State v. Bishop (Slip Opinion), 124 N.E.3d 766

Defendant Dustin Bishop, while on postrelease control for a prior felony, pleaded guilty to possession of heroin (a fifth-degree felony); the state dismissed a misdemeanor count.
At the plea hearing the court advised Bishop of the maximum sentence for the heroin charge and explained general postrelease-control consequences but did not tell him that under R.C. 2929.141 the court could terminate his existing postrelease control and impose a consecutive judicial-sanction prison term.
At sentencing the trial court imposed a nine-month term for the heroin offense and a one-year consecutive term under R.C. 2929.141 for the postrelease-control violation.
Bishop appealed, arguing his plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because the court failed to advise him of its authority under R.C. 2929.141 to impose a consecutive sanction; the Second District agreed, vacated the plea, and certified conflict with Fifth and Eighth District decisions.
The Ohio Supreme Court granted review of the certified conflict and held that Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)’s requirement to advise a defendant of the "maximum penalty involved" includes potential consecutive prison time the court may impose under R.C. 2929.141 for committing a new felony while on postrelease control.

Issue	Bishop's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) requires advising a defendant on PRC that the court may terminate PRC and impose a consecutive R.C. 2929.141 prison term when accepting a guilty plea to a new felony	Bishop: Rule requires advising of the "maximum penalty involved," which includes a possible R.C. 2929.141 consecutive sanction; omission rendered plea invalid	State: Advisements only cover maximum for the charged offense(s); Johnson controls and Crim.R. 11 does not require advising about collateral/consequential sanctions or sentencing discretion	Held: Yes — Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) requires advising such that the potential R.C. 2929.141 consecutive term is part of the "maximum penalty involved." Complete failure to so advise requires vacatur of the plea (no prejudice showing required).

State v. Johnson, 40 Ohio St.3d 130 (1988) (discusses Crim.R. 11 advisory scope regarding maximum penalty for charged offenses)
State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176 (2008) (explains strict vs. substantial compliance under Crim.R. 11 and standards for pleas)
State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239 (2008) (plea must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; defines partial vs. complete noncompliance with Crim.R. 11)
State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106 (1990) (prejudice standard for Crim.R. 11 noncompliance analysis)
Woods v. Telb, 89 Ohio St.3d 504 (2000) (explains postrelease control as part of original sentence and statutory framework)
State v. Martello, 97 Ohio St.3d 398 (2002) (postrelease-control sanctions are not separate criminal punishment for double jeopardy purposes)
State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21 (2004) (postrelease-control imposition errors and their effect on sentence validity)
State v. Gordon, 153 Ohio St.3d 601 (2018) (R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(e) does not require trial court to inform offender at initial sentencing of R.C. 2929.141 sanctions)