State v. Blum, 187 A.3d 566

Background

On Sept. 14, 2015 Blum was arrested in New Hampshire for criminal threatening/domestic violence and released on bail subject to a New Hampshire bail-commissioner-signed Conditions Order prohibiting possession of firearms, dangerous weapons, or ammunition until arraignment.
The Conditions Order warned it could be enforced by courts of any state, exposed Blum to state/federal penalties for violation, and notified him of a right to be heard before a judge on bail issues within 24/48 hours; Blum signed the order.
On Sept. 18, 2015 Blum purchased knives in Kittery, Maine; police stopped him and found multiple knives, leading to charges in Maine.
First grand jury indicted Blum on Count 1 (violation of condition of release) and Count 2 (violation of a protective order, 19-A M.R.S. § 4011(1)). A trial court dismissed Count 2, concluding the New Hampshire bail Conditions Order was not a "similar order issued by a court ... of another state" under § 4011(1)(A).
On appeal the Maine Supreme Judicial Court considered whether the New Hampshire Conditions Order (issued by a bail commissioner) qualifies as a "similar order" to Maine temporary/emergency/interim/final protective orders such that a Maine prosecution under § 4011(1)(A) is permitted, including whether due process was satisfied.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Blum)	Held
Whether the New Hampshire bail Conditions Order is a "similar order issued by a court ... of another state" under 19-A M.R.S. § 4011(1)(A)	The Conditions Order serves the same protective purpose and effects as Maine protective orders and thus is a "similar order" subjecting Blum to § 4011 prosecution	The Conditions Order was issued by a bail commissioner (not a judge) and under a different procedure, so it is not a "similar order" under § 4011(1)(A)	Held: The Conditions Order is a "similar order" issued by a court of another state and § 4011(1)(A) applies; indictment reinstated
Whether the procedures used to issue the Conditions Order satisfied due process required to permit Maine prosecution under § 4011(1)(A)	The order provided notice of restrictions, warning of penalties, and opportunity to be heard—process sufficiently similar to Maine temporary protective orders	Blum argued the processes differ materially and thus do not satisfy due process to criminalize out-of-state violation in Maine	Held: Due process satisfied—order provided notice and meaningful opportunity to be heard; procedures sufficiently similar
Whether an order signed by a bail commissioner qualifies as an order "issued by a court" of another state	State: New Hampshire treats bail-commissioner orders as court orders and the order functions as a temporary protective/criminal protection order	Blum: A bail commissioner is not a judge; the order is not a court-issued protective order for § 4011 purposes	Held: New Hampshire law treats such bail-commissioner orders as court orders; qualifies as issued by a court of another state
Whether "similar order" requires identical procedures or forms to Maine protective orders	State: "Similar" means comparable in purpose/substance; liberal construction mandated by protection statutes supports broad reading	Blum: "Similar" should be read narrowly to require the same statutory procedure as Maine orders	Held: "Similar" interpreted by plain meaning and statutory purpose—does not require identical procedures; narrow reading would conflict with statutory protective aims

Key Cases Cited

State v. Christen, 976 A.2d 980 (Me. 2009) (standard for de novo statutory interpretation)
State v. Dubois Livestock, Inc., 174 A.3d 308 (Me. 2017) (begin with statutory language)
Guardianship of Jones, 164 A.3d 969 (Me. 2017) (due process essence: notice and opportunity to be heard)
In re Randy Scott B., 511 A.2d 450 (Me. 1986) (due process varies with circumstances; "what process is due")
State v. Blier, 162 A.3d 829 (Me. 2017) (probable cause standard for arrest)
Michaud v. Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co., 505 A.2d 786 (Me. 1986) (evaluate opportunity available at time notice received)
State v. Falcone, 760 A.2d 1046 (Me. 2000) (statutory construction must not frustrate protective purpose)
Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587 (U.S. 1961) (rule of lenity applies only after construing statute and resolving ambiguity)
United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482 (U.S. 1997) (lenity applied only when legislative intent remains ambiguous)
State v. Pinkham, 137 A.3d 203 (Me. 2016) (interaction of lenity and strict-construction rules in criminal statutes)
State v. Hederson, 149 A.3d 539 (Me. 2016) (prior case involving similar New Hampshire bail-protection order prosecuted in Maine)