State v. Blake, 481 P.3d 521

Background:

In 2016 Shannon Blake was arrested after police found a small bag of methamphetamine in the coin pocket of jeans she was wearing; she testified the jeans were bought secondhand and she did not know the drugs were there.
Blake was tried by the court, asserted the judicially created affirmative defense of "unwitting possession," and was convicted under Washington’s drug possession statute, RCW 69.50.4013 (a strict-liability possession offense).
The Court of Appeals affirmed based on Washington precedent (State v. Cleppe and State v. Bradshaw) holding the statute imposes strict liability and places the burden on defendants to prove unwitting possession.
The Washington Supreme Court granted review and, in a majority opinion, held RCW 69.50.4013(1) violates state and federal due process because it criminalizes wholly innocent, passive nonconduct without any mens rea while attaching severe felony consequences; the Court vacated Blake’s conviction.
The majority concluded statutory avoidance (reading a mens rea into the statute) is no longer possible because of decades of precedent and legislative acquiescence; concurring and dissenting opinions urged narrower statutory interpretation approaches or defended the legislature’s power to create strict-liability offenses.

Issues:

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does RCW 69.50.4013 permissibly impose strict liability for simple possession?	Blake: statute criminalizes innocent, passive, unknowing possession and thus cannot omit mens rea.	State: legislature may define crimes; Cleppe/Bradshaw show possession is strict liability.	Held unconstitutional: statute exceeds police power by punishing wholly innocent nonconduct without mens rea.
Can the judicially created "unwitting possession" affirmative defense save the statute or does it violate due process?	Blake: shifting burden to defendant to prove unwitting possession violates due process.	State: the affirmative defense ameliorates harshness and preserves statute.	Court: defense cannot cure an unconstitutional statute; burden-shift issue irrelevant once statute is invalidated.
May the Court avoid a constitutional ruling by reading an implied mens rea into the statute?	Blake (and concurrence): canon of constitutional avoidance supports reading in mens rea; Cleppe/Bradshaw should be reconsidered.	State: longstanding precedent and legislative acquiescence confirm the statute’s strict-liability reading.	Majority: legislative acquiescence and stare decisis foreclose reading in mens rea here; thus constitutional ruling required. Concurrence: would instead overrule Cleppe/Bradshaw and read in mens rea.
Does criminalizing passive, innocent nonconduct without mens rea violate due process (police power limit)?	Blake: such criminalization offends fundamental due process protections (Lambert/Papachristou/Pullman).	State: legislature has plenary power to create strict-liability crimes; public safety rationales justify drug laws.	Held: applying Lambert/Papachstion/Pullman principles, statute criminalizes solely passive, innocent nonconduct with severe penalties and thus exceeds the State’s police power.

Key Cases Cited

Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957) (criminalizing wholly passive, innocent noncompliance without notice violates due process)
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (ordinances that criminalize ordinarily innocent behavior and vest too much discretion in enforcement are constitutionally invalid)
City of Seattle v. Pullman, 82 Wn.2d 794 (1973) (state law criminalizing passive/nonharmful presence during curfew exceeded police power; due process limit on criminalizing innocent nonconduct)
State v. Cleppe, 96 Wn.2d 373 (1981) (Washington court held possession statute imposes strict liability; created unwitting-possession affirmative defense)
State v. Bradshaw, 152 Wn.2d 528 (2004) (reaffirmed Cleppe’s strict-liability interpretation of possession statute)
State v. Yishmael, 195 Wn.2d 155 (2020) (discusses circumstances in which legislature may create strict-liability offenses; contrasts active conduct offenses with passive nonconduct)
State v. Brown, 389 So.2d 48 (La. 1980) (held a statute making "unknowingly or intentionally" possession unlawful was unconstitutional insofar as it criminalized unknowing possession)