[¶ 1] The State of Maine appeals from a decision of the trial court (Fort Kent, Sou-cy, J.) granting Dale E. Blier’s motion to suppress evidence that resulted in a criminal complaint charging Blier with operating under the influence (Class D), 29-A M.R.S. § 2411(1-A)(A) (2016). The State argues that the court erred in concluding that the officer violated the Fourth Amendment when he ordered Blier to leave his hоuse in order to complete a traffic stop. We agree and vacate the order suppressing the evidence.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶ 2] On June 26, 2015, the State charged Blier by criminal complаint with operating under the influence (OUI) (Class D), 29-A M.R.S. 2411(1-A)(A), to which he pleaded not guilty. Blier moved to suppress some of the evidence against him, arguing that the State had unlawfully seized him without a warrаnt. In September of 2015, the court held a hearing on the motion.
■ [¶ 3] Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the court’s order, the following facts articulated in the court’s order are supported by the evidence presented at the suppression hearing. See State v. Collier,
[¶ 4] Seven months after the hearing, on April 29,' 2016, the court granted Blier’s motion to suppress, concluding that (1) although the officer had a reasonable, ar-ticulable suspicion to make a traffic stop for the defective license plate lights, the officer did nоt have probable cause to suspect any criminal activity, and no exigent circumstances existed when he ordered Blier to exit his house; (2) because Blier would not have believed he was free to disregard the officer’s order to come outside, the verbal order amounted to an unlawful seizure of Blier; and (3) because all evidence оf Blier’s OUI arose after that seizure, it must be suppressed.
[¶ 5] The State moved the court to reconsider and for further findings of fact and conclusions of law. On August 15, 2016, the court denied the motiоn to reconsider and further found that the officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion of a civil traffic violation, sufficient for an investigatory traffic stop but not sufficient to seize Blier across the threshold of his house; that although the officer believed that Blier was refusing to stop for or fleeing from him, that belief was not objectively reasonable, and so there was no probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed; that Blier had not exhibited any furtive behavior; and that the officer’s pursuit of Blier was not a “hot” one based on video evidence that the officer did not leave his car to follow Blier for at least seven seconds. The State timely appealed pursuant to 15 M.R.S. § 2115-A (2016) and M.R. App. P. 21(b).
II. DISCUSSION
[¶ 6] The motion court determined that the officer unlawfully seized Blier across the threshold of his house in what amounted to a de facto arrest beсause the officer did not have probable cause to believe that Blier had engaged in any criminal activity. Because we conclude that the officer had prоbable cause to arrest Blier for refusing to stop for a law enforcement officer, we vacate the suppression order. 29-A M.R.S. § 2414(2) (2016); see also 17-A M.R.S. § 751-B(1)(A) (2016).
[¶ 7] When an appellant challenges a court’s order on a motion to suppress, we review the factual findings of the motion court for clear error and “the application of those facts to cоnstitutional protections ... de novo.” State v. Bailey,
[¶ 8] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects citizens “from unreasonable intrusions of police officers and other government agents,” State v. Dominique,
[¶ 9] “Probable cause exists where facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the officers and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information would warrant a prudent and cаutious person to believe that the arrestee did commit or is committing the felonious offense.” State v. Lagasse,
[¶ 10] Here, viewing the facts as found by the motion court objectively, probable cause to arrest Blier existed because the officer had persоnal knowledge of facts that would lead a prudent and cautious officer to believe that Blier was refusing “to stop [his] motor vehicle on request or signal of a uniformed law еnforcement officer.” 29-A M.R.S. § 2414(2) (defining the Class E crime of “[f]ailure to stop”); 29-A M.R.S. § 2414(1)(B) (defining “[s]ignal” to include “flashing emergency lights”). Blier did not pull over despite being followed by a police cruiser with flashing headlights. Blier also got out of his car and attempted to enter his house notwithstanding the fact that a police cruiser with flashing headlights was parked behind him in the driveway.
[¶ 11] Because the police officer had probable cause to arrest Blier for the Class E crime of failure to stop, and pursued him “immediately] and fairly continuously] from the scene of the crime” into the curtilage of his home, State v. Pease,
The entry is:
Order of suppression vacated. Remanded for further proceedings.
Notes
. Although he intended to engage the blue lights on top of the cruiser when he turned on the wig wag lights, the officer did not engage them until he was in Blier's driveway. The officer did not engage the cruiser's siren at any point.
. The State’s notice of appeal—which indicated that it filed the appeal "in anticipation of the receipt of the Attorney General’s written approval”—did not strictly comply with statutory requirements because it neglected to either include the written approval of the Attorney General or to state "that the Attorney General has orally stated that the approval will be granted." 15 M.R.S. § 2115—A(5) (2016). We urge the State to be more diligent in its compliance with section 2115-A and Maine's Rules of Appellate Procedure. However, we decline to dismiss the appeal because the Attorney General had, in fact, given written approval two days before the filing of the aрpeal and because section 2115-A requires us to liberally construe its provisions. See 15 M.R.S. § 2U5-A(6).
. Article I, section 5 of the Maine Constitution provides the same protections as the Fourth Amendment. State v. Gulick,