State v. Buser
2015 Kan. LEXIS 715
Kan.2015Background
- Defendant (Buser) appealed an Ex Post Facto challenge to retroactive application of the Kansas Offender Registration Act; appeal was argued and taken under advisement by the Kansas Supreme Court.
- Appellate counsel Meryl Carver‑Allmond moved to be relieved of any duty to comply with K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 20‑3301(c)(2), after the statute’s 180‑day decision deadline elapsed; the State did not respond.
- K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 20‑3301(c) (effective July 1, 2014) imposes deadlines: (1) courts must decide within 180 days of submission; (2) if missed, counsel must file a joint request that a decision be entered without further delay; (3) within 30 days the court must issue a decision or notify parties of the decision date, with further procedures involving the chief justice if the court fails to comply.
- Carver‑Allmond argued subsection (c)(2) forces attorneys to seek judicial action that would violate their ethical duty (KRPC 3.1) and intrudes on the judiciary, relying on State ex rel. Morrison v. Sebelius.
- The court analyzed whether the statute (particularly subsections (c)(1)–(3)) impermissibly interferes with judicial decision‑making and thus violates the separation of powers; it assessed two alternative remedies the statute would compel the court to provide.
- Chief Justice Nuss concluded subsections (c)(1), (2), and (3) are unconstitutional under the separation of powers; Carver‑Allmond was relieved of any duty to comply with (c)(2).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 20‑3301(c)(2) violates separation of powers by directing counsel to compel court action | Carver‑Allmond: (c)(2) forces counsel to seek remedies that intrude on judicial function and would require violation of ethical duty to avoid meritless or coercive filings | State: (no response in this matter) but statute aims to expedite decisions and provides judiciary mechanisms to set dates | Held unconstitutional: (c)(2) violates separation of powers; counsel relieved of duty to comply |
| Whether mandatory judicial deadlines (c)(1): 180‑day requirement are an unconstitutional legislative intrusion | Carver‑Allmond: legislatively imposed decision deadlines interfere with core judicial function and risk arbitrary/ rushed rulings | Legislature: deadlines promote prompt decisions and are administratively desirable | Held unconstitutional: setting time for judicial decisions is an essential judicial function and legislative mandate is impermissible |
| Whether the remedy forcing the Court to issue a decision within 30 days of joint request is an unconstitutional compulsion on judicial decision‑making | Carver‑Allmond: the 30‑day compulsion would cause external pressure, risking independence and quality of judgment | Legislature: provides for internal responses and notification; court retains some control | Held unconstitutional: the 30‑day mandatory decision remedy impermissibly interferes with judicial deliberation |
| Whether requiring counsel to trigger a court‑set deadline and publicize a firm decision date (including involving the chief justice) is permissible | Carver‑Allmond: requiring attorneys to be the legislature’s agents to force deadlines violates KRPC duties and judicial independence | Legislature: promotes transparency and accountability in decision timing | Held unconstitutional: attorney‑driven deadlines and publicized forced dates constitute undue legislative pressure and violate separation of powers |
Key Cases Cited
- Coleman v. Newby, 7 Kan. 82 (1871) (Kansas Constitution creates three separate branches)
- State ex rel. Morrison v. Sebelius, 285 Kan. 875 (2008) (legislature cannot compel Attorney General to seek unconstitutional remedy; separation of powers limits legislative direction of attorneys)
- Gannon v. State, 298 Kan. 1107 (2014) (courts have final authority to decide constitutionality of legislation)
- Coate v. Omholt, 203 Mont. 488 (1983) (state supreme court has inherent authority to determine timing of its decisions; statutes imposing deadlines violate separation of powers)
- In re Allcat Claims Serv., L.P., 356 S.W.3d 455 (Tex. 2011) (collecting authorities that hold legislatures may not prescribe time limits for judicial decisionmaking)
- United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (describing the court’s singular power as the power of judgment)
- Chicago, K. & W. R. Co. v. Harris, 42 Kan. 223 (1889) (supreme court must have inherent power to protect its jurisdiction and processes)