State v. Carlisle, 136 N.E.3d 570

Christian Carlisle was fired from Walmart and set a fire at the store; he was charged with aggravated arson, arson, and inducing panic and pled guilty to first‑degree misdemeanor arson.
At sentencing defense and the prosecutor jointly requested a 10‑year limit on registration under Ohio’s Arson Offender Registry (R.C. 2909.15); the trial court rejected the recommendation and ordered lifetime registration.
Carlisle appealed, arguing the lifetime registration was not supported and that R.C. 2909.15(D)(2)(b) is unconstitutional because it conditions a judge’s ability to reduce registration on a prosecutor/law‑enforcement request (separation of powers).
The appellate majority treated the registry as a civil statutory requirement (not part of the criminal sentence), rejected the separation‑of‑powers challenge, and affirmed the trial court’s lifetime registration order.
The court certified a conflict with the Fourth District’s decision in Dingus to the Ohio Supreme Court; Judge Trapp concurred in certification but dissented, arguing R.C. 2909.15(D)(2)(b) does violate separation of powers and should be severed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Carlisle)	Held
Whether lifetime registration was improperly imposed and unsupported by the record	Registry duties are statutory, civil (not part of sentence); no judicial error where statute mandates lifetime registration absent executive request	Record and circumstances warranted limiting registration to 10 years; trial court abused discretion by imposing lifetime registration	Affirmed: statute governs registration; sentencing court’s discretion not implicated absent executive request; no reversible error
Whether R.C. 2909.15(D)(2)(b) violates separation of powers by conditioning judicial discretion on a prosecutor/law‑enforcement request	The prosecutor/agency request is a precondition that does not bind or usurp judicial discretion; statute is constitutional	The statutory requirement unlawfully transfers a sentencing function to the executive and therefore violates separation of powers (relying on Dingus and Sterling)	Majority: statute does not violate separation of powers because the request only triggers, not controls, judicial discretion; dissent would sever the offending language and permit judicial reduction without executive request; conflict certified to Ohio Supreme Court

State v. Sterling, 113 Ohio St.3d 255 (Ohio 2007) (statute that made a prosecutor's disagreement final and unreviewable violated separation of powers)
State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344 (Ohio 2011) (sex‑offender registry requirements are punitive in nature)
State ex rel. Bray v. Russell, 89 Ohio St.3d 132 (Ohio 2000) (judicial power includes determination of guilt and sentencing; courts protected from encroachment)
S. Euclid v. Jemison, 28 Ohio St.3d 157 (Ohio 1986) (principle that each branch must be protected from encroachment by the others)
State v. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d 404 (Ohio 1998) (statutes entitled to a strong presumption of constitutionality)