State v. Blackshear, 2019 Ohio 655

Police stopped Bey's truck after a 911 caller reported reckless driving; officers observed a possible lane violation and saw alcohol in the vehicle.
Trooper Doerle smelled a strong odor of alcohol, observed bloodshot/glassy eyes and swaying, ordered Bey out of the vehicle, and arrested him after Bey refused field sobriety tests and later refused a breath test.
Bey was charged with first‑degree misdemeanor OVI (R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a)), a turning violation, and minor marijuana possession; the non‑OVI counts were later acquitted at trial.
Bey repeatedly told the court he intended to represent himself; the trial judge warned him to consider counsel and encouraged hiring one but did not engage in a detailed colloquy about the dangers and disadvantages of self‑representation.
After a bench trial the court convicted Bey of OVI, imposed jail time (mostly suspended), fines, probation, and a one‑year license suspension; Bey appealed and appellate counsel was appointed.
The Sixth District reversed the OVI conviction, holding Bey did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his right to counsel because the court failed to make the required inquiry; the sufficiency/manifest‑weight claim was rendered moot and not addressed.

Issue	State's Argument	Bey's Argument	Held
Whether Bey validly waived the right to counsel by proceeding pro se	Court informed Bey of right to counsel; Bey knowingly elected to proceed pro se	Court failed to explain the dangers/disadvantages or ensure Bey understood consequences, so waiver invalid	Waiver invalid; conviction vacated and remanded for new trial unless counsel is appointed or a proper on‑the‑record colloquy occurs
Whether evidence was sufficient / conviction against manifest weight	Evidence (odor, can in console, officer observations, refusals) supported OVI conviction	Evidence insufficient and against manifest weight	Not reached (moot) because waiver issue required reversal

Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (right to counsel applies when imprisonment is a possible sentence)
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies to states)
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (defendant has the right to represent himself, but must knowingly and intelligently waive counsel)
Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948) (judge must investigate thoroughly before accepting waiver of counsel)
State v. Gibson, 45 Ohio St.2d 366 (1976) (Ohio standard for valid waiver: defendant must understand charges, penalties, defenses, and other essential facts)
Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004) (no fixed script required; colloquy content depends on case‑specific factors)
State v. Johnson, 112 Ohio St.3d 210 (2006) (waiver inquiry depends on defendant’s sophistication and case complexity)
State v. Wellman, 37 Ohio St.2d 162 (1974) (right to counsel triggered when imprisonment is authorized)
State v. Martin, 103 Ohio St.3d 385 (2004) (discusses right to counsel and its correlative right to self‑representation)
State v. Obermiller, 147 Ohio St.3d 175 (2016) (trial court must ensure defendant is aware of dangers and disadvantages of self‑representation)