison tеrms, with no time suspended, and two $500 fines. “An abuse of discretion occurs when a district court acts arbitrarily without conscientious judgment or exceeds the bounds of reason.”
State v. Cotterell,
¶26 The District Court provided eight valid reasons for the statutorily-authorized sentences. Notably, the District Court was influenced by the fact that Morris’ previous public service indicated he should have known better. Furthermore, when Morris signed the plea agreement, he was more than well aware of the potential maximum penalty. We conclude that the District Court’s sentences were not arbitrary and did not exceed the bounds of reason.
¶27 Affirmed.