State v. Braswell, 145 Conn. App. 617

Background

In Oct. 2009 Emily Person reported being grabbed and carried toward a Stamford building; she bit the assailant’s finger and later identified Velmon Braswell (known as Danny King). Police responded to 58 Stone Street, observed blood on the exterior door and signs of disturbance, and ultimately found Braswell hiding in attic insulation. He was handcuffed and transported to the station.
Officers collected blood evidence from the exterior door, processed the second-floor area, and a buccal swab from Person and a swab of Braswell’s bloodied left index finger for DNA testing; Person’s DNA was found on the door and on Braswell’s finger.
Braswell was tried and convicted of second-degree kidnapping and interfering with an officer; he appealed, arguing (1) denial of his right to self-representation when he sought to "go pro se" before trial and later during trial, and (2) improper denial of motions to suppress evidence seized from his home and person.
On pretrial record (April 28, 2010) Braswell filed a pro se motion to remove counsel and asserted a desire to represent himself; the trial court denied the request based largely on perceived attorney performance and discovery timing rather than completing the required canvass under Practice Book § 44-3.
At the suppression hearing, officers testified about the blood, the risk of loss of DNA on a fingertip wound, and practical delays in obtaining a warrant; the trial court denied suppression, finding exigent circumstances justified the warrantless collection of the fingertip DNA and that Braswell failed to show a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas allegedly searched.
The appellate court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial because the trial court improperly denied Braswell’s pretrial request to represent himself; it affirmed the denial of the suppression motions (DNA and statements).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Braswell)	Held
Whether the court denied Braswell his Sixth Amendment/right to self-representation by refusing his pretrial pro se request	Court properly managed trial and could deny pro se where defendant was disruptive and uncooperative	Braswell argued he made a timely, clear, unequivocal request to proceed pro se and the court failed to canvass him under Practice Book § 44-3	Reversed: court improperly denied the pretrial pro se request on irrelevant grounds (counsel adequacy/discovery); remanded for new trial because violation is structural
Whether subsequent disruptive behavior justified denying pro se right without canvass	Post-request disruptive conduct can justify denying self-representation	Denial on April 28 (initial request) was improper; later conduct might have been a separate basis but did not excuse failing to canvass at first request	Court must have completed § 44-3 canvass at first clear, unequivocal request; later disruption could justify denial but not retroactively excuse initial procedural error
Whether DNA swab from Braswell’s injured fingertip was admissible absent a warrant/consent	Exigent circumstances existed: risk of loss/destruction of DNA, need for prompt evidence collection, noninvasive procedure; warrant practice would cause impracticable delay	Argued warrantless extraction violated Fourth Amendment and was nonconsensual	Affirmed: exigent-circumstances exception applied; warrantless, noninvasive swab was justified
Whether evidence seized from 58 Stone Street (and statements) should be suppressed for warrantless entry/search	Police had lawful basis to enter/process common areas and observed indicators (blood, disturbance); Braswell had no shown expectation of privacy in areas processed	Argued unlawful entry/search of home and arrest in attic required suppression	Affirmed: Braswell failed to prove a reasonable expectation of privacy in the second-floor/common areas or attic; statements not shown to be custodial/interrogative at suppression stage

Key Cases Cited

State v. Flanagan, 293 Conn. 406 (discusses constitutional right to self-representation and canvass requirements under Practice Book § 44-3)
State v. Jordan, 305 Conn. 1 (self-representation inquiry and that deprivation of the right is structural error)
State v. Jones, 281 Conn. 613 (disruptive conduct may forfeit right to self-representation)
State v. Brown, 256 Conn. 291 (recognition of the inviolability of self-representation right)
Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (defendant may waive counsel if knowing/intelligent)
United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12 (once request for self-representation is unequivocal, court must canvass defendant)
State v. Aviles, 277 Conn. 281 (burden on state to prove exigent circumstances; standard of review)
State v. Owen, 126 Conn. App. 358 (warrantless searches are per se unreasonable except recognized exceptions like exigent circumstances)
State v. Mooney, 218 Conn. 85 (defendant must show reasonable expectation of privacy to invoke Fourth Amendment protections)
State v. Boyd, 57 Conn. App. 176 (relationship to location needed to establish privacy expectation)