State v. Carlos
484 S.W.3d 602
Tex. App.2016Background
- Officer stopped Molden after observing erratic driving and signs of intoxication; Molden was arrested for DWI.
- Molden failed to provide a valid breath sample (refused to seal lips) and then refused a blood draw.
- Officer learned Molden had two prior DWI convictions and obtained Molden’s blood under Tex. Transp. Code § 724.012(b)(3)(B) (mandatory blood draw statute).
- Molden moved to suppress blood-test results, arguing the warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw violated the Fourth Amendment in light of Missouri v. McNeely.
- Trial court granted suppression, finding no consent, no exigent circumstances, and no warrant; State appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Molden) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 724.012(b) authorized a warrantless blood draw under the Fourth Amendment | Statute renders the warrantless draw reasonable under a traditional Fourth Amendment balancing test | Warrant required absent consent or exigency; statute does not override Fourth Amendment protections | Court did not address statute constitutionality; suppressed evidence because draw was warrantless and nonconsensual in these circumstances |
| Whether implied consent (including irrevocable implied consent based on two prior DWI convictions) supplies voluntary consent for Fourth Amendment purposes | Implied-consent statute means Molden had consented and could not revoke under the two-DWI rule | Molden revoked any implied consent by refusing testing; implied irrevocable consent cannot substitute for voluntary Fourth Amendment consent | Court (following Villarreal) held an express refusal revokes implied consent; implied/irrevocable consent cannot satisfy Fourth Amendment consent requirement |
| Whether federal exclusionary-rule good-faith exceptions (reliance on statute or precedent) prevent suppression | Officer acted in good faith relying on statute and precedent; federal good-faith doctrines should allow admission | Good-faith reliance does not cure a Fourth Amendment violation where consent was absent and no warrant existed | Federal good-faith exceptions discussed, but State’s argument rejected under Texas law for purposes of suppression here |
| Whether Texas article 38.23 permits non-warrant good-faith exceptions (statute or precedent) to avoid exclusion | Good-faith reliance on statute/precedent should be treated as exception to Texas exclusionary rule | Article 38.23 allows a single statutory good-faith exception (warrant-based); other non-statutory exceptions are inconsistent with the statute | Held that only objective good-faith reliance on a warrant fits article 38.23(b); officer’s reliance on statute/precedent is not an article 38.23 exception, so exclusion was proper |
Key Cases Cited
- Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (warrantless blood draw is a search subject to Fourth Amendment reasonableness)
- Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (warrantless searches presumptively unreasonable absent an exception)
- Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (natural-metabolism exigency analysis in blood-draw cases)
- State v. Villarreal, 475 S.W.3d 784 (Tex. Crim. App.) (statutory mandatory blood-draw cannot rely on irrevocable implied consent; refusal overrides implied consent)
- Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (federal good-faith precedent-based exception to exclusionary rule)
- Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (federal good-faith reliance on statute may preclude exclusion)
- United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (good-faith reliance on a magistrate’s warrant can bar exclusion)