State v. Cady, 414 P.3d 974

Background

Victim stayed overnight on Defendant Michael Cady’s couch; Defendant later touched and digitally penetrated her while she gave verbal and nonverbal signals of refusal. Defendant admitted to inserting his fingers into Victim’s vagina in a recorded police interview.
Three separate sexual incidents were alleged: (1) a January incident (over a year earlier) alleged nonconsensual intercourse; (2) the object-rape incident (the subject of conviction) involving digital penetration; and (3) an April incident about five minutes after the object-rape event involving intercourse. Defendant was convicted only of object rape and acquitted of the two rape counts.
Victim testified she said “unh‑unh,” pushed Defendant away, held her pants up, curled into a fetal position, and cried; Defendant testified Victim’s body language was “back and forth” and claimed he thought the encounter was consensual.
The jury heard Defendant’s recorded police interview in which he acknowledged Victim said “unh‑unh,” admitted digital penetration, and said he felt he had “fucked up.”
The trial court convicted on object rape (penetration by a foreign object or body part without consent with requisite sexual intent). Defendant appealed, arguing insufficient evidence of nonconsent and recklessness as to nonconsent, inherent improbability/internal inconsistency of Victim’s testimony, and that jury verdicts were inconsistent.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Cady's Argument	Held
Was there sufficient evidence that Victim did not consent to digital penetration?	Victim’s verbal (“unh‑unh”) and nonverbal cues (pushing, crying, curled body, holding pants) proved lack of consent beyond a reasonable doubt.	Victim’s single verbal refusal plus “vague” body language was insufficient; her testimony was internally inconsistent and inherently improbable.	Held: Sufficient. Jury reasonably credited Victim’s verbal and nonverbal cues; ignoring a verbal “no” can alone support conviction.
Was there sufficient evidence that Defendant acted recklessly as to Victim’s nonconsent (mens rea)?	Defendant’s admissions (he heard “unh‑unh,” described indecisive body language, said he “fucked up,” and admitted penetration) support a finding he consciously disregarded a substantial risk.	Defendant claimed he thought encounter was consensual, encouraged Victim to tell him to go away, and said his remorse related to cheating, not assault.	Held: Sufficient. Jury could reject Cady’s explanations and infer recklessness from his own statements and the facts.
Do inherent improbability or internal inconsistencies in Victim’s testimony require reversal?	N/A (responding to Cady’s attack on credibility).	Trial testimony was allegedly inherently improbable/apparently false or internally inconsistent so no reasonable jury could convict.	Held: Rejected. The record contained corroboration (including Defendant’s admissions); inconsistencies were credibility issues for the jury, not grounds to disregard testimony as inherently impossible or apparently false.
Are the acquittals on two rape counts inconsistent with the object‑rape conviction requiring reversal?	N/A	Acquittals on rape counts showing jury didn’t believe Victim means object‑rape conviction is inconsistent and must be reversed.	Held: No reversal. Verdicts can stand; jury may separately assess each incident and evidence differed across incidents, so no irreconcilable inconsistency.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Bagnes, 2014 UT 4 (describing standard for appellate review of sufficiency challenges)
State v. Robbins, 2009 UT 23 (defining "inherent improbability" and when testimony may be disregarded)
State v. Hammond, 2001 UT 92 (holding that ignoring a victim’s “no” can support a rape conviction)
State v. Barela, 2015 UT 22 (consent is context dependent; jury decides credibility)
State v. Prater, 2017 UT 13 (explaining narrow application of inherent‑improbability doctrine)
State v. Crespo, 2017 UT App 219 (Robbins inapplicable where corroborating circumstantial evidence exists)
State v. Garcia‑Mejia, 2017 UT App 129 (credibility and inconsistencies are for the jury)
State v. LoPrinzi, 2014 UT App 256 (verdict inconsistency standard; sufficiency of evidence controls)
Neff v. Neff, 2011 UT 6 (resolve jury inconsistencies in favor of giving effect to verdict)