State v. Boyce
2021 Ohio 712
Ohio Ct. App.2021Background
- Appellant Ramon Boyce was arrested April 3, 2017 in Columbus for burglary and indicted April 12, 2017; he was also facing separate, serious felony charges in Clark County and was later jailed there.
- Multiple trial dates were continued; Boyce failed to appear for a December 12, 2017 Franklin County trial date and a capias/detainer was issued December 13, 2017.
- Clark County retained custody; Boyce was remanded to ODRC on May 16, 2018 after conviction in Clark County.
- Boyce filed a pro se motion to dismiss for violation of the statutory speedy-trial time (R.C. 2945.71) on October 15, 2018 while he had counsel; counsel signed several speedy-trial waivers later on.
- Jury trial was held April 22, 2019 (Boyce proceeded pro se); he was convicted April 25, 2019 and sentenced to 6 years, consecutive to a 70-year Clark County sentence. He appealed solely on statutory speedy-trial grounds.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validity of pro se motion filed while Boyce was represented | State: pro se filing was a nullity because Boyce had counsel | Boyce: pro se motion should be considered and preserved | Court: pro se motion was considered (counsel participated in hearings and court ruled on motion issues), so argument preserved on appeal |
| Whether delay from Dec 13, 2017 to July 18, 2018 is attributable to Boyce under Bauer (failure to appear) | State: Bauer makes the delay attributable to Boyce because he failed to appear and a warrant issued | Boyce: those days must be counted against the speedy-trial clock | Court: Bauer is distinguishable—Bauer covers defendants at large; here State knew Boyce was in Clark County custody, so those days were not solely attributable to Boyce |
| Whether speedy-trial time tolled because Boyce was unavailable due to other proceedings/confined in Clark County | State: R.C. 2945.72(A) tolls time while accused unavailable for other proceedings and State exercised reasonable diligence (capias/detainer, warrants to convey) | Boyce: State did not exercise reasonable diligence to secure his availability; time should run | Held: issuance of capias/detainer and later warrants constituted reasonable diligence; time tolled while Boyce was confined in Clark County |
| Applicability of prison-specific speedy-trial statute (R.C. 2941.401) after May 16, 2018 and effect of failure to give required notice | State: once imprisoned in ODRC, R.C. 2941.401 governs (180 days); State argues only 63 of 180 days elapsed before trial | Boyce: R.C. 2941.401 was not properly invoked or the 270-day clock already expired | Held: upon remand to ODRC R.C. 2941.401 controlled; Boyce had the burden to give the required written notice and did not—so the 180-day period never began to run in his favor; even under State’s math, timing did not show a statutory violation |
Key Cases Cited
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (U.S. 1972) (articulates constitutional speedy-trial factors; court limited analysis to statutory claims here)
- State v. Bauer, 61 Ohio St.2d 83 (Ohio 1980) (failure-to-appear rule: delay attributable to defendant who was at large)
- State v. Martin, 103 Ohio St.3d 385 (Ohio 2004) (defendant may choose counsel or proceed pro se; rights are distinct and not simultaneously asserted)
- State v. Butcher, 27 Ohio St.3d 28 (Ohio 1986) (once defendant shows statutory time elapsed, State must prove tolling/extension)
- State v. Hairston, 101 Ohio St.3d 308 (Ohio 2004) (R.C. 2941.401 places burden on incarcerated defendant to notify prosecutor and court to trigger the 180-day rule)