State v. Biggs
171 A.3d 457
| Conn. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- Defendant Frank Biggs was convicted by a jury of multiple counts arising from an August 27, 2011 theft of deposit bags (larceny in the second degree, conspiracy to commit larceny in the second degree, larceny in the third degree as an accessory, conspiracy to commit larceny in the third degree, and engaging police in pursuit) and pled nolo contendere to persistent offender charges; sentences on all counts produced an effective term of incarceration plus special parole.
- After trial, defense presented a notarized affidavit from Darcy Hudson-Monroe alleging that a juror (A.S.) outside the courthouse told her during the trial that “they have no real hard evidence against him.”
- The trial court conducted a preliminary, on-the-record inquiry: Hudson-Monroe testified; the court found the juror’s comment nonsubstantive, not conveying extrinsic information, and concluded the defendant failed to prove actual prejudice.
- Defense requested an evidentiary hearing and subpoena of the juror; the court declined to call the juror, finding no need for a full hearing under governing precedent.
- On appeal Biggs argued (1) the court violated his right to an impartial jury by failing to apply the Remmer presumption of prejudice and by denying a juror evidentiary hearing, and (2) double jeopardy was violated because he was separately convicted and sentenced on two conspiracy counts arising from a single agreement.
- The appellate court affirmed the juror-misconduct ruling (no abuse of discretion; no Remmer presumption because no external interference or court implication and no extrinsic information) but reversed and vacated the conviction/sentence for conspiracy to commit larceny in the third degree as violating double jeopardy.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Biggs) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial court should have applied Remmer presumption of prejudice after juror’s out‑of‑court comment | No; state argued preliminary inquiry showed comment was nonsubstantive and not prejudicial, so no presumption necessary | Argued court should have presumed prejudice (Remmer) and required state to prove harmlessness or at least hold full evidentiary hearing including juror testimony | Remmer presumption did not apply: no evidence court was implicated or of external interference conveying extrinsic information; defendant bore burden to prove actual prejudice and failed to do so |
| Whether trial court abused discretion by refusing to subpoena juror and hold full evidentiary hearing | Court’s limited inquiry (Hudson‑Monroe testimony) was sufficient; full hearing unnecessary where preliminary inquiry shows no likely prejudice | Argued Brown and Remmer require juror testimony to determine effect and to protect right to impartial jury | No abuse of discretion: trial court reasonably relied on preliminary inquiry, found comments nonsubstantive, and properly declined further evidentiary hearing |
| Whether juror’s remark constituted extrinsic evidence or influence on deliberative process | Comment was opinion-based, not extrinsic fact or tampering; no indication juror obtained outside information | Urged remark could have biased juror and affected deliberations; needed probing of juror’s mental process | Comment was not extrinsic information and did not show interference with deliberations; inquiry limited by law on juror mental processes, and defendant did not move allegation from speculation to fact |
| Whether convictions/sentences on two conspiracy counts violate double jeopardy | State conceded evidence showed a single conspiracy (agreement to steal deposit bags) | Argued multiple punishments for same agreement violated double jeopardy; sought vacatur of one conspiracy conviction | Court held convictions for conspiracies based on single agreement constituted multiple punishments; vacated conviction/sentence for conspiracy to commit larceny in the third degree |
Key Cases Cited
- Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (presumption of prejudice for private communication with juror in some circumstances)
- Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (due process does not require new trial for every potentially compromising juror situation)
- United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (Remmer presumption not automatic; some intrusions require proof of prejudice)
- State v. Brown, 235 Conn. 502 (trial courts must conduct preliminary inquiry into juror misconduct; scope discretionary)
- State v. Berrios, 320 Conn. 265 (Remmer presumption applies to external interference that directly relates to matter being tried)
- State v. Roman, 320 Conn. 400 (defendant must prove actual prejudice if court not implicated)
- State v. Polanco, 308 Conn. 242 (remedy and analysis for multiple conspiracy convictions arising from single agreement)
