State v. Beitel
296 Neb. 781
| Neb. | 2017Background
- Roger and his father Allen were charged with conspiracy to commit felony theft; Allen’s information filed July 1, 2015, Roger’s July 15, 2015.
- Allen’s trial was originally set for October 5; Roger’s for November 2. Allen waived speedy trial at an October hearing and his trial was continued; the court later granted joinder of the cases on November 18.
- At a January 5, 2016 pretrial conference the joint trial was set to begin February 1; Roger’s statutory 6‑month speedy‑trial period (absent exclusions) would expire January 24.
- Roger objected to a February date on speedy‑trial grounds but did not file a motion to sever before January 24; he filed a motion for absolute discharge on January 27 after his speedy period expired.
- The district court held an evidentiary hearing, found the three statutory elements of the codefendant exclusion (joined with a co‑defendant whose time hadn’t run; reasonable delay; good cause for not granting severance) satisfied, excluded 8 days (Jan 24–Feb 1), and denied discharge. Roger appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Beitel) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 29‑1207(4)(e) creates a unitary speedy‑trial clock for joined codefendants | The State argued the codefendant exclusion should be read like the federal rule to apply the latest codefendant’s time to all joined defendants | Beitel argued his speedy‑trial right is personal and should not be extended by a codefendant’s remaining time; the shorter clock should govern | Court held Nebraska’s statute does not create a unitary clock; speedy‑trial right is personal and measured for each defendant separately |
| Whether a defendant must move to sever before his speedy period expires to preserve speedy‑trial rights | State argued failure to seek severance effectively waived speedy relief | Beitel argued he preserved the right by objecting and could file for discharge after time ran | Court held failure to move to sever before expiration waives only the practical remedy of severance (not the substantive speedy‑trial right); defendant may still seek discharge after time expires |
| How to measure excluded delay under § 29‑1207(4)(e) when a joint trial date is set | State contended exclusion could be measured by the later codefendant’s calculation | Beitel argued the measure must start from his own speedy period and compare to the joint trial date | Court held compute each defendant’s 6‑month clock without the exclusion, then exclude the reasonable days between that expiration and the scheduled joint trial |
| Whether the State proved the subsection’s remaining elements (reasonable delay; good cause not to sever) | State maintained the 8‑day delay was reasonable and there was good cause to keep a joint trial | Beitel argued earlier trial dates were available and no substantial reason existed to deny severance | Court held the State met its burden by a preponderance: 8‑day delay was reasonable given scheduling and jury pool concerns, and the record supported good cause for not granting severance |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Alvarez, 189 Neb. 281 (1972) (discusses legislative history of Nebraska speedy‑trial act and ABA Standards)
- Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321 (1986) (federal Speedy Trial Act interpretation regarding codefendant exclusion)
- State v. Betancourt‑Garcia, 295 Neb. 170 (2016) (method for computing six‑month speedy‑trial period)
- State v. Knudtson, 262 Neb. 917 (2001) (State’s burden to bring defendant to trial)
- State v. Kolbjornsen, 295 Neb. 231 (2016) (definition and treatment of good cause in speedy‑trial context)
- State v. Vela‑Montes, 287 Neb. 679 (2014) (statutory construction principles)
- State v. Covey, 290 Neb. 257 (2015) (statutory interpretation standard)