State v. Brooks, 2020 Ohio 3286

In 1988 Dwayne Brooks was convicted of aggravated murder (with a mass-murder specification), two counts of attempted murder, and aggravated robbery; he was sentenced to life with parole ineligibility until serving 20 years (journal entry omitted the word "full").
Brooks exhausted direct appeal and multiple collateral challenges in the 1990s; prior appellate decisions rejected his postconviction and related motions.
In 2012 Brooks sought correction of a supposed clerical sentencing mistake (absence of the word "full"); the trial court denied relief and this court found those claims barred by res judicata/untimeliness.
In July 2019 Brooks filed a "Motion to Vacate Void Sentence" arguing the omission of "full" made his sentence void and therefore subject to attack at any time; the trial court denied the motion.
On appeal the court considered whether the omission rendered the sentence void (attackable anytime) or merely voidable (subject to direct appeal), and whether res judicata and postconviction timeliness rules precluded relief.
The court applied recent Ohio Supreme Court authority holding most sentencing errors are voidable, concluded the trial court had jurisdiction, and affirmed the denial as barred by res judicata and by the postconviction statutes.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether omission of the word "full" in the sentencing entry renders the sentence void	Omission does not make sentence void; errors of statutory phrasing are subject to normal appellate/postconviction rules	Omission makes sentence void as a matter of law and therefore attackable at any time	Omission, even if contrary to statute, renders the sentence voidable, not void; cannot be collaterally attacked now
Whether res judicata bars Brooks’s claim	Yes — claim could have been raised on direct appeal and is therefore barred	No — a void sentence can be attacked at any time (so res judicata does not apply)	Res judicata bars the claim because the sentence is voidable and the issue could have been raised on direct appeal
Whether Brooks’s motion must be treated as a petition for postconviction relief and is timely	The motion is a postconviction petition, but it is untimely and successive under R.C. 2953.21/23	The motion challenges a void sentence and so is not governed by postconviction timing rules	Motion is a petition for postconviction relief, untimely and successive, and no statutory exception applies
Effect of recent Ohio precedent (Harper) on void-vs-voidable question	Harper reaffirms that many sentencing errors (e.g., postrelease control omissions) are voidable, not void	Brooks relied on older authority treating statutory sentencing errors as void	Court applied Harper’s framework to conclude sentencing error is voidable, not void

State v. Williams, 148 Ohio St.3d 403 (Ohio 2016) (void-sentence principle: a sentence may be attacked when the court lacked jurisdiction)
State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92 (Ohio 2010) (courts may only sentence as authorized by statute; some sentences previously held void)
State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175 (Ohio 1967) (res judicata bars claims that were or could have been raised on direct appeal)
State v. Reynolds, 79 Ohio St.3d 158 (Ohio 1997) (postconviction petition standards and when motions are treated as petitions)
State v. Davis, 119 Ohio St.3d 422 (Ohio 2008) (res judicata in criminal appeals bars matters that could have been raised on direct appeal)
State v. Beasley, 14 Ohio St.3d 74 (Ohio 1984) (sentences contrary to statute are void)
Smith v. Sheldon, 157 Ohio St.3d 1 (Ohio 2019) (common pleas courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over felony cases)