AC47201
Conn. App. Ct.Jul 28, 2026Background
- Brozynski was convicted after a jury trial of multiple homicide, assault, and DUI offenses arising from a head-on collision while driving the wrong way on Colt Highway. 1
- The collision killed two occupants of the other vehicle and seriously injured the driver and another passenger. 2
- At the hospital, Brozynski’s blood alcohol content tested at 0.18 about one hour after the crash and later at 0.08, and his samples also contained therapeutic levels of zolpidem, oxycodone, and meprobamate. 3
- Brozynski testified that he drank two Bloody Marys, took Ambien, fell asleep, and had no recollection of driving because of alleged sleep driving. 4
- The state’s toxicology expert testified that Brozynski’s BAC at the time of the crash was likely 0.16 to 0.20 and that such a BAC would impair driving. 5
- On appeal, Brozynski argued that prosecutorial impropriety during cross-examination and argument deprived him of a fair trial, but the conviction was affirmed. 6
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did prosecutor violate court rulings during cross-examination? 7 | Brozynski: prosecutor ignored sustained objections and repeated improper questions. | State: rulings were ambiguous or the questions were rephrased properly. | No reversible impropriety; the rulings were unclear or the questions were rephrased. 8 |
| Did prosecutor denigrate defense counsel? 9 | Brozynski: sleep-driving questions implied counsel invented the defense. | State: questions attacked the defense theory, not counsel’s integrity. | No; the comments challenged the defense theory, not counsel. 10 |
| Were closing-argument comments impermissible emotional appeals? 11 | Brozynski: remarks inflamed the jury and invoked sympathy and fear. | State: remarks were evidence-based, common-sense rhetoric, or responsive. | Mostly no; the comments were permissible, fact-based, or common-knowledge argument. 12 |
| Were cross-examination comments based on facts not in evidence? 13 | Brozynski: several remarks referenced facts outside the trial record. | State: most were proper impeachment; one remark was improper but harmless. | Only one remark was improper, and it did not require reversal. 14 |
| Did the single improper remark deny a fair trial? 15 | Brozynski: the remark that he should feel terrible because he killed two people was prejudicial. | State: the remark was isolated and harmless under Williams. | No; under Williams, the lone impropriety did not deprive him of a fair trial. 16 |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Williams, 204 Conn. 523 (Conn. 1987) (sets the due process factors for assessing prosecutorial impropriety 17)
- State v. Antwon B., 236 Conn. App. 428 (Conn. App. 2025) (failure to object is relevant but not fatal; discusses Williams framework 18)
- State v. Dabate, 351 Conn. 428 (Conn. 2025) (trial-court rulings must be unambiguous before a prosecutor is faulted for noncompliance 19)
- State v. Fasanelli, 163 Conn. App. 170 (Conn. App. 2016) (distinguishes attacks on defense counsel from attacks on the defense theory 20)
- State v. Diaz, 348 Conn. 750 (Conn. 2024) (cross-examination may impeach testimony with a good-faith factual predicate 21)
- State v. Devito, 159 Conn. App. 560 (Conn. App. 2015) (appeals to jurors’ common sense are permissible 22)
- State v. Daye, 159 Conn. App. 831 (Conn. App. 2015) (fact-based comments and rhetorical flourishes are permissible if not unduly provocative 23)
- State v. Bothwell, 78 Conn. App. 64 (Conn. App. 2003) (jurors may rely on common knowledge and experience in closing argument 24)
- State v. Tilus, 157 Conn. App. 453 (Conn. App. 2015) (rhetorical device may properly rebut a defense theory 25)
- State v. Patterson, 170 Conn. App. 768 (Conn. App. 2017) (sympathetic references to victims are not improper if they do not distract from the argument 26)
- State v. Santiago, 269 Conn. 726 (Conn. 2004) (absence of curative measures weighs against reversal when no objection is made 27)
- State v. Schiller, 115 Conn. App. 189 (Conn. App. 2009) (courts should not lightly infer a prosecutor intended the most damaging meaning from an ambiguous remark 28)
