State v. Carter
2017 Ohio 7501
Ohio Ct. App.2017Background
- On April 29, 2013 Kristopher Stuart was shot to death in his Youngstown residence; defendant Kalontae Carter (age 17 at the time) and his uncle DeJuan Thomas sustained gunshot wounds and were treated at hospitals.
- Carter was bound over from juvenile court and indicted in common pleas court for aggravated murder and related offenses with firearm specifications; Thomas (co‑defendant) later died before trial.
- Physical and forensic evidence placed Carter in the victim’s bedroom (blood on mattress, blinds, ceiling; Carter’s blood on the handle of the victim’s .357 found at the scene); ballistics showed at least three firearms were used.
- Carter gave multiple statements to police (initially claiming he was shot in a drive‑by, later admitting presence during a confrontation and describing a “bop”/“bop”/“lick”), and provided a videotaped, Mirandized statement at the station.
- A jailhouse witness (Queener) testified that Thomas told him he and Carter intended to rob the victim; the trial court admitted that testimony under Evid.R. 804(B)(3) (statement against interest) and as non‑testimonial for Confrontation Clause purposes.
- A jury convicted Carter of aggravated murder (with firearm spec); Carter appealed claiming hearsay/Confrontation violations, Batson error in juror removals and race‑based argument, ineffective assistance, insufficiency/weight of evidence, and unconstitutional mandatory bindover of juveniles.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Carter) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of co‑defendant’s jailhouse statement (hearsay / Evid.R.804(B)(3)) | Statement against interest of unavailable declarant; corroborating circumstances exist so it is admissible | Statement was unreliable and should not be admitted as hearsay or under confrontation protections | Admitted: trial court did not abuse discretion; corroboration and established precedent support admissibility |
| Confrontation Clause / Bruton concerns | Jailhouse statement was non‑testimonial (made to a fellow prisoner) so Crawford/primary purpose test inapplicable; Bruton irrelevant to nontestimonial statements | Co‑defendant’s out‑of‑court incriminating statement violated confrontation and Bruton principles | Held: statement nontestimonial; Confrontation Clause not violated; Bruton inapplicable to nontestimonial statements |
| Batson / racial discrimination in juror removal and prosecutor’s rebuttal comments | Peremptory strike of an African‑American juror was race neutral (equivocal answers re: complicity); other challenged jurors were excused for cause | Removal of all three Black venirepersons and prosecutor’s race‑referencing rebuttal deprived Carter of equal protection and fair trial | Held: prosecutor offered race‑neutral reasons; trial court’s credibility finding not clearly erroneous; rebuttal remarks were responsive and not plain error |
| Ineffective assistance of counsel (various failures) | Trial counsel litigated admissibility, did not forego relevant objections for no tactical reason | Counsel failed to move in limine, failed to move to suppress pre‑Miranda statements, did not renew or preserve objections to video and certain testimony, and failed to cross‑ex ballistics expert | Held: counsel’s performance fell within reasonable strategic decisions; suppression motions likely meritless; no prejudice shown |
| Sufficiency and manifest weight of evidence (purpose element) | Evidence (statements, blood/DNA, ballistics, activity at scene) supports purpose/complicity and aggravated murder conviction | Evidence insufficient to prove Carter purposefully caused death or knew robbery would occur; alternative explanations exist | Held: evidence (direct and circumstantial) sufficient; weight review does not show manifest miscarriage of justice |
| Mandatory juvenile bindover constitutionality (Aalim) | Appellant urged Aalim (procedural due process requirement for amenability hearing) | Carter argued mandatory transfer violated due process/equal protection | Held: Aalim was vacated on reconsideration; bindover statute upheld; argument fails |
Key Cases Cited
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (testimonial statements by non‑testifying witnesses barred unless prior cross‑examination opportunity)
- Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (primary‑purpose test distinguishing testimonial from nontestimonial statements)
- Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (2011) (clarifies multi‑factor primary‑purpose analysis for statements to law enforcement)
- Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2183 (2015) (statements to non‑law‑enforcement less likely testimonial; apply primary‑purpose test)
- Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (admission of non‑testifying codefendant’s confession that incriminates defendant raises confrontation concerns historically)
- Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (three‑step framework for proving racial discrimination in peremptory strikes)
- State v. Yarbrough, 95 Ohio St.3d 227 (2002) (co‑defendant’s statements against interest admissible; corroboration considered)
- State v. Issa, 93 Ohio St.3d 49 (2001) (unavailable co‑defendant’s confession admissible under statement‑against‑interest when Fifth Amendment asserted)