State v. Cardeilhac
293 Neb. 200
| Neb. | 2016Background
- In Feb 2014, 15-year-old Dylan Cardeilhac (juvenile detainee) strangled correctional officer Amanda Baker in the juvenile section of the Scotts Bluff County Detention Center; autopsy: asphyxia by manual strangulation.
- State charged first-degree murder; jury convicted Cardeilhac of second-degree murder after being instructed on first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and unintentional manslaughter.
- At jury-instruction conference, defense objected to an instruction stating jurors "may" separate only if no verdict by 9:00 p.m.; court overruled and gave instruction as part of standard deliberation directions.
- After verdict, a juror submitted an affidavit alleging a juror performed a choking "re-enactment" during deliberations and that she changed her vote thereafter; district court excluded most affidavit content under Neb. Evid. R. 606 and denied a new trial.
- At sentencing, the court heard mitigation including expert testimony on adolescent brain/development and considered age, mentality, background, motivation, violence involved, and imposed 60 years to life (with parole eligibility), consecutive to another robbery sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Cardeilhac) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jury instruction requiring deliberation until 9:00 p.m. | Instruction coerced jurors to decide early and was unduly coercive | Instruction was routine, noncoercive, and jury could request an earlier break | Court: No error — instruction not coercive in context; jurors didn’t request early break and returned verdict at ~7:30 p.m. |
| Juror misconduct based on choking reenactment | Reenactment introduced extraneous prejudicial information and warrants new trial | Reenactment was internal testing of the evidence (not extraneous); affidavit mostly barred by Rule 606 | Court: No misconduct shown; district court did not abuse discretion in denying new trial and in declining evidentiary hearing |
| Whether Rule 606 barred juror affidavit testimony | (implicit) affidavit described deliberation matters but contained possible allegation of extraneous information | Rule 606 precludes juror testimony about deliberative matters except to show extraneous prejudicial information or outside influence | Court: Properly excluded most affidavit; only parts arguably admissible were reviewed and found not to show extraneous information |
| Excessive sentence / Miller v. Alabama application to term-of-years | Miller protections require individualized juvenile sentencing; long term-of-years (60+ years) effectively life and should be vacated/remanded | Cardeilhac was not sentenced to life without parole; court considered juvenile-specific mitigation and Miller factors; parole eligibility preserved | Court: Sentence within statutory limits and sentencing complied with Miller principles; no abuse of discretion — affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (mandatory life-without-parole for juveniles unconstitutional; requires individualized consideration)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (Miller requires states to give juvenile homicide offenders a chance for parole or otherwise provide Miller protections)
- State v. Garza, 185 Neb. 445 (1970) (trial court coercion of deadlocked jury impermissible)
- State v. Floyd, 272 Neb. 898 (2007) (external comments pressuring jurors to reach verdict can be coercive)
- State v. Stricklin, 290 Neb. 542 (2015) (burden and procedure for proving juror misconduct; evidentiary-hearing requirement when showing tends to prove serious misconduct)
- State v. Thomas, 262 Neb. 985 (2002) (interpretation of "extraneous prejudicial information" under Rule 606)
- State v. Mantich, 287 Neb. 320 (2014) (discussion of Miller’s individualized sentencing requirements)
- State v. Ramirez, 287 Neb. 356 (2014) (statutory response to Miller for Class IA felonies; legislative scheme for juvenile homicide sentencing)
- State v. Balisok, 123 Wash. 2d 114 (1994) (juror reenactment testing plausibility not extrinsic evidence)
