State v. Brown
921 N.W.2d 804
| Neb. | 2019Background
- Victim Carlos Alonzo was found dead of a single gunshot wound on May 28, 2016; Rolander L. Brown was charged with murder and related firearm offenses.
- Police obtained cell-site location information (CSLI) for a phone believed used by Brown via a 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) order under the Stored Communications Act (SCA) on May 31, 2016.
- Trial evidence included CSLI placing Brown near the scene, surveillance showing a sedan like Brown’s, and the testimony of Parris Stamps who implicated Brown and later explained his cooperation by reference to being shot in January 2017.
- Brown moved to suppress the CSLI as a Fourth Amendment violation; the district court denied the motion and admitted Stamps’ testimony after limiting instructions.
- A jury convicted Brown of second-degree murder and related offenses; the court imposed lengthy sentences (including consecutive terms). Brown appealed, relying in part on Carpenter v. United States.
Issues
| Issue | Brown's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether CSLI obtained under a § 2703(d) SCA order without a probable-cause warrant violated the Fourth Amendment | CSLI acquisition without a warrant violated Brown’s Fourth Amendment rights (Carpenter controls) | At time of collection, officers reasonably relied on the SCA and controlling precedent (no warrant required) | Court: Fourth Amendment was violated under Carpenter, but exclusionary rule did not apply because officers acted in objectively reasonable reliance on the SCA (Illinois v. Krull rationale) |
| Whether CSLI should be suppressed for failure to meet the SCA § 2703(d) standard | Affidavit did not establish "specific and articulable facts" showing records were relevant and material; suppression warranted | Suppression is not an available remedy under the SCA; statutory remedies are exclusive | Court: Even assuming the SCA showing was deficient, suppression is not an available remedy under the SCA; no suppression warranted |
| Admissibility of Stamps’ testimony about being shot months before trial | Testimony was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial under Neb. Evid. R. 403; should have been excluded | Testimony was relevant to explain Stamps’ subsequent cooperation and credibility; limiting instructions mitigated prejudice | Court: Testimony was relevant to witness credibility and not unfairly prejudicial given limiting instructions; admission not an abuse of discretion |
| Whether Brown’s sentences were excessive | Sentences were excessive and did not adequately account for Brown’s difficult upbringing | Sentencing court considered presentence report, mitigation, criminal history, and violence involved; sentences within statutory limits | Court: Sentences were within statutory limits and the trial court did not abuse its discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (U.S. 2018) (CSLI implicates reasonable expectation of privacy; warrant generally required)
- Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (U.S. 1987) (exclusionary rule does not apply where officers reasonably rely on statute later held unconstitutional)
- Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (U.S. 2011) (exclusionary rule not applied when officers reasonably rely on binding appellate precedent)
- United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (U.S. 1984) (good-faith exception to exclusionary rule for objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant)
- State v. Jenkins, 294 Neb. 684 (Neb. 2016) (prior Nebraska decision holding no reasonable expectation of privacy in CSLI; subsequently superseded by Carpenter)