State v. Burnett, 427 P.3d 288

In 2011 a then-15-year-old (Victim) disclosed years of sexual abuse by her father, Revere Burnett; the State charged Burnett with multiple counts of aggravated sexual abuse, rape, and sodomy.
Victim described prolonged abuse beginning around age 3–4 through about age 11 and reported later symptoms including conversion disorder, pseudo-seizures, self-harm, hallucinations, and suicidality.
The State called Dr. David Corwin, a psychiatrist and forensic expert who had not examined Victim, to testify about (a) common reasons for delayed disclosure and (b) symptoms more common among sexually abused children and methods he uses to evaluate credibility in custody-dispute contexts.
Corwin testified that many symptoms (e.g., conversion disorder, pseudo-seizures, dissociation, self-harm) are consistent with or more common among sexual-abuse victims; he also stated, repeatedly, that only a "small percentage" of allegations are fabricated and described features he uses to distinguish truthful from false allegations.
Defense theory was fabrication to affect custody; Burnett testified and argued credibility at trial. The jury convicted Burnett on multiple counts related to Victim.
On appeal Burnett argued ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to portions of Corwin’s testimony that bolstered Victim’s credibility; the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial in part.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Burnett)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to expert testimony describing symptoms common to abuse victims (profiling)	Counsel should have objected because such testimony improperly suggested Victim was abused	The symptom-consistent testimony was admissible under Kallin; it aided the jury in assessing evidence	Denied as to this portion: symptom-consistent testimony was admissible; failure to object was not ineffective because objection would have been futile
Whether defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to expert testimony about credibility/statistics (bolstering)	Counsel should have objected because the expert’s statements that only a "small percentage" of allegations are fabricated and his methods for distinguishing true/false allegations improperly bolstered Victim’s credibility and constituted inadmissible statistical/anecdotal evidence	State argues tactical reason: expert testimony also supported defense by acknowledging divorce as a possible non-sexual trauma; counsel may have chosen not to object	Granted as to this portion: expert credibility-statements were inadmissible under Rammel and counsel was ineffective for not objecting; prejudice was shown and a new trial ordered

State v. Kallin, 877 P.2d 138 (Utah 1994) (testimony that symptoms are "consistent with" sexual abuse is generally admissible to assist jury)
State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986) (expert/statistical testimony about witness veracity is inadmissible; unduly prejudicial and invites jurors to rely on apparent science rather than evidence)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two-prong ineffective-assistance test: deficient performance and prejudice)
State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989) (expert testimony impermissibly opining that a witness was telling the truth on a particular occasion is barred)
State v. Wright, 304 P.3d 887 (Utah Ct. App. 2013) (delayed disclosure evidence in child abuse cases is proper context for expert testimony)
State v. Christensen, 387 P.3d 588 (Utah Ct. App. 2016) (expert testimony that victim symptoms were "consistent with" PTSD/abuse permissible when expert did not opine that abuse occurred)