2018 Ohio 2267
Ohio Ct. App.2018Background
- Appellee Larry E. Brown II was indicted (May 27, 2016) for fifth‑degree felony cocaine possession after officers obtained cocaine from him following a March 15, 2016 overdose for which he received medical assistance.
- The Ohio General Assembly amended R.C. 2925.11 in Sept. 2016 to provide immunity for a “qualified individual” (minor possession) if: (1) the evidence was obtained because the individual sought/needed medical assistance for an overdose; (2) within 30 days after seeking/obtaining medical assistance the individual sought and obtained a screening and received a referral for treatment; and (3) upon request by the prosecutor the individual submits limited documentation verifying the screening/referral.
- Brown moved to dismiss in Jan. 2017, asserting he met the statute: he overdosed March 15, 2016; he re‑engaged with treatment at Pike County Recovery Council on March 29, 2016; and he later entered ongoing treatment (SelfRefind, Aug. 2016).
- At the March 1, 2017 hearing, parties stipulated Brown had an assessment Dec. 15, 2015, and began treatment March 29, 2016; the prosecutor agreed the statute applied retroactively but disputed that Brown obtained screening/referral within 30 days after the overdose.
- The trial court granted the dismissal, finding (1) the statute could apply retroactively, (2) Brown’s March 29 re‑entry into treatment reasonably implied a screening and referral within the 30‑day window, and (3) the prosecutor never requested the documentation required by subsection (iii).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Brown) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether R.C. 2925.11(B)(2)(b) could be applied to conduct that occurred before the statute’s effective date | The amendment is not expressly retroactive and should not apply to overdoses occurring before its effective date | The State expressly conceded at trial the statute applies to Brown’s pre‑effective‑date overdose; any challenge is invited error | Trial court’s retroactive application was permitted; appellate court held State invited any error and overruled this assignment of error |
| Whether Brown sought and obtained a "screening" and received a "referral for treatment" within 30 days after seeking/obtaining medical assistance | Brown did not show a screening/referral within 30 days; the Dec. 15, 2015 assessment predates the overdose and cannot satisfy the statutory timing | Brown’s March 29, 2016 re‑entry into treatment reasonably implies a contemporaneous screening and referral; screening/assessment may be repeated | Court defined "screening" and "referral" using substance‑abuse practice and held it was reasonable to infer PCRC re‑screened/re‑referred Brown on March 29, satisfying the statutory requirement |
| Whether Brown submitted documentation verifying the screening/referral as required by subsection (iii) | No written documentation showing screening/referral within 30 days was produced; therefore statute’s verification requirement unmet | Prosecutor never requested the limited documentation; subsection (iii) requires a prosecutor request before a defendant must submit documentation | Held prosecution never requested verification; Brown had no obligation to submit documentation, so (iii) was satisfied as to procedure |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. D.B., 150 Ohio St.3d 452 (Ohio 2017) (statutory interpretation starts with plain language)
- State ex rel. Kline v. Carroll, 96 Ohio St.3d 404 (Ohio 2002) (invited‑error doctrine bars a party from attacking an error it induced)
- Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116 (Ohio 1997) (plain‑error doctrine generally inapplicable where error was invited)
- State ex rel. Clay v. Cuyahoga Cty. Med. Examiner’s Office, 152 Ohio St.3d 163 (Ohio 2017) (absurd‑result principle of statutory interpretation is a narrow exception to plain meaning)