404 P.3d 1017
Or. Ct. App.2017Background
- At ~9:40 p.m. on a one-way, two-lane downtown Portland street, Officer Louka in an unmarked car found defendant stopped completely in the right lane just before an unmarked intersection; no lights/signs/pedestrians explained the stop.
- Louka waited ~5 seconds behind the stopped vehicle, sounded the air horn, and then activated lights and approached when the car still did not move.
- Defendant told the officer he thought there was a stop sign; officer observed slow speech and signs of intoxication and called a traffic unit; defendant was later arrested and charged with DUII.
- Defendant moved to suppress identity, statements, and evidence from the stop, arguing the stop lacked probable cause because his conduct did not objectively violate ORS 811.130 (impeding traffic).
- Trial court denied the suppression motion; after a jury trial defendant was convicted of DUII. Defendant appealed, renewing the objective-reasonableness/probable-cause challenge.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether officer had probable cause to stop for impeding traffic under ORS 811.130 | Officer subjectively believed defendant impeded traffic; facts as perceived met statutory elements. | Although officer subjectively believed a violation occurred, that belief was not objectively reasonable because officer could have passed in left lane and defendant’s stop was not an unlawful impediment. | Court held probable cause existed: stopping completely in right lane blocked a lane of travel and altered normal and reasonable movement of traffic, so officer’s belief was objectively reasonable. |
| Whether defendant’s stopped conduct fell within ORS 811.130(2)/(3) safe-operation exceptions | State: no applicable exception shown. | Defendant: stopping at night downtown near an intersection was commonplace and part of normal/ reasonable traffic movement. | Court rejected defendant’s contention; no evidence of a safe-operation justification, so exceptions did not apply. |
| Applicability of precedent requiring facts-as-perceived to actually constitute the offense | State urged overruling and allowing reasonable mistakes of law as basis for probable cause. | Defendant relied on prior rule that probable cause must be based on facts that actually constitute the violation (no reasonable mistake of law). | Court declined to revisit precedent: continued to require that facts as perceived actually constitute the violation. |
| Whether Chen or Tiffin controls analysis of impeding traffic | State: Chen (complete stop blocking lane) is analogous and supports stop. | Defendant: Tiffin undermines stop because passing was possible and context made slow/stop commonplace. | Court applied Chen over Tiffin: complete stop blocking lane altered normal traffic flow and constituted impeding traffic. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Tiffin, 202 Or App 199 (Or. Ct. App. 2005) (driving slightly below speed limit did not necessarily impede traffic where no other cars and passing opportunities existed)
- State v. Chen, 266 Or App 683 (Or. Ct. App. 2014) (complete stop in right lane that caused other vehicles to slow/swerve supported impeding-traffic finding)
- State v. Matthews, 320 Or 398 (Or. 1994) (statutory requirement that officer have probable cause to stop for traffic violation)
- State v. Miller, 345 Or 176 (Or. 2008) (probable cause requires subjective belief plus objective reasonableness)
- Helen v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (U.S. 2014) (under Fourth Amendment, reasonable suspicion may rest on a reasonable mistake of law)