State v. Benally, 2016 NMSC 010

On June 23, 2011, Gallup police stopped Norman Benally’s vehicle, smelled marijuana, requested consent to search (denied), and impounded and sealed the Escalade at the police impound lot.
A K-9 alerted; officers believed the vehicle contained drugs and possibly money; they secured the vehicle with evidence tape and exclusive police control.
On June 29, 2011, after obtaining a search warrant, officers searched the vehicle and found 586.7 grams of marijuana and $1,295 in currency.
The State filed a criminal complaint and, simultaneously on July 27, 2011, filed a forfeiture complaint seeking the $1,295 (more than 30 days after the vehicle was impounded but within 30 days of the warrant search).
Defendant moved to dismiss the forfeiture complaint as untimely under former NMSA 1978 § 31-27-5(A) (2002), which required the State to file “[w]ithin thirty days of making a seizure” or return the property; the trial court dismissed and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Supreme Court reviewed whether the 30-day period ran from the impoundment/seizure of the vehicle (June 23) or from discovery of the currency/search warrant (June 29) and affirmed the Court of Appeals: impoundment constituted a seizure of the vehicle’s contents.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the State’s 30-day filing period under former § 31-27-5(A) began when officers impounded the vehicle (thereby seizing its contents) or when the currency was discovered by warranted search	The State argued the limitations period should run from discovery of the property or execution of the search warrant (not from impoundment), because “seizure” requires an intentional taking of the specific property for forfeiture and the statute’s other provisions emphasize warrant-based seizures	Benally argued the 30-day period ran from the date the vehicle was seized/impounded (June 23), because impoundment deprived him of possessory interests in the vehicle’s contents and thus constituted a seizure	Court held that ‘‘seizure’’ means interference with possessory interests; impounding and sealing the vehicle on June 23 constituted a seizure of the vehicle and its contents, so the State’s forfeiture complaint was untimely under former § 31-27-5(A)

Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (U.S. 1990) (seizure invades owner’s possessory interest)
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (U.S. 1984) (seizure occurs when there is meaningful interference with possessory interests)
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (U.S. 1983) (seizure can be a brief detention of personal effects; intrusion on possessory interests)
Soldal v. Cook County, Illinois, 506 U.S. 56 (U.S. 1992) (seizure inquiry focuses on effect on possessory interests, not officer intent)
State v. Bomboy, 144 N.M. 151 (N.M. 2008) (seizure aspect protects notions of possession under state and federal constitutions)
State v. Nunez, 129 N.M. 63 (N.M. 2000) (forfeitures disfavored and statutes construed strictly against forfeiture)
Reynoso v. State, 702 P.2d 1222 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) (impoundment is a seizure because it places vehicle into exclusive governmental custody)