State v. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d 814

In 2011–2012 high‑school students (including defendant Robert Bishop and victim Dillion Price) exchanged Facebook posts and comments; some posts exposed or discussed allegedly private/sexual material about Price.
Price became distraught; his mother reported the matter to police, who captured screenshots and six students were charged under North Carolina’s cyberbullying statute, N.C.G.S. § 14‑458.1.
Bishop was arrested (9 Feb 2012), convicted in superior court (5 Feb 2014) under § 14‑458.1(a)(1)(d) for posting or encouraging posting of “private, personal, or sexual information pertaining to a minor” with intent to “intimidate or torment.”
On appeal the Court of Appeals upheld the conviction, characterizing the statute as regulating conduct (not speech) and imposing only an incidental burden on expression.
The North Carolina Supreme Court granted discretionary review to decide whether § 14‑458.1(a)(1)(d) violates the First Amendment as applied.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Bishop)	Held
Does § 14‑458.1(a)(1)(d) regulate speech or only nonexpressive conduct?	Statute punishes the act of posting (conduct), not protected speech.	The statute targets posting of information online and therefore restricts speech.	Regulates speech, not merely nonexpressive conduct.
Is the statute content‑based or content‑neutral?	The law serves child‑protection interests and is not aimed at content; any burden is incidental.	The statute defines prohibited speech by subject matter and requires content examination.	Content‑based on its face; strict scrutiny applies.
If content‑based, does it survive strict scrutiny (narrowly tailored to a compelling interest)?	Protecting minors from online bullying is a compelling interest; the statute’s intent and subject‑matter limits suffice.	The statute is overbroad and imprecise (undefined terms like “personal,” “private,” “torment”); it reaches a vast range of protected speech without requiring injury.	Fails strict scrutiny: not narrowly tailored; statute is unconstitutionally overbroad as applied.
Remedy for Bishop’s conviction under § 14‑458.1(a)(1)(d)?	Uphold conviction.	Reverse conviction based on First Amendment violation.	Court reversed the Court of Appeals and held the statute unconstitutional as applied.

Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (conduct can receive First Amendment protection when inherently expressive)
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (First Amendment protections apply fully to the Internet)
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (expressive conduct—wearing message on jacket—is protected speech)
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015) (facially content‑based speech regulations trigger strict scrutiny)
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (overbroad criminal speech restrictions are suspect under the First Amendment)
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (distinctions based on subject matter or viewpoint are unconstitutional)