State v. Bryan A. Santana
162 Idaho 79
| Idaho Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Santana was convicted of DUI, placed on probation; the probation order omitted a checked Fourth Amendment-waiver condition and the judge did not orally impose such a waiver.
- Nearly six weeks later, Santana signed a probation agreement (presented by his PO) that included a Fourth Amendment waiver; he signed without counsel and believed signing was required.
- When signing, Santana admitted recent alcohol and marijuana use; two days later a drug test was positive for marijuana.
- Twelve days after the positive test, a probation officer and police conducted a warrantless, nonconsensual search of Santana’s residence and seized marijuana and paraphernalia.
- Santana moved to suppress; the magistrate granted the motion (finding no valid probation-waiver condition), the district court affirmed on intermediate appeal, and the State appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Santana) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Fourth Amendment waiver in the later-signed probation agreement was a valid condition of probation | The probation order’s requirement to follow probation department rules incorporated the waiver in the probation agreement | The sentencing court did not include or orally impose a waiver; probation order controls and gave no notice | Waiver was not a probation condition: only the sentencing court may set substantive probation terms and Santana had no notice at sentencing |
| Whether Santana consented to the search by signing the probation agreement | Signing the agreement constituted voluntary consent to searches | Santana signed under the belief it was required; no counsel, no advisal of rights; signing was coerced/acquiescence | No valid consent: signature was not voluntary but coerced/acquiescent |
| Whether probation officers had reasonable grounds to conduct a warrantless search despite no waiver/consent | The admission of recent use plus a positive drug test provided reasonable grounds that evidence of violation would be at the residence | The magistrate found the information too remote and lacking indicia that contraband was at the residence | Search was reasonable: ongoing substance use is continuous, information was not stale, officers had reasonable grounds |
| Whether suppression of the seized evidence was proper | Search lawful under reasonable-grounds standard -> evidence admissible | Evidence should be suppressed because no valid waiver and no consent and magistrate found insufficient reasonable grounds | District court’s suppression reversed: search lawful under probation-search reasonable-grounds exception; remanded for further proceedings |
Key Cases Cited
- Franklin v. State, 87 Idaho 291 (1964) (probation order, not agreement, sets probation conditions)
- Ex Parte Medley, 73 Idaho 474 (1953) (oral advisement at sentencing can validate omitted written conditions)
- State v. Mummert, 98 Idaho 452 (1977) (probation agreement may set conditions when presented in court at sentencing)
- State v. McCool, 139 Idaho 804 (2004) (defendant has the right to decline probation if conditions are too onerous)
- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (voluntariness of consent judged from totality of circumstances)
- State v. Kilby, 130 Idaho 747 (1997) (State bears burden to prove consent by preponderance)
- State v. Klingler, 143 Idaho 494 (2006) (probation/parole officer may search on reasonable grounds related to a suspected violation)
- State v. Gomez, 101 Idaho 802 (1980) (staleness of information analyzed by context and nature of suspected conduct)