2018 Ohio 3668
Ohio Ct. App.2018Background
- In 2002 a jury convicted Michael Buehner of two murders and one attempted murder based largely on testimony from eyewitnesses Lawone Edwards and Randy Price; Price testified he drove and identified Buehner as the shooter.
- The prosecutor’s discovery responses listed several potential witnesses (including Debbie Anderson, Gail Jenkins, Tierra Edwards, Antoine Edwards) and stated that "no exculpatory material" was in the prosecutor’s possession.
- Defense counsel specifically requested statements from those witnesses before trial, but no statements were produced and the state represented there was nothing to produce.
- In 2014 a public‑records request to the Cleveland Police Department produced police reports not previously disclosed to the prosecutor, including Debbie Anderson’s statement describing three Black suspects and Jenkins’s inconsistent description.
- Buehner filed motions for leave to file a motion for a new trial and for postconviction relief asserting Brady violations and that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the reports within 120 days; the trial court denied leave without a hearing.
- The appellate court reversed and remanded, holding the trial court abused its discretion and must consider Buehner’s motion for a new trial and whether the withheld statements were material under Brady.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Buehner) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying a hearing/leave to file a new‑trial motion based on newly discovered evidence (police reports) | State: Witnesses were disclosed; defense could have interviewed them pretrial; statements were in police possession, not prosecutor’s, so no deliberate suppression | Buehner: The prosecutor represented no exculpatory evidence existed; defense reasonably relied on that and could not have discovered the police reports within 120 days | Held: Court abused discretion; defense showed by clear and convincing evidence it was unavoidably prevented from discovering the reports; remanded to consider new‑trial motion |
| Whether the undisclosed police statements were Brady material (exculpatory/impeaching) | State: No proof prosecutor had the statements; no intentional suppression | Buehner: Statements contained exculpatory/impeaching descriptions (e.g., shooter described as Black), which would undermine identifications at trial | Held: Statements were at least exculpatory/impeaching and the police knowledge is imputed to the state; trial court must assess materiality under Brady on remand |
| Whether the untimely Crim.R. 33 motion was barred because it was filed more than 120 days after verdict | State: Buehner could have sought public records earlier and offered no reason for 12‑year delay | Buehner: Reasonable reliance on prosecutor’s discovery responses saying no exculpatory evidence existed made later public‑records request reasonable; thus he was unavoidably prevented within 120 days | Held: Defense established by clear and convincing proof it was unavoidably prevented; Crim.R. 33(B) leave should have been granted to file late new‑trial motion |
| Whether ineffective assistance (failure to call Anderson) required relief | State: Not separately addressed as dispositive; primary issues were nondisclosure and unavoidable prevention | Buehner: Counsel’s failure to call Anderson (who contradicted ID testimony) was prejudicial | Held: Court did not reach merits of IAC on appeal; remand directs trial court to consider new‑trial motion (which would encompass materiality and related issues) |
Key Cases Cited
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecutor must disclose material exculpatory evidence)
- State v. Wiles, 59 Ohio St.3d 71 (1991) (police knowledge is imputed to the prosecution)
- State v. Johnston, 39 Ohio St.3d 48 (1988) (addressing prosecutorial disclosure duties and related standards)
- State v. Gondor, 112 Ohio St.3d 377 (2006) (standards for postconviction relief and materiality issues)
- State v. Trimble, 30 N.E.3d 222 (2015) (procedural standard: trial court must grant leave if clear and convincing proof of unavoidable prevention is shown)