State v. Benton, 534 P.3d 724

Background

Benton was charged with aggravated murder and jailed; Layman, a fellow inmate with pending cases, was housed nearby and questioned Benton about the crime.
Layman approached prosecutors and made three proffer meetings (June 16, July 2, July 30, 2015); prosecutors recorded and questioned him and discussed possible benefits for cooperation.
Layman ultimately signed a cooperation agreement (Jan 16, 2016) and testified at trial; the jury convicted Benton on aggravated murder and related counts.
Benton moved to suppress Layman’s testimony, arguing Layman acted as a state agent in questioning Benton and that those statements violated Article I, §11 (right to counsel); the trial court denied the motion.
The Court of Appeals held Layman became a state agent on July 2, 2015 (second proffer) and that statements after that date should have been excluded; the Supreme Court affirmed that holding and reversed convictions on Counts 1, 2, 6, and 7.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Benton)	Held
When does a private citizen become a state agent under Art I, §11?	Require objective signs amounting to authorization; Sines-style common-law agency test (reasonable person would think state authorized elicitation).	Any state conduct reasonably likely to induce informant to gather evidence triggers §11; Layman was an agent from the start.	Use Smith framework informed by Sines: focus on objective manifestations of state involvement; no single metric—ask whether state sufficiently guided/encouraged/supported informant.
Was Layman a state agent when he first questioned Benton or at first proffer (June 16)?	State: No; prosecutors admonished Layman they were not directing him and no deal was made then.	Benton: Yes from the start because of state practice of rewarding informants and Layman’s history.	Not a state agent at initial questioning or after the first proffer; objective conduct at that time showed only state interest, not authorization or encouragement.
Was Layman a state agent after the second proffer (July 2, 2015)?	State: Still not an agent; no explicit direction to continue questioning and lesser involvement than cases like Lowry.	Benton: Yes; second proffer showed negotiations for a benefit, specific prosecutor questions, and lack of discouragement—so agency existed.	Held: Yes. By July 2 the state’s negotiations, specific follow-up questions, implicit topic guidance, and failure to discourage made Layman’s subsequent questioning attributable to the state—§11 protections attached.
Are statements by Benton to Layman after July 2 admissible?	State: Admissible because Layman was not an agent.	Benton: Inadmissible; they were obtained in violation of right to counsel.	Held: Inadmissible; trial court erred in denying suppression for post–July 2 admissions; convictions tied to that evidence were reversed and remanded.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Sines, 359 Or 41 (recognizes use of objective agency manifestations in evaluating private-citizen involvement)
State v. Smith, 310 Or 1 (articulates test whether police were sufficiently involved in initiating, planning, controlling, or supporting an informant)
State v. Lowry, 37 Or App 641 (Court of Appeals case describing when police encouragement converts an informant into a state agent)
State v. Acremant, 338 Or 302 (considers informant motive and lack of police direction in agency analysis)
State v. McNeely, 330 Or 457 (holds informant’s expectation of benefit insufficient without state initiation/control)
State v. Prieto-Rubio, 359 Or 16 (discusses right to counsel protection for pretrial interrogations)
State v. Craigen, 370 Or 696 (explains individual nature and importance of Article I, §11)
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (U.S. Supreme Court precedent referenced on government attribution for private searches)