State v. Carr
1 CA-CR 16-0088
| Ariz. Ct. App. | Sep 5, 2017Background
- Ralph Carr, a horse trainer, was charged with multiple counts of sexual abuse involving female students (incidents from 2002–2009). Victims described repeated touching of breasts or buttocks while taking lessons or working at stables.
- First trial (Oct. 2012) on nine counts resulted in hung jury; charges dismissed without prejudice. A later indictment charged Carr with 16 felonies; a second/third trial sequence followed.
- Before the February 2015 trial, Carr moved to sever counts; the court held an evidentiary hearing, considered experts on aberrant sexual propensity, and denied severance finding offenses similar and cross-admissible under Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b)/(c).
- After a February 2015 trial (19 days) the jury acquitted on two counts but hung on 14 counts; a retrial on the remaining counts occurred in Oct. 2015.
- During the Oct. 2015 trial defense counsel observed a juror in a restroom with a victim and her mother; the court questioned and excused the juror (an alternate). No mistrial or renewed severance motion was made; jury convicted Carr on the charged counts and he was sentenced to four years’ prison, lifetime probation, and sex-offender registration.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Denial of severance for counts involving different victims | State: joinder permissible because offenses were of same/similar character and cross-admissible under Rules 404(b)/(c) | Carr: counts too remote/dissimilar; evidence of other acts improperly used to show propensity; court relied on State expert improperly | Affirmed. Carr waived plenary review by not renewing severance motion at or before close of evidence; offenses were similar, cross-admissible, and limiting jury instructions mitigated prejudice |
| Juror taint from prior (second) trial misconduct/media exposure | N/A | Carr: jury in prior trial were exposed to media and juror prejudice, tainting proceedings | Dismissed as moot because none of those jurors sat on the later (convicting) trial; appellate court declined to address moot issue |
| Alleged extrinsic exposure (juror overheard victim in restroom) and mistrial request | N/A | Carr: juror overheard victim and mother in courthouse restroom; trial court questioned wrong juror and should have declared mistrial | No fundamental error. Court questioned correct juror; juror denied hearing case-related discussion; juror was an alternate who did not deliberate, so no presumed or actual prejudice |
| Admissibility/reliability of State expert on aberrant sexual propensity | State: expert testimony supported cross-admissibility under Rule 404(c) and helped satisfy court’s findings | Carr: State expert’s methodology unreliable (no error rates, not verifiable); expert testimony should not support severance denial | Rejected. Even accepting criticisms, court made independent findings and Rule 404(c) does not always require expert testimony; evidence met clear-and-convincing, relevance, and Rule 403 balancing requirements |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Blackman, 201 Ariz. 527 (App. 2002) (standard of review for denial of severance)
- State v. Gutierrez, 240 Ariz. 460 (App. 2016) (renewal requirement and fundamental error review)
- State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561 (2005) (standard for fundamental error review)
- State v. Goudeau, 239 Ariz. 421 (2016) (requirements for admitting other-acts evidence under Rule 404(c))
- State v. Benson, 232 Ariz. 452 (2013) (remoteness of prior acts not dispositive; multi-year gaps can be admissible)
- State v. Vega, 228 Ariz. 24 (App. 2011) (victim testimony can suffice to establish other act by clear and convincing evidence)
- State v. Miller, 234 Ariz. 31 (2014) (defendant must show compelling prejudice to prevail on severance claim)
- State v. Juarez-Orci, 236 Ariz. 520 (App. 2015) (waiver and fundamental error framework)
- State v. Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191 (2004) (prejudice presumed from private communication with juror about pending case)
- State v. Dann, 205 Ariz. 557 (2003) (mistrial is drastic remedy; granted only when necessary to prevent miscarriage of justice)
